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PLAYING ON WO'R DS: JUDGE RICIIARD A. POSNER'S
APPEidi,ATE OPINIONS, 1981-82 RUMINATIONS ON
SEXY JUDICIAL OPINION S1'YI.,E DURING AN
EXTRAORDINARY ROOKIE SEASON
•
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I. INTRODUCTION

'(Style'' is a sexy, if ambiguous, concept, which, in many_ways, is at
1
the very core ·or American culture. The American media
is obsessed
.
· with matters ofstyle. We learn ·by way ofillustration of such stylistic
concerns as the. following potpourri: the predotninandy black player
uni_on's perception of the 100 percent white owned National Basketball
Association's negotiating committee as harboring "bargaining style" that
2
is "disrespectful and provocative;" whether or not Martha Stewart's
"housewife-cum-multimedia-entrepreneur" ideas and products for
.

'

.

'

.

middle class ''polish and elegance" setves to "construct notions of
3
whiteness and middle · class heterosexual i~entity;';
how Steven
Spielberg's film Saving Private ·Ryan purportedly ."(r]epresent[s]
Hollywood at its high-minded best '[in its promotion .of] the traditional
values ofheroism, virtue and patriotic duty with gripping, cinema-verite4
style battle sequences to make it all seem fresh and up to date·;" the
ostensible "essence" of the "Sinatra style'' as constituting "his ability, in
this world gone increasingly_ stiff, to remain a. symbol of reckless
•

•
0

.

*

'

0

Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B~S. (Economics), University of
Pennsylvania (Wharton School) 1973; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1977. My thanks go to William
Domnarski, Larry Albrecht, and Walter F. Kelly for helpful comments on an earlier draft. My thanks and
appreciation, also, go to my research assistant, Gary Selig, for his excellent insight,judgment and research.
1. The word "style"· can be both a noun and a verb. As a noun, the chief definitions of "styleu
include the following: "a distinctive manner ofexpression (as in writing or speech) (the flowery style of 18th
century prose)"; "a particular manner or techniqU,e by which something is done, created, or performed (a.
classical style of dance)"; "a distinctive ,quality, form, or type- of something (the Greek style of
architecture)"; "a state of being popular., COIJ.EGIATE DICTIONARY 504 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 'ed.,
1Oth ed. 1998). As a verb, the key definitions of "styleu are as follows: "to design, make, or arrange in
accord with the prevailing mode"; "to give a particular style to; "to call or designate by an identifying
term.'' !d.
·
2. Selena Roberts & Mike Wise; Both Sules in N.B.A. Llckuut S~ Rae~ Complicilles T<tlkr, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1998, at AI.
·
·
·
3. Martlu1's Vm9ard, WAU. ST.j., Nov. 20, 1998, at Wl7 (quoting an "e-mail message from a
University ofToronto graduate student proposing that the Model'n Language Association devote a session
in its upcoming annual conference to Martha Stewart" to explore such questions).
4. Stephen Holden, In Summer's Popc017} Season, Appr~cial,ing tht Champagne, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1998,
'
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independence;" features of President Clinton's controversial crisis
management "style" in handling an_ international standoff with Iraq,
which style involved· fund-raising trips, golf outings, and "reacting to
6
events rather than shaping them," and the reported adyice of
Manhattan interior decorating gurus for combining "ease ... w~ile
yearning for elegance" by such stylistic techniques as "learn [ing] from
the scale,. proportio~s and lines of painting and sculpture, from the
7
character of architecture and the wisdom of other cultures-''
Item:
We encounter an entire issue of Civilization
Maga~ine published by. the Library of Congress on "The Style
Around Us,'' with guest editor, Bill Blass picking the 20th century's 50
8
"Most Stylish People. '' .
•

•

•

5. Rick Kogan, W/ult Would Frank Do?, CHI. TRill.; May 17; 1998, § 2, at 3. ''If there was a high
roller -a· bit of ft·eewheeling frolic locked in the heart of everyone, Sinatra had the key." ld. See alro,
Stehan Holden, Frank Sinatra DW at82; Matchkss S!Jlist ofPop, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1998, at AI.
In a series of brilliant conceptual albums, he codified a music~l vocabulary of adult
relationships with which millions identified. The haunting voice heard on a jukebox in the
wee small hours of the morning lamenting the end ofa love affair was the same voice that
jubilantly invited the world to "come fly with me" to exotic realms.~n a never-ending party.
• • • •

•

It was as. a singer that he exerted the strongest cultural influence~ Following his idol Bing
Crosby, who had pioneered the use ofthe microphone, Sinatra transformed popular singing
by infusing lyrics with a pet-sonal, intimate point of view that conveyed a steady current of
• •
erottctsm.
]d.

6. James Bennet, Clinton in a Crisis: A Qyestion tifS!Jk, N.Y. TI.MES, Nov. 20, 1997, at AIO.
7. Julie V. Iovine, With
a Nod anJ a Wink, N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept 18, 1997, at Fl (recommending,
.
.
. .
among :other things, "breaking [the]. rules'' regarding upholstery and bl~nding the textures of "gossamer
curtains and whichwashed blinds, neoclassical wallpaper and [a] rustic washstand,'' iJ. at F9). See also
Michael Pollan, A Room Wtlh Too Much Vuw, HARPERS, Mar. 1997, at 28 ("[w]henevera window looks_out
on the street, it tells a story about the social world we inhabit; when its gaze is .o n the landscape, it usually
. has something to say about our relationship to nature"); Richard L. Berke, Bush Brothers Provide Iiglu ID
Republicans Ajler a Dreary Election, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1998, at A20 (feted as models of "compassionate
conservatism,', the Governors Bush talked about "the style ofgovernance" ofGeorge W. Bush ofTexas and
the "style of-campaigning'' ofJeb Bush of Florida).
8. Bill Blass, Bill Bloss's 50 Mosl S9lish People, CIVIUZATION, AUG./Sept. 1998, at 82. According
to Blass, "[a]ll the people I've selected embody the qualities allure, mov~ment, wit, boldness, presence,.
confidence, and undoubtedly, self-invention that I think sum up that elusive commodity known as.style".
/d. Blass's list of the fifty peo·ple, along with a briefdesca-iption, in alphabetical order is as follows:
Gianni Agnelli (Fiat chairman emeritus); Josephine Baker (entertainer); Nina Griscom
Bakel· (food critic, TV personality); Billy Baldwin (interior designer); Cristobal Balenciaga
(couturier); Duke of Beaufort (aristocrat, huntsman); Constance Bennett (actress); Mark
Birley (English entrepreneur); Evangeline Bruce (Washington hostess); Coco Chanel
(fashion designer); Tina Chow (model); Ina Claire (stage actress); Gary Cooper (actor); Sir
Noel Coward (playwright}; Marlene Dietrich (entertainer, actress); Mica Ertegun (interior
designer); Loul..ou de Ia Falaise (fashion muse); Clark Gable (actor); Hubert de Givenchy
(fashion··designer);. Louise Grunwald (New York socialite); C.Z. Guest (garden guru,
horsewoman); Gloria Guinness (style pet'SOnality); Nicky de Gunzburg (fashion sage);
Ernest Hemingway (writer, sportsman); Anotiska Hempel {hotelier, style arbiter); Audrey
Nan
Hepburn (actress); Carolina Herrera (fashion designer); Sli~ Keith (Amet·ican ideal);
.
,'

.
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Item: Among the hundre·ds qf books-in-print on the Amazon.com
9
webpage with "style'' in the title, we find the following works, chosen

•

•

at random: Alain· Silver's and James Ursini's Tke Noir S~le (1999);
Judith Miller's Tke S~le Sourcebook (1998); Letitia Baldridge's In the
10
. Kennedy Sryle (1998).
Item: A professor of dramatic literature at Vassar College fancies
himself as. a literary style sleuth; the New rork Times described him as
Jf<>ll<>~s:
·

•

•

'•

You are what you write. At least, that's how Donald W. Foster sees
it.
Dr. Foster, who is a professor ofdramatic literature at Vassar College;
made a name for himself in the academic world by persuading many
other scholars that a long and disappointingly bland funeral elegy
came from th~ pen of William ·s hakespeare .
Now he spe~ds his spare moments helping to resqlve crimes.
It all started last year after Dr. Foster wrote an article for New York
magazine identifying Joe Klein, the journalist, as the anonymous
author of ''Primary Colors," the political roman a clef.
Since then, law-enforceinent officials have sought his help, and he has
applied his talents at text analysis to the Unabomb case, the murder
of JonBenet Ramsey and a 1996 double. murder in Windsor,
Connecticut. Usually more ·a t home with songs and sonnets, he is
tips and ransom notes.
poring over extortion letters, pseudonymous
.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has asked
him
to
teach
agents
.
some of his techniques to unmask authors,
.
Those techniques include using a computer to see if the authors oftwo
d~fferent texts favor the same ·uncommon words and phrases. Then
he compares stylistic mannerisms, looking for parallel patterns in
grammar, syntax and sentence structure .. .. and ideas and
11
psychological underpinnings.

•

•

.

.

.

•

•

T
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•
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Kempner (fashion maven); Serena Linley (British royalty by marriage); Carole Lombard
(actress); Mary McFadden (fashion desiger); Kitty Millet•(social personality); Babe Paley
. (VOGUE editor and model); Sidney Poitier (actor); Cole Porter (composer and ly..icist);
Linda Porter (wife of Cole, style icon); Chessy Rayner (Interior designer); Eliza Reed
(fashion professional); Carolyne Roehm (tastemaker); Millicent Roget'S Oewelry designer);
Pauline de Rothschild (fashion designer, writer); Bobby Short (entertainer); Tina Turner
(singer); Valentina (fashion designer); ·Gloria Vanderbilt (writer, entrepreneur); Diana
Vreeland (fashion empress); Reed Vreeland (husband ofDiana); the Duke and Duchess of
Windsor (mythic couple).
ld. at 82, 84.
'
.
9~ Amazon ~com search (January 18, 2000) (6;507 books had the word "style" in the title) •
10. See aLro WILHELM WORRINGER, ABSTRACTION AND EMPATHY: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE
PsYCHOLOGY OF S1YLE (1997); DlNTY W. MOORE, THE ACCIDENTAL B:UDI)HIST: MINDFULNESS,
ENLIGHTENMENT, AND SrrnNG STilL, AMERJCAN STYLE (Main St. Books 1997).
11. Tercy Pristin, FromSonnetstoRansomNo!a, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at Bl. The article also
notes:

•
•

.•

•
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Given the American cultural fascipation with "style," it is, perhaps,
notsurprising that legal schola~ly attention should come .to focus on the
13
style of appellate judicial opinion writing. In this regard~ the most
significant recent intellectual efflorescence on this subject occurred
during the Fall of 1995 when the Universi~ of Chicago Law Review
14
published a special colloquium issue onjudicial opinion writing, with
15
contributions by United States Circuit Courtjudges Patricia M. Wald
16
and Richard A. Posner, and three full-time members of the
17
18
professorate: James Boyd White, Frederick Schauer, and Martha C. ·
19
Nussbautn. Indeed, one ofthe contributors ..·····RichardA. ·P osner.... has
captured considerable n·ational attention and developed a general
reputation for his unique judicial opinion writing style as Chiefjudge of
20
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
•

•

. It is up to Dr. Foster to look fol' idiosyncl'asics making up a distinctive pattern. "One
can make deliberate errors to tty to conceal one's identity," he_said, "but it's ve•y hard to
abandon one's ~ustomary habits." In the case of"Primary Colors,', for-example, Dr~ Foster
found that Anonymous andJoe Klein were both fond ofcompound words, colons and shoat
sentences.
In his criminal work, he also hunts for psychological clues, the aspect of attributional
work that he seems to find most engaging. "The person who is being criticized or is under
suspicion for committing some sort of serious misdeed,, he said, "will on the one hand
'

adopt various strategies_for self-:-Justification and va.rious su:ategies for concealing."
•• •

. • . . "Text analysis is now where DNA analysis was a few years ago, or where
fingerprinting was 50 years ago,'~ he said. "We're realizing that we can ~earn an awful lot
from evidence of this_sort.,•
ltl. at BlO.
'
12. Se~ JujJrtl notes 1·11 and accompanying text.
13. But se.c one contrasting example, Akhil Reed Amar, Conslilutwntll R~dundtmc:ies tlfl.d Clt~rf.{ying
CiltuJ~, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. I, 6, I 0 (1998) (discussing ''stylistic" features of"a good constitution, which [by
its textual language] rna y well feature a certain kind ofgood redundancy rcprcsen ted by val'ious clauses that
are clarity-enhancing and doubt-removing").

14. See Sptcitd Issue: Judicial Opinion Writing, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363·1519 (1995)~ See tllso Wlll.IAM
D-OMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OFTHE.COURT(l996) {examination ofjudicial opinions as ,litcrat-y genre).
15. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rh.ewric l![Resulls and !he Re.Julls tifRireloric: Jutlicial Writings, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1371 (1995) [hereinaftel" Rhetoric]; Patricia M~ Wald,A Repg, w]ur{{e Posner, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1451
(1995) [hereinafter Rep[,J.
16. S~e Richard A. Posner,Jutlges' WritingS9.ks (Ant/Do TlvJMatw?}, 62 U.CHI.L.REV.l421 (1995).
17. Seejames Boyd White, U'?lat'sAn OjJinion For?, 62U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995).
18. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. LA\V REV. 1455 (1995).
19. See Martha C. Nussbaum, PoeLr as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric tlfld .l k li16trry lmogintllion, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1477 (1995).
20. Richard A. Posner is an outstanding and prolific intellect by any measure. As ofj unc 1999,
Posner had authored or co-authored an assortment of books including th~ following: THE ECONOMICS
OFjUSTICE (1981 ); THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); THE ECONOMIC STRUC.TURE
OF TORT LAW (1987) (co-authot·ed with William M. Landes); LAW
AND lJTERATURE:
A
.
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION ( 1988); THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE (1990); CARDOZO: A STUDY
IN REPUTATION (1990); THE ESSEN11AL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LEITERS, SPEECHES,
jUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OUVER WENDELLHOLMES,JR. (Richard A. Posner ed.,
•

•
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1992); ECONOMICANALYSiSOFLAW(4th
ed.
l992);
SEXANDREASON(l992}.
.
.
As ofjune, 1999 Posne .. had authored or co-authored hundreds of"articles, essays and reviews
on topics ranging from antitrust to aging; healthcare to homophobia, literature to sex." .Alexander Wohl, .
Pa]ler Trailbltu;er, 83 A.B.A.J. 68 (April 1997). A sample of Posner's less.. than .. book·length intellectual
expression in law journals and other publications is as follows: A Statirtical Stut!J Antitrust Enfwcement, 13
J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970); A Theory f![Negligence, lJ. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); The Social Costs q[Monopo!J and
Regulation, 83J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); MarketPowerinAntilmst Cas&r(with William M. Landes), 94 HA~V.
L. REV. 937 (1981}; Economics, Politics, and 1M Reading l!{Silltules and lk Constitution,
49·U.
CHI.
L.
REv.
263
.
(1982); An Economic Theory of/Ju. Crimintd TAW., 85 COLUMB. L. REv. 1193 (1985); 7k Summary Jury Trial tmd
Other Metlwdr . ofAllernative Dispuu R&rolutwn: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. . REV. 366 (1986);
ugislalion llntl Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L .. REV~ 431 (1989); Borkand Beellwven, 42 STAN. L~ REV.
• 1365 (1990).
.. .
Judge Posner has captured attention from othet· scholars who have. devoted considerable words
to respond usually quite critically to his multitudinous ideas. See, e.g., David Luban, The Posner Variations
(27 Variations on a 17zemebyHolmes), 48 STAN. L. REv.l001 (1996); Robin Paul Malloy,lnviribkHand orSleighl.
ofHand? Ailllin Smith, Richard Posner and the PhilosoplrJ q[Lnw and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 209 (1988);
David Campbell & Sol Picciouo, E.\fJ/oring the Interaction Between lmo and Economics: Th limits·ofFormalism,
•
18 LEGAL STUDIES, 249, 255 (1998) ("By dispensing with ... mathematics, Posner has widened the appeal
of the economistic gospel, but in doing so h-e has also removed the inherent check which mathematical
modelling places on the miracles that that gospel can claim to have worked;").
Posner has also received lavish attention from the legal media. See, e.g., Musings ofa "MonkP:J JtV'Uh
ll Brain," NAT'L. L.J. A26 (June 17, 1996); Jeffrey Cole, EconomicJ· of llJW: An InlmMw. wilh]udge Posner, 22
Litig. 23 (1995).
Practicing lawyers, too, have had a lot to say about Posner-the:Judge. See, e.g., Chicago Council
of Lawyers, Evtzlumion l!fthe Uniutl Seaus Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 793
(1994). Indeed, extended exuacts of this Bar critique are worthy of extensive quotation by way of
background to this Article. Impo1·tant comments, in this regard, include the following:
Richard Posner .•. is a 1962 graduate ofHatvard Law School, where he was president
of the ~arvaad Law Review. After clerk.ng for Supreme CourtJustice William Brennan ....
Posner spent two years as an assistant to a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission
and another two years as an assistant to Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall. He spent
a year at Stanford teaching law before moving to the University of Chicago in 1968, where
he was a law professor until 1981. During his tenure at the University of Chicago, Judge
Posner became known as a leading exponent of the "law and economics school." ... In
addition to his scholarly activities, he is the co·founder of a highly successful company,
Lexecon, Inc., which provides expert witness services to companies and litigants in antitrust
matters. President Reagan appointed judge Posner to the Seventh Circuit in 1981, and he
became Chiefjudge in September 1993. He continues to teach at the University ofChicago
and he remains a prolific writer and lecturer.
·

t

w

4

•

•

•

•

~

'

.... . .
· Chiefjudge Posner is unquestionably one of the
most influential legal thinkei~s in the
•
country.· He is a man of high personal integrity; Chiefjudge Posner is also a controversial
'
judge. The Council believes the controversy centers primarily around five characteristics
of his decision-making. The. first is his use of economic theory in dedsionmaking [sic],
especially concerning traditionally no~economic issues. The second source ofcontroversy
is the report by lawyers that he tends to give short shrift to the facts. His opinions are often
attacked by lawyers who feel that he did not take important facts into account, that he
ignored facts which Would have changed the result had they been acknowledged, or that he
simply did not care that much about the actual facts before him. The third criticism is that
Chiefjudge Posner often looks for ways to modify or overturn settled precedent when he
does not care for the outcome that precedent might dictate. Fourth, the Council believes
that Chiefjudge Posner's opinions could be better structured and that his digressions into
dicta should be severely restricted. Fifth, the Council believes that Chiefjudge Posnet must
•

•
•

•
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The threefold purpose ofthis Articl~ and related plan of inquiry, is:
First, to identify and synthesize the different theoretical views on the
meaning and types of appellate judicial opinion writing style emanating
from the aforementioned contributors to the University of Chicago Law
21
Review special issue on judicial opinion writing; second, to amplify
these extant views (hereinafter ''Chicago Law Review Colloquium
Views") by identifying and_grounding other theoretical characteristics
22
of appellate judici~l opinion writing style, paying particular attention
to the thoughts of a 1996 book on the subject by.William Domnarski
23
entitled In the. Opinion ofthe Court; and third, to apply these theoretical
insights to a selective sample of the published judicial opinions written
by Judge Richard A. Posner during 1981-82 his "rookie~' season on
24
the federal appellate bench. It is my plan to build on the insights
.gained-in this study byp~blishingfuture articles that will exa:mineJudge
Posner's evolution ofhisjudicial appellate opinion writing style over the
25
course of his judicial career.
·_
•

II. A SYNTHESIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
COLLOQUIUM VIEWS ONjUDICIAL OPINION STYLE
•

A. The Judges, Accounts

•

l .. Judge Wald's View

•

•

According toJudge Wald,judges write opinions for seven reasons: (1)
to legitimate their authority to say what the law requires litigants to doi
(2) to demonstrate consistent and equal application of law to different
citizens; (3) the force of tradition; (4) to reveal their intellectual thought
processes; (5) to politically rationalize their decisions; (6) for personal
· gratification; and (7) .to attract attention "in hopes of promotion to
2
higher judicial office. '; fi According to her, '~ [t] he symbiotic relationship

•

•

•

follow the spirit as weil as the letteroffSeventh] Circuit R.ule 38 and not continue to impose
de facto sanctions in the forrn of scathing language about the purported inadequacy of
attorney performance without notice and a chance to be heard.
/d. at 793, 811-12. Su also in.fra notes '172-77 and accompanying text.
2'1. See-Judicial Opinion Writing, supra note 14; in.fra notes 26-113 and accompanying text.
22. See infta notes 114-71 and accompanying text.
•
23. DOMNARSKI, supra note 14.
24. See infta notes 172-407 and accompanying text.
.
25. For example, the-tentative title of my next Posnerian style study is as follows: The Insighiful
Contrarian: Tlu Dissenting and Concurring Opinions tif]udge Ri&kord A. PoSM, 1981-2000.
26. Wald, Rhetoric, s11pra note 15, at 13 72.
•

•

•

•

•

•

·'

•

'

'

'

'
'
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•

between judicial style and substance must be appraiseq against all .these
institutional and personal reasons why judges write, but.the quests for
credibility and consistency, t:Wo goals· not always in harmony, are the
27
most critical. "
A particularly valuable insight ofJudge Wald regarding appellate
judicial writing style is the recent development "[d]ue to the pressure
28
of accelerating caseloads" at the federal ·level
for individu~ federal
circuit judges to exercise their own idiosyncratic approach in deciding
whether to write full-blown, publishable opinions for the court or to use .
29
"no-opinion dispositions" . defined as either no written opinion at all
or, ifwritten, unpublished in the official court reporters. In W aid's view,
30
such "a double-track system allows ·for deviousness and abuse," the
fallout of a kind of"non-writing" and "non-reasoning~' style of appellate
judicial opinions - "two different modes of decision making" that W aid
31
differentiates as "rhetorical" and "non-rhetorical. " As persuasively
explained by Judge Wald:
.

There is indeed a worrisome "lost horizon" aspect to no-opinion
dispositions. Even when judges agree on a proposed result after
reading briefs and hearing argument, the true test comes when the
writing judge reasons it out on paper (or on computer). That process,
more than the vote at conference or the courtroom dialogue, puts the
writer on the line, reminds her with each tap of the key that she will
be held responsible for the logic and persuasiveness of the reasoning
and its implications for the larger body of circuit or national law.
Most judges feel that responsibility keenly; they literally agonize over
their published opinions, which sometimes.take weeks or even month~
to bring to term. It is not so unusual to modulate, transfer, or even
switch an originally intended rationale or result in midstream .b ecause
"it just won't write." ~ut writing to explain a preordained result with
no concern for its precedential effe~t under a self-imposed time
constrai~t of hours is something else entirely, inviting no backward
looks or self-doubt. Rhetoric will always be tied to import and
permanence, and its absence in unpublished decisions signifies that

•

•

•

•

•

•

27. /d. at 1373.
28. /d.
29. /d. at 1374.

•

•

30. ld. Wald reports as follows about her recent experience as a Federal Circuit judge, during the
1990s:
I have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decision incorporating an
agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time·consuming public debate about what law
controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go along with a result they do not like
so long as it is not eleva ted to a precedent. We do occasionally sweep troublesome issues
under the rug, although most will not stay put for long. But what is the alternative?
ltL

31. /d. at 1376.

•

f

•

•
•

•

•
•

•

•

•
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they .are the product of a different and. much-abb~eviated decision.32
making process.

Wald identifies three "[i]institutional constraints in the judging
33
p~ocess" that put a practical limit on an individual appellate judge's
preference for written opinion styles that would reflect that judge's
34
unalloyed vision of comprehensive rationality and justice. First, the
reality. that the drafting of majority opinions is a delicate political and
human relations undertaking, precludes the exercise of pure stylistic
preference. by a judge in choosing relevant rationales, rhetoric, issues;
legal doctrines, precedents, authorities, and even linguistic flourishes like
35
literary allusion or humor. Second, the writing judge is affected by
•

32. Id. at 1374-75. Wald's important stylistic insight can be usefully compared to e-mail
communications over the compute.r Internet in recent years. Arguably, people composing e-mail messages
compose them with less thought and meticulousness than they would compose written correspondence sent
by "snail mail, because ofpsychologically-perceived ephemeral nature and relative lack ofimport ofe-mail.
Judge Wald sees a real danger for "oveaworkedjudges [to) be seduced too easily into preferring
the easier, nonrhetorical route, especially in dose cases." /d. at 1376. Moreover, she opines that:
·
More and more issues are being decided without opinion, almost in arbitral fashion
(arbitrators need give no reasons, just bottom lines). Possible alternatives, such as per
curiams shqrt on rhetoric but nonet~eless of precedential value and a·equit'ing minimally
responsible rationales. have been largely bypassed. There ought; in my view, to be
periodic overviews of which kinds of cases get sent down one track rather than another.
•
Danger signals include the presence of obviously difficult issues or the predominance of
certain kinds of cases (for example § 1983 prisoner cases) on one track, inconsistencies
between published and unpublished results and rationales, and widely differing rates . of
published an~ unpublished opinions among different judges.
/d.
Fo1· Wald,
The law is coming to be defined by the issues and situations the judges (subjectively) decide
to write about, not as in the old common law by the accretion of all the results in all the
situations actually presented to the judges. If that fault becomes too wide, the ground on
which judicial legitimacy rests can be disastrously shaken.
/d. at 13 76.;.77.
33. /d.atl377.
, .34. In attractive and compelling prose, judge Walq explains this theoretical, unalloyed vision as
follows:
·
If judges' druthers prevailed, opinion writing "'ould go like this: read briefs, listen to
argument, confer with colleagues, do research, organize thoughts and material, begin
writing-with a tentative tilt but not a perrnanent fix toward a particular result. At each
step the judge would rccanvass her building blocks to make sure they were solid i_n their own
right and locked together in a systematic design. She would go where the facts, logic, and
th~t sense of ultimate rightness call it conscience, moral compass, or asJ US,tice Holmes did,
his "can~t helps" took her. And like a gifted novelist, she would let the characters and the
plot take on a life oftheir own, drawing her along toward one irresistible conclusion.
A Platonic guardian, or perhaps a single Chancellor in Equity, might so dispense justice;
a modern-day appellate judge cannot.
·
Id.
35. See id. at 1377-79. Interestingly, Wald notes, in this regard~ that "[r]hetoric is the hostage of
judicial politics ... (and] minority judges must find their rhetotic~l outlet mainly in dissents., /d. at 1380.
'

,·

'

'

•

'

"

•
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personal relationships on the court in choosing the style of an opinion;
sometimes soothing or humorous words· are used when describing the
past work-product of a respected colleague or ideological ally; other
times ~aus tic prose is used to debunk the views of a disfavored colleague
36
or doctrinal foe. Third, the pressures of docket volume coupled with
•

•

human nature lead to stale, ''frozen," and "boilerpl~te" modes ofwritten
37
.
expression that tend to turn up in an appellate judge's opinions.
In concluding her thought provoking article,Judge Wald discusses a
grab-bag of idiosyncratic opinion writing styles that va~ous appellate
judges have adopted to reflect their own personalities. 'rhe following
examples, drawn from her account, are illustrative: the psychologicallyexpansiveJudgeJerome Frank of the Second Circuit who was wont to

make "excursions into other disciplines for insights on legal problems.
and the sharing of odd and interesting tidbits_of infortnation along with
38
spur-of-the-moment witticisms and literary allusions," the caustic and
combative Justice Scalia who '(uses con·ceptual phrases sarcastically,
always set out in capital letters .. ~ Oike] 'Powers that Be; and 'Land of the
39
Free,"' the resort by some judges to -"m.akeplays on words,_ or engage
in double entendres, or sprinkle movie titles throughout their opinions,
40
[in] a game of hide-and-see~ l with] the playful reader. "
·
·
•

•

;

In ·contradistinction, howevea•,Judge Wald points out that the crafty, strategic appellate·writer
can subtly "'fram[e] the case, by what may be called the style of "spin" by selectively and judiciously
'~'finding' the facts," id. at 1386 (original capitalization omitted); "setting the standard of review," id. at
1391 (original capitalization omitted); "controlling the principles,'' id. at 1394 (original capitalization
omitted); ''labeling the product" as ~ "narrow or broad;, holding, id. at 1398..99 (original capitalization
omitted); "parsing precedent'' by expanding or contracting it, bypassing it, contrasting it, downsizing it,
or discrediting it, id. at 1399 (original capitalization omittd); "defending dietan by selective analysis of the
implications of the cited authoritie~, id..at 1408 (origi~al capitalization omitted); and setting the tone ofthe
opinion (cautious, expansive, confident, etc.), see id. at 1412-15.
36. See id. at 1380-85. According to Wald, "[r]egular dissenters such a5Justice Scalia are particularly
prone to [use] stylish stabs." ld. at 1383. Moreover, "thejudge's [usually symbiotic] relationship to his law
clerk(s)" typically results in most appellate judges incorporating "nice phrase(s]" and other stylistic
enhancements to a written opinion. It!. at 1383, 1385.
37. ld. at 1385.
38. ld. at 1415. Wald noted, following her description of her former boss,JudgeJerome Fran~,
''D.] ike Hemingway, other judges write to the bone,·abhorring descriptive adjectives; still others delight in
injecting exotic language in their opinions., calculated
to send readers, including other judges, scurtying to
.
the dictionary. We write what we are, and perhaps, more than others, judges are what they write!' /d.
39. ld. at 1416.
40. !d. Another "recent development in judicial style," identified by Judge Wald., is "the trend
toward 'natural language' in judicial opinions as opposed to hypertechnicallegalistic prose." /d. at 1417.
She contends that this development is salutary "because it helps avoid pitfalls in judicial thinking/' /d.
•

.

-

•
•

•

•

•
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2. ,Judge Posner's View ·
_Citing and drawing upon his extensive scholarly interest in judges'
41
writing styles, Judge Posner starts his article in the Universi~ of Chicago
lAw Review Colloquium by "trying to explain the elusive concept of
'style':and to distinguish it from related concepts," including the concept
•

42

of "rhetoric." In this regard, Posner provides an insightful working
definition of writing style, in general, as: .
•

[TJhe specific written form in which :a ·writer encodes an ·idea, a
"message," that he wants to put across. His tools of communication
are, of course, linguistic. But they include not only vocabulary and
·grammar but also the often tacit principles,goveming the length and
complexity ofsentences, the organization ofsentences into larger units
such as paragraphs, and the level of formality at which to pitch the
writing. These tools are used not just to communicate-an idea but
also to establish a .mood or perhaps a sense of the writer's
43
personality.
·
•

.

·Posner continues his analysis by observing that ''rhetoric" is broader
than "style" since the former involves "a process of reasoning as well as
44
the medium of verbal expression," yet, he also p·oints out that
'"rhetoric' is narrower than 'style,' because-its focus is on persuasion and
45
that is only one function of.expression." For Posner, ''style is what is
46
left out by paraphrase".
"the range of options for encoding the
7
paraphrasable content of a writing."~ A truly remarkable judicial
writing style is "portabl [e]," a~cording to ·Posner; since it may transcend
48
a particular legal issue discussed in the judicial opinion.
"The
sparkling, vivid, memorable opinion is not so chained to the immediate
.

•

.

•

•
•
•

•

•

41. Posner, supr':' note 16, at 1421, n.l (citing some of his prior writings on judicial writing style:
THEFEOERALCOURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM, 1-07-15, 2~0-36(1985); Goodbyem~Bhuhook, 53 U. CHL
L. REV. 1343 (1986); LAW AND LITERATURE: A M -ISUNDERSTOOD RELATION, 281-299 (19,88);
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN R£PUTATION, 33-5 7, 125-43 (1990)).
42. Jd. at 1421.
43. /d. a·t 1422.
44. Id.
45. /d. Posner offers the following explanation for this distinction:
A judge might crack a joke in an opinion merely to amuse, or to show ofT, or to grip the·
reader's attention and thus make the opinion more likely to be remembered. The joke
would affect the style of the opinion but it might not be intended to induce agreement with
the outcome -though then again it might, by making the reader more receptive, as with the
conventional speaker's opening joke.
·
/d.
46. Id. Q.nternal quotation marks omitted).
47. /d. at 1423.
48. Jd. at 1424.
'

•

·.
••

.

.
·.

•

i
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context of its creation. It can be pulled au~ and made exemplary of
49
law's abiding concerns. ''
.
.
The s.e cond key contribution of Posn~r's article is to define and
differentiate between what he refers to as ''the pure and the impure
50
judicial style [s]. '' Essentially, Posrier sees this dichotomy as a matter
of ''tone'': he notes that "[t]one depe·nds on many things, notably
though not only the choice of words and phrases anq the decision to
51
e~brace or avoid contractions,··colioqui~isms, humor, arid jargon.·"
Moreover, according to Posner, " [t] one is .also s~aped by the length .a nd
52
structure of sentences," as well as the use of headings, subheadings, ·o r
footnotes in a judicial opinion (which tend to raise the tone), ·"technical
terms and acro~yms" (which tend to raise the tone),. "candor, 'straight
talking,' and spontaneity" (which tend to lower the tone), among other
53
ways of writing. · Posner, however, perceives a problem with the
negative connotation of"low" tone in judicial opinions since, py way of
an example, 'judges such as Holmes who have used .. .~ the 'low' style.
:a re by and large the judges who were intimate with high culture, fussy
about their style, aristocrats of writing and thought, judicial
54
Coriolanuses even.u
Accorqingly, Posner substitutes what he
.

·

.

characterizes as "a parall~l contrast'' the distinction between "pure"'
55
and '~impure" literary styles
first proposed in an essay by the poet
•
•

49. ld. at 1425.
· 50. ld. at 1426 (capitalization omitted).
51. Id. Posner describes his definition of'~argon" as follows:
I do not mean the names oflegal doctrines, which could hardly be dispensed with in judicial
opinions. I mean turns of phrase characteristic of legal writing but avoided in good
writing such words or phrase~ as ''absent" (when used as a preposition), "implicate'; (to
· mean relate to or invoke, as in ''the due. process ,clause implicates privacy concerns"),
"ambit/' ''chilling effect, (to describe the affect of the regulation of speech on the
marketplace of ideas and opinions) ... ''instant" {for present, as in "the instant ca~e"),
"facially''- (to mean "on its face"), "impeach" (to mean "contradict") ... '" mandate'' (as a
verb meaning to order or to require), "prong" (to describe one el·ement of a multifactor test
or-standard), and '" progenf' (cases that follow or derive from an earlier case are the earlier
case's "progeny"). These usages are eminently avoidable. If they were not, they would not
mark a.style; styles are optionaL

•

•

'

•

•

/d.
52~

ld. at 1427. Posner amplifies this observation by noting:
Suppression of ornamentation and parentheticals, simplicity and brevity, .and short
•
sentences and sentence fragments all tend, generally, to "lower" the toile of a writing, to
make it more like speech. But the qualification implicit in "generally" is important. The
•
elimination ofall ol'namentation may impart an, impersonal, bureaucratic, and he11ce fonnal
Lone to ,a writing) while an excess.of brevity may lend it an oracular, dogmatic, imperative,
and thus, again, a formal tone .

/d.

•

•

;

•

53. ld.
54. ld. at 1428.
55. Itl

•

•

· ·

..

•
•
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..
to judicial op1n1on

56

Robert Penn Warren, and applies it
According to Posner, "pu~e- style" judicial opinions:

•

[Vot 68

.
.
wnt1ng.

tend to be long for what they have to say, solemn, highly polished and
artifactual far removed from the tone of conversation impersonal
... and predictable in the sense of conforming closely to professional
expectations about the structure and style of a judicial opinion. If we
had a judicial laureate, that is how he or she. would write. The
standard "pure" opinion uses technical legal terms without translation
into everyday Englis-h, quotes heavily from previousjudicial.opinions,
includes much detail concerning names, times, an·d places, complies
scrupulously with whatever are the current conventions of citation
form, avoids any note of levity, conceals the author's personality,
prefers familiar and ready-made formulations to novelties; and b.ows
to the current norms of"political correctness" (corresponding to the
euphemisms for which the Victorians became notorious) at whatever
.

•

'

•

56. See id. at n.ll (citing ROBERT PENN WARREN, Pure and lmpur~ Poetry, in S~LECTED ESSAYS 3
(1958)). Posner summarizes the application ofWarrcn's literary dichotomy to various figures in the history
or literature;Warren was writing at a time when the most celebrated modern poets, such as Yeats
and Eliot, were in self-conscious revolt against the c~aracteristic style of much nineteenthcentury Romantic, and particularly, Victorian poetry. Te.nnyson•s poetry, for example, is
very refined, like Victorian culture generally "correct,U smooth, polished, sonorous, and
proper. He was, after all, .the poet laurea.te of Victoria's England. "Pure, poetry as
exemplified by Tennyson avoids ''low" subjects and diction; upholds conventional values,
expresses conventional emotions, is self-consciously "poetic'• and "elevated!' As a corollary
of all these things, it lacks a ~ertain tang and texture, as well as .conversational immediacy.
As Warren puts it, '•(.T]he pure poem tries to be pure by excluding, more or less rigidly,
certain elements which might qualify or contradict its original impulse. In other words, the
pure poems want to be, and desperately, all ora piece/'
Tennyson was a vety gre'lt poet, but it is possible also to enjoy, or even to prefer, a
"rougher," sometimes even bawdy, sometimes startlingly direct, freer•fo•·m poetic style, one
that is more concrete, more personal,franker, wittier, more intellectual and that has a wider
emotional register and range of subject matter and employs a more varied diction, one.
closer to that of everyday life (to prose, even).
It is the style ofShakespeare, of Donne, and the other "metaphysical" poets, ofByron,
and among modern poets ofT.S~ Eliot ... Wallace Stevens, Yeats (after 1910 or so), and
Auden, to name a few. Warren speaks of"resistallces," of"the tension between the rhythm
of the poem and the rhythm of speech ... ; between the formality of the rhythm and the
informality of the language; between the pat·ticular and the general, the concrete and the
·
abstract; ..• between the beautiful and the ugly; between ideas.., Other "New Critics"
speak of irony, paradox, complexity, polysomy, ambiguity.
· No one ... considers Shakespeare, and few consider even Eliot, inredor to Tennyson.
They are merely different. And it is a difference echoed in judicial opinions. Most judicial
opinions are carefully drafted to emphasize the difference between their diction and that of
ordinary speech, which is just the sort of difference that poet~ like Shakespeare, Byron, and
Eliot like to blur. Yet no ca.-eful reader, making due allowance for· differences in linguistic
conventions between th~ nineteenth century and today, will fail to note Lhc pel"sonal, direct,
and .conve t-sationaltone ofj udges Iike Holmes and Lea•·ncd Hand, which 'is so d i ffe rent from
the usual tone ofjudicial opinions.
/d. at 1428.. 29 {citations omitted). ·

•

'

•

•

•

.

,

•
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cost in stilted .diction. The familiarity of the pure style makes it
invisible to practitioners of the style and to the intended audience of ·
lawyers. But it is not at all a plain or transparent scyle. Its artificiality
is revealed by a comparison with the. prose of a nonlawyer de:a ling
with a similar issue for example; a philosopher writing about
intention compared to a judge in a criminal case writing about
intention as well as by a comparison with the· less common
51
"impure" style ofjudicial opinions.

..

•

•

In contrast to ''pure style'' judicial opinions, Posner obseiVes that:
•

Impure stylists like to pretend that what they are doing when they
write a judicial opinion is explaining to a hypothetical audience of
laypersons why the case is being decided in the way that it is. These
judges eschew the "professionalizing" devices ofthe purist writer · the
jargon, the solemnitY, the high sheen, the impersonality, the piled-up
oetails conveying an attitude of scrupulous exactness; the fondness for
truisms, the unembarrassed repetition of obvious propositions, the
long quotations from. previous case-s to demonstrate fidelity to
precedent, the euphemisms, and the exaggerated CQnfidence
58
corresponding to the declamatory mode of"pure" poetry.

•

•

While Judge Posner is candid enough to admit that his contrast
between the "pure".and "~mpure" styles ofjudicial opinion writing is
•

•

•

57. /d. at 1429-30.
•
•
•
58.. /d. at 1430 (footnote omitted). Posner continues his description ·~f the "impure style" ofjudicial
opinion writing as follows:
.
The handful of impure judiCial stylists prefer the bolder approach (to critics, brazen)
of trying to persuade without using stylistic devices intended to overawe, impress, and
intimidate the t"eader. They like to be conversational, to write as ifit were for the ear rather
than for the eye. They like to avoid quoting previous decisions so that they can speak with
their own· tongue make it new, make it fresh. (Avoidance of the ready•made was an
important element of the "wit, that Eliot admired in the metaphysical poets.) They like to
be candid and not pretend to know more than they do or to spea_k with greater confidence
than they feel. They eschew unnecessary details, however impressive the piling on of them
might be. They like to shun cliches, to be concrete, to entertain; to seem to enjoy writing;
· to imitate the movement of thought unfriendly critics call their style ''stream of
consciousness." Of the impure stylists we may say, as Warren did of Eliot and other
moderns, "they have tried, within th~ limits of their gifts, to remain faithful to the:
complexities of the problems with which they are dealing ... they have
refused to take the,.
easy statement as solution".
Paradoxically, the impure judicial stylists generally take mo~ pains over style than the
pure stylists do. Unless one is a pat·ticulaa·ly gifted writer, it takes much effort. to make an
opinion seem effortless! The pure style, despite its artificiality, tomes mo•·e easily to a legally
trained pe ..son than the impun: style. For one of the things that law school and leg-dl '
practice teach, aU unconsciously but not the less effectively for that,_is to forget how one
wrote before one became a lawyer.
Id. at 1430-31 (footnotes omitted).
•

•

•

'
•

•

•

•
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59

"overdone," and that many judges for stylistic as ·well as rhetorical
purposes mix the approaches, · he confidently offer~ a thumbnail
· taxonomy ofjudicial writing styles by noting:
•

•

•
•

•

The pure tendency is illustrated in the opinions of Cardozo, Brandeis
(especially his majority opinions), Frankf~rter, Brennan, and the
second Harlan, and is characteristic of the vast majority of opinions
written by law clerks, which means most opinions in all Am~rican
courts today. The pure style is the inveterate style of law review
editors, from whose ranks most of the clerks are drawn . .On the
impure side can be found most opinions of Holmes, Douglas, Black,
Jackson, and Learned Hand. In the middle, the most notable
opinions may be those of Henry Friendly. Inclusion ofDouglas in the
list of impure judicial writers should make clear that impure judicial
opinion writing is not always superior to pure, any more than all
impure poetry is superior to all pure poetry. Cardozo, mostly a purist;
60
was one ofthe finestjudicial writers in our history.

The third important contribution ofPosner's article is his elaboration
on how the two styles ofjudicial opinion writing the impure style and
the pure style relate to what he describes as "two jurisprudential
stances": the "formalist" stance on the one hand, and the "pragmatic"
61
stance on the other. Posner argues that pure writing style strongly
correlates with formalist content, although he notes, there are exceptions
such as justice Hugo Black who wrote in an impure judicial opinion
style in support of formalist-reasoned results and Justice Benjamin
Cardozo who wrote in a pure judicial opinion style to justify pragmatic62
reasoned outcomes. Yet, because of such analomies in interrelations
•

•

•

•

•
59. ld. at 1431.
60. ld. at 1432 (footnote omitted).
61. ld. According to Posnea·'s conception:
.
The forrnalist firmly believes in right and wrong, truth and falsehood, and believes that the
fun~tion of a judicial opinion is to demonstrate that the decision is right and true. The
pragmatist, while not doubting that right and wrong and true and false· have useful roles to
•
play in a variety of "language games,, is inclined to doubt that the decision of cases
sufficiently finely balanced, or at least non routine, to have been appealed to and to require
decision by means ofa published opinion is consistently one of those g-ames. 'The pragmatist
thinks that what the judge is doing in deciding the non routine case is trying to come up with
the most reasonable result in the circumstances, with due regard for such systemic
constraints on the freewheeling employment of" reason" as the need to maintain continuity
with previous decisions and respect the limitations that the language and discernable
purposes of constitutional and statutory texts impose on the interpreter.
ld. at 1432-33 .
'62. Said. at 1433: Posner sarcastically observes, in this regard, that "the pure style is an excellent
disguise for the shy pa-agmatist or, for that matter, the willful or partisan judge." /d. He also goes on to
acidly distinguish a real impure judicial writing style (which is mediated by tangible legal constraints) and
an "arch-sentimentalist•~ or "arch-egoist" judicial writing style, exemplified in Posner,s analysis by the
•

•

•
•

•
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between judicial opinion style and substantive jurisprudential stances,
63
and because '' [s] tyle is artifice"
and can ·be. feigned to convey what
a particular judge "thinks an admirable character for a judge to
64
have"
Posner cautions against automatic inference of "a judge's
jurisprudential stance from the judge's style without a consideration of
65
both the content and form of the judge's opinions, "
·
An arguably mean-spirited confrontational, and largely unhelpful
aspect ofjudge Posner's article is his deconstruction of a criminal law
opinion written byJu·dge Wald an~ his unflattering comparison of that.
opinion which he views as written in a pure style that uses formalist
reasoning with an opinion written byJustice Holmes while he was on
·the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts which Posner views as.
66
written in an impure style that uses pragmatic reasoning. Judge
67
Wald's reply to Posner is, likewise, largely unhelpful and obviously
68
defensive. Perhaps the redeeming value of this academic spat between
two of our most distinguished federal app~llate judges is to demonstrate
that judicial writing style· ofwhatever stripe comes freighted with an
enormous amount of judicial ego. This insight is both surprising and
unsurprising. It is. surprising to those of us who might abstractly hope
that our life-tenured federal judges would learn how to depersonalize
their opinions from their self-identity and self-worth. It is unsurprising,
however, in the larger cultural context ofMillennial America, standing
betwixt the Age of Narcissism and Anxiety and the Age of Celebrity-atany-Cost. Yet, we should not throw out the wheat with the chaff of the
honorable judges.' valuable insights on the nature. and role of judicial
writing style.
· .

•

•

1

•

•

•

•

opinions ofj ustice Harry Blackmun, which while dcpartiog from professional norms ofa pure style judicial
opinion, is an "embarrassing" performance consistingof"the unmediat(!d expression of self.'~ /d. at 143334. CJ Resolutions in Tribute lo Justice Hany A. 8/atkmun, 120 S. Ct. No. 4 Ct. R-1-17 (Dec. 15, 1999).
63. ld. at 1436.
64. /d.
•

65 .. /d.
66. See id.

•

a~

1437-46, where Posner compares and contrasts judge
Wald's
opinjon
in
UnikdSJaUs
.
.
v. Morris,. 977 ·F. 2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992),. with justice Holmes'' opinion in SlaCk v. New r()fk, N.H. & H.R.
Co., 58 N.E. 686 (Mass. 1900), written before Holmes was appointed to the United States Supreme Court.
67. Su Rep!J, supra note 15 at 1451.
68. Sec id. at 1451-52, in which judge Wald expresses her surprise and dismay at the manner in
'
which Judge Posner u~s her written opinion:
(This single opinion], apparently consigns me to the fearful rhetorical hell reserved for lazy
and untalented "pure' judges whose:opinions are notorious for '~argon/' "solemnity,"
"high
.
sheen," "impersonality,"' "piled-up details/' "fondness for truisms," "unembarrassed
repetition of obvious propositions,'• "long quotations from previous ca5es,t, "e~phemisms,t'
and "exaggerated confidence.,
Wow! What has happened to the vaunted Seventh Circuit civility?
ld. {footnote omitted).
•

.

•

•

'
.
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B. The Proftssors' Accounts
•

I. Professor Schauer's View
•
•

Professor Frederick Schauer claims that "in law, as in life, dull may
69
sometimes have its uses."
Accordingly, in a contrarian approach,
Schauer challenges the conventional wisdom that the contemporary
ju~icial opinion should be viewed as "a legal performance of a special
sort, one in which the features expected in statutes should largely be
absent, and in which the features often detrimental to the effective
operation of a statute or administrative regulation literary flare [or
70
literary style], for example are generally to be encouraged. " Scha~er ·
suggests in his article, entitled Opinions As Rules, that appellate judicial
opinions are not, and should not be viewed, "as consumption items for
law professors, as evidence of the creative intellig~nce of their authors,
71
or as objects of aesthetic pleasure."
The analytical foundation of Professor Schauer's assessment of
appellate judicial opinions is that the limited functions of judicial
opinions are articulating.applicable legal rules, clearly and accurately
applying the rules to the facts oflitigated cases, and in so doing, deciding
the merits of the .litigants' legal rights while justifying the result in the
case to a limited ''reading audience" consisting of other judges, lawyers,
72
law professors and law students. Thus, according to Schauer, Hthe
judicial opinion ... should serve a function within law quite different
from ... be [ing] accurate reflections of the reasol)ing processes of their
authors, or literary performances to be appreciated like we appreciate
73
a novel, a poem, or even an elegantly written work of nonfiction." In
Professor Schauer's worldview, therefore, it is okay for judicial opinions
to be like statutes (the Securities Act of 1933 or the Internal Revenue
Code, for instance) or like administrative regulations (such as Rules of
the Occupational Health .and Safety Administration published in the
Code qfFederal Regulations). Commentators should not expect fulsome or
scintillating or stylistically competent literary performances of legal
materials; boring but clear · pronouncements of the law is quite
74
appropriate in his view.

•

•

•

•

69. Schauer, supra note 18, at 1475 .
70. /fl. at 1455.
71. Ill. at 1456.
72. See id. at 1456-66.
73. /d. at 1456.
74. See ill. Schauer contends that "the formal an~ alitea-ary style of many contemporary judicial
•

•

•

•
•

•

•

'

•

•
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Schauer conceptualizes the writing of appellate judicial opinions as
75
at least part of "a conscious process of rule making" that can be
expected to va-ry, depending on the case. He writes in support of this
contention as follows:

•

•

•

At times it may be appropriate for a court, as with the exact
specification in Miranda v. A~ona, to delineate exactly what primary
actors should do. At other times it may be appropriate to set out only
broad standards, either as·a way of delegating further specification to
other bodies, or as a means of delaying further specification· until
additional c~ses arise. And at still other times ~t may be appropriate .
to set out neither crisp rules nor open-ended standards, delaying, in
classic common law fashion, the entire rule-making process until a
richer stock of experience is developed. But my point here is not one
about just what kinds of rules the courts should make. It is about the
importance of recognizing that judicial rule making is no less
important than rule making by other bodies, and no less likely to be
constrained and informe4 by the kinds of considerations we would
76
employ with respect _to any ~ther rule-making enterprise.

Schauer concludes his article by arguing that when an appellate
judicial opinion is viewed as a rulemaking vehicle, rather than a
· tea~hing/scholarship vehicle for legal academics, "[t]his mode · of .
evaluation may often find the.literary and _the aesthetic distracting, and
77
the imaginative and stylish cou·nt~rproductive." By linking up this
conclusion with an earlier portion of his text, which discusses his
prognosis that "the number of people who actually read judicial
78
opinions is likely decreasing," and of those who do "read" the opinions
they increasingly use computer:..assisted search techniques to read
•

•
•

opinions may be less an object of scorn and mol'e of an indication .. . of the functions that judicial opinions
might seavc in the actual operation of the law., /d.
In contrast, Schauer summarizes the criticisms of modern United States Supreme Court
opinions implicitly .the most impoa·t.ant ~ppellate judicial opinions in Amea~ican s~ciety as focused on
the court's "employing excess[ive] doctrinal ~nd discu.rsive complexity,, id. at 1459, through such devices
•
as multi-part balancing tests, footnotes, prongs, requirements and standa rds, see id. at 1456-59; as masking
dose "policy and political discretion"' id. 1458; and as producing stylistically deficient piec~s ofliterature
lhat are
·
·

at

•

less memorable, less quotable, less followable, and less teachable than the best work ofa ·
Holmes, a Hand, or a Cardozo, all of whom had the ability to write with great style to
produce ~he kind of opinion that is a pleasure to read, that is evocative and suggestive at
numerous layers of subtlety, and that employs phr~s that are at once insightful, persuasive,
and memorable.
!d. at 1459.
75. !d. at 1470.
•
76. Itl. at 1470-71 (footnote omitted).
77. Jd.atl475.
78. ld. at 1471-72.
•

•

•

•
•

•

•

•

•

•
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79

"chunks, of the opinion to find "quotable language," Professor
Schauer apparendy would prefer appellate judges (and, of course, their
law clerks the real authors- of most of the judicial opinions) to write
their opinions in the form of "headnotes-" compiled by law book

publishers.
·
Professor Schauer's article, however, is unhelpful for a number of
reasons. First, despite his elaborate attempt to reconceptualize appellate
judicial opinions as m.ere rule-pronouncements, he still assumes th~t
style matters in theory. The rub, he argues, is that the public does not
typically have_access to or read appellatejudicial opinions, and lawyers
are more interested in bits and pieces of opinions rather than a ~oherent
.whole. Second, and related to the first point, Schauer does not define
judicial style, nor does he provide a·ny clear exampl~s ofgood style/poor
substance, poor style/ good substance, or the like. Rather,· he
implicidy and without elaboration seems to equate ''style" with mere
unnecessary ornamen~ation as if all judicial opinion. style could be
characterized by Baroque and Rococo decorative conventions, which
80
·are curious, expansive, excessive, extravagant, and irregular. 1"'hird,
Schauer's approach fails_to _appreciate, or underappreciates, stylistic
variations between different statutes and different administrative
regulations some of which are better-crafted, more elegant, and
clearer Cvthan other statutes _and regulations. Fourth, he seemingly
dismi~ses the social value of aesthetically pleasing legal
materials· ~hether they be appellate judicial opinions, statutes or
.

•

'

administrative.regulations and the plausible connection between good
style in legal materials and good legal outcomes. In a word, Professor
Schauer's discussion is naive. ~n another word, his discussion is
superficial.
In contrast to Professor Schauer's unhelpful approach to judicial
opinion style,. Professor James Boyd White's brief, but ric<
h , article,
81
·What's An Opinion For? is most illuminating.

,•

..
•

•

79. Id. at 1472.
•
80. See, e.g., GERMAIN BAZIN, BAROQUE AND ROCOCO 6..7 (1964).
The Baroque artist ..• longs lo enter into the multiplicity of phenomenon, intolhe :flux of
things in their perpetual becomin~his compositions are dynarnic and open and tend to
expand outside their boundaries . ·... The Baroque at·tist's instinct for escape drives him to
prefer 'forms that take flight' to those that are static and dense ....

.

.

•

.

.

.

]d.

81. White, mprit note 17, at 1363.
,.

•

•
•
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2. Professor White's View
.•

•

•

Professor James Boyd White is no stranger to the powerful linkages
between. law and language. As the Hartright Professar of Law and
· Professor of English at the Unive~ity ·o f Michigan, he has written
82
extensively on law, literature and literary style. White makes several
importa~t points about the overarching question of the Universi~ of
Chicag~ Lllw Review colloquium: ''whether it matters how judicia~
83
opinions are written, and if so why."
.
First, and foremost, Professor White reasons that "[t]h:e judicial
84
opinion is a claim of meaning" that is vitally importa1:1t to what he
metaphorically characterizes as "the central conversation that is for us
85
the law:"
White's explanation in this regard is ·worthy of full
•
quotation:

•

·
•

•

The judicial opinio·n is a claim of meaning: it describes ,the case,
telling its story in a particular way; it explains or justifies the result;·
and in the pro,cess it connects the case with earlier cases, the particularfocts with
more general concerns. It translates the experience of the parties, and the
language in which they naturally speak of it, into the language ofthe law,

which connects cases across time ,and space; ,and it translates the texts of the
law-the statutes and opinions and constitutional provisions into the

•

terms defined by the facts of the present case. The opiniori thus
engages in the central conversation that is for us the law, a
conversation that the opinion itself makes possible. In doing these
thi~gs it makes two claims of authority: for the texts and judgments
86
to which it appeals, and for the methods by which it works.

Second, White . asserts that judicial performance in opinion
writing-say, establishing the facts or interpreting
authoritative
texts
or
.
in construing legal .m eaning . · "can be done, well or badly in virtually
87
·every dimension."
This, in tum, leads to Prefessor White's third
important point: bad judicial opinions tend to trivialize the law; well88
crafted judicial opinions have the potential to dignify the law.

•

•

•

•

82. See, e.g., jAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACI..ES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
TiiE LAW {l985);JAMES BOYD WHITEJUSTICE AS TRANSLAnoN: AN EsSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL,
CRITICISM (1990).
83. White, mpra note 17, at 1363.
84. /d, at 1367.
85. /d.. at 1367-68.
86. ld. (Emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1368.
88. Su id. Indeed, according to White, a well-constructed judicial opinion "may even be touched
with nobility." /d.
·
•

•

•
•

•

•

•
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A fourth important argument articulated by Professor White in his
article is that robust criticism of judicial opinions on multiple levels
including logic, politics and morals "is an essential part of the activity · .
oflaw [since] [i]t is crucial to legal practice, for it is on the basis of such
criticism that one will argue for or against the continued authority of a
89
particular
opinion
or
line
of
opinions.
'·'
.
Professor White ends his short think piece on the significan~e of
judicial opinion writing by postul~ting that opinion style, or reasoning
style, is linked with legal results in cases because "the right '.style' or the
90
right mode. of reasoning will over time lead to the best results.', This
is ·so, White asserts~ not because there is an automatic connection
between opinion scyle and case results, but rather "through the ways in
which the imaginations, minds, and feeli~gs of those who live with the
91
law are affected."
•

.

•

3. Professor Nussbaum's View
•

•
•

.

Professor Martha C. Nussbaum brings to the study oflaw an intimate
and refined sense of the power ofliterature as a shaping force of human
culture. In a cornucopia qf recent books she has, by way of illustration,
92
explored the relationship between literature and moral philosophy,
meditated on the meaning of a liberal educa.t ion-with necessary
perspectives of ethics, race, sexuality and religion melded with a
"narrative imagination" in understanding the modern meaning oflaw
93
within a socially-ordered community, and examined how an
imaginative bent ofmind, derived from readi~g literature, is an essential
94
ingredient in just public discourse within a democratic society.

.

•

.

89. ltl As White obsetves in this regard: "The opinion is not merely an epiphenomenon to the law,
a slight adjunct to the real business of deciding cases and predicting what officials will do, but is central to
the activities of mind and character of the law as we know and value it". Id.
90. ld. at 1369.
91. Id. White expands his thought by obsetving:
[T]he great question of the qay is whether law will move in the direction of trivializing
human experience, and itself, or in the direction of dignifying itself and that experience.
This is in large measure a function of the ways in which the minds that work in this field
manifest themselves. The deepest sources of meaning and ·dignity in human life are
activities oflove and art; ·properly understood, the law cannot only enable them, it can be
one of them, an activity fully worthy of the human mind and spirit.
Id.
92. Set MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LoVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE
(1990).
93. Set MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF REFORM
IN LIBERAL EDUCATION (1997).
94. See_ MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC jUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PuBUC
LIFE (1995).
•

•
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In the course of her written contribution
to
the
Chicago
Law
Review
.
Colloquium, Professor Nussbaum explores the intuitively unlikely
metaphor of "poets as ju.dges" in discussing what she terms ''judicial
95
rhetoric a~d the literary imagihation." She articulates a number of·
fascinating observations about judicial opinion writing style.
Initially, deriving insight.from a statement from justice Stephen G.
Breyer during his United States Senate Confirmation ~earin.gs to be an
96
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Professor
Nussbaum sculpts an underlying attitude of a: hypothetical appellate

court judge who would be inclin~d to write a good opinion: "[t]he

ability to think ofpeople'slives in the novelist's way is., ... :a n important
part of the equipment of a ju<;lge not the whole, or even the central
9
part, but a vital part nonetheless." ~ What Nussbaum means by this
hypothetical underlying judicial attitude is informed by the discussion,
earlier in her article, of what she calls "[t]he literary judge/judicious
98
99
spectator," learning to "think like a novel-reader,'' and her
conception, borrowed by Walt Whitman, of a "poet-judge," the latter
being someone with "the ability to imagine vividly and then to assess .
judicially another person's pain, to participate in it and then to ask.
about its ·significance . . . Veading] to acquire a motivation to alter
100
[it]."
Second, aligning herself with the Confirn1ation Hearing
101
thoughts ofjustice Breyer, Professor Nussbaum's model of a judge

95. Martha C. Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1477 (capitalization omitted). As Professor Nussbaum
The literary /maginaJ.um in Public IJ..fl [supra
notes, her "essay is a version of the final chapter ofPottic]ustice:
.·
note 94}." !d. at n. t.
96. See id. (quoting from the Confirmation Hearings for Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Senate Committee on thejudiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 89
(July 13, 1994)). The quote by, now,Justice Breyer is as follows:
I read something that moved me a lot not very long ago. I was reading something by
Chesterton, and he was talking about one of the Brontes, : . . or ]fllll Eyre that she wrote.
He said that if you want to know what that is like, you go and
you look out at the city I
.
think he was looking at London ---and he said, you know, you see all those houses now, even
at the. en~ of the 19th century, and they aU look all as if they,re the same. And you think
all of those people are out there, going to work, and they're all the same. But, he says, what
Bronte tells you is that they are not the same. Each
one of those persons and each
.
. one of
those houses and each one of those families is di(ferent, and they each have a stoty to tell.
Each of those stories involves something about human passion. Each or those stories
involves a man, a woman, cbildren,.families, work, lives. And you get that sense out of the
book.
So sometimes l have found literature very helpful as a ~ay out of the tower.
~

•

•

/d.

•

97.
98.
99.
100.
10 1.

ld. at 1496 {footnote omitted).
Id. at 1486.
Id. at 1492 .
Id. at 1487-88.
See supra note 96 ~nd accompanying text.
"

•

•

•
•
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•

•
•

•

who is psychologically and emotionally prepared · to write a good
appellate opinion is one who "stresses the need for technical mastery as
well as sentiment and imagination, and [who] insists that the latter must
102
·continually be informed by and tethered to ~e former."
Third, in examining two appellate court opinions a partial
concurrence an~ partial dissent by United States Supreme CourtJustice .
13
Stevens in the 1984 prisoners' rights case, Hudson v. Palmer, 9 and a
United States Court of Appeals panel majority opinion by Seventh
Circuit judge Richard Posner in a 1994 sexual harassment case, Carr v.
104
Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp.
Professor Nussbaum
105
Nussbaum discerns in
extolls the stylistic virtues qf these opinions.
both opinions the use of imagination and appropriate emotion by the
106
jurists.
In both the Stevens and Posner opinions she uncovers a
"literary approach [that] is closely connected With sympathetic attention
107
to the special plight ·o f people who are socially unequal,,, like a .
prisoner in his cell and a woman in an overwhelmingly male and hostile
workplace.
Fourth, Professor Nussbaum explains a negative exemplar ofjudicial
style in her stylistic analysis of both the maJority opinion ~nd concurring
opinion by Chief]ustice Burger in the 1986 sodomy prosecution case of
108
Bowers v. Hardwick.
In her critique of these opinions she criticizes the
"distancing strategy" of both opinions, which do not attempt to tell the
story ofthe defendant Michael Hardwick's pursuit "to live a fully human
109
life" through his expression ofhomosexuality. Moreover, Nussbaum
disagrees with the opinions' "level of generality'' in characterizing the
. . purported right at bar as '"a right to commit homosexual sodomy,"'
instead of a more focused "right to determine the course of one's own
110
sexual life so ·long as one does not harm others."
According to
Nussbaum, jurists exercising "literary imagination" style in Bowers v.
Hardwick would have given "[more] .careful attention to history and
social context, and an empathetic consideration of the situation of the
111
.
homosexual in American socie~."

•

•

'

•

•

•

•

•

102.· Nussbaumt supra note 19, at 1496.
I 03. 468 U.S. 517, 541 (1984) (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994).
105. See Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1496-1509.
106. Stl id. at 1509.
107. /d.

'

108. 478 u.s. 186 (1986).
I 09. Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1513.
110. /d.
lll. ld. at 1514.
•

•
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'

Finally, Professor Nussbaum ends her set of obseiVations on judicial
. opinion writing style by using the Ame·r ican poet Walt Whitman's Song
qfMyselfas a model of the poetic imagination needed for a judge to write
112
a go.o d judicial ~pinion.
According to Nussbaum: "[i] n order to be
fu~ly ratio_
n al a judge must be capable. of literary imagining and
sympathy. She must educate not only her technical capacities hll:t also .
113
her capacity for humanity."
•

III. BEYOND CHICAGO: SOME OTHER PERSPECTIVES ONjUDICIAL
OPINION
S'I'YI.E
.
.
•

A. Domnarski's Assessment

•

•

Attorney William Domnarski provides a variety ofvaluable ideas and
insights about appellate judicial opinion style in his 1996 book, In the
114
Opinion ofthe Court. Domnarski's analysis is a valuable extension and
amplifiGation of 1995 Chicago Law Review Colloquium views discussed
115
in the previous section.
Initially, Domnarski emphasizes how judicial opinions are ''a forrn of .
literature" that consists of "communications between [a] court and
116
society."
In this respect, he emphasizes how judicial opinion style is
"a function of court business, dominant [judicial] personalities, and the
117
influence of law clerks."
·
Second, Domnarski examines the captivating, but varying, judicial
opinion styles and methods of key United States Supreme Court
118
119
Justices, including ·Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Louis Brandeis,
120
121
22
Benjamin Carclozo, Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas/ Felix
123
124
Frankfurter, and Robertjackson.
In a related way, he articulates
125
an intriguing "canon" of eleven Supreme Court opinions,
chronologically ranging from the 1819 opinion for the Court by Chief
'

•

•

f

•

•

•

•

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

•

Su id. at 1517-19.
Id. at 1519.
DOMNARSKI, mpra note 14.
Su supra notes 26·113 and accompanying text.
DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 2 .
/d.

'

.

•

•

•

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.

at .35-36, .63·64.
at 63-66.
at 67.
at 36-37, 67-69.
at 38, 67-68.
at 66-68.
at 69-70.
125. See id. at 75-89.
'

•

•

•

•

•
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Justice john Marshall in McCullough v. Maryland to th~ 1973 opinion
127
for the· Court by Justice Harry Blackmun in Roe v. Wade.
In
constructing his .canon, Domnarski uses style as one of six criteria for
128
selection and points out that stylistically "[t]he majority of the
opinions in the canon were written with the average reader in mind
[with the] rhetorical strategies [ofthe individual opinions] stress (ing] the
importance of the issues being considered by highlighting their
129
universality and by making them human rather than legal." .
Third, In the Opinion ofthe Court compares and contrasts the prevailing
style of United States Supreme Court opinions with the style in certain
lower federal court opinions consisting of both the appellate opinions
of the circuit courts of appeal and the trial level opinions of the district
130
courts. As noted by the author of the book:
126

•

The. bland, homogenous style th(lt dominates the judicial opinions of
the High Court today also dominates the opinions of the lower federal
courts. At the same time, however, lower federal court judges are
seeking to distinguish themselves and thei~ opinions with ,a variety of
stylistic approaches. These draw ·upon and expand the approaches
that federal judges in earlier decades had used. The difference,
however, is in the significantly greater number of judges who are
writing distinctive opinions and in the frequency with which they
write them. The opinions ofth~ lower federal courts, as a result, are
now defined by what had been the exception in earlier times. The
reader, of course, benefits from the variations in style. The readers of
current Supreme Court opinions wade through bland p-rose. But
readers of the lower federal court opinions, while they too encounter
blandness, frequently find prose that, more than merely amusing or

.

•

126. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
127. 410 U.S~ 113 (l973). The other nine. "canon, opinions,
in Dornnai'Ski's view, are justice
.
.
Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. Uniud StaUs, 250 U.S. 616~ 624 (1919),Justice Black's opinion in Gluunbers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940),Justice Black's opinion in Youngstown Shut & Tube Co. v. StlU!Jer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), Chiefjustice Warren's opinion in Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Chiefjusti~e Warren's
opinion inMirandav. .Af'kona, -384 U.S. 436 (1966),JusticeJack.~on;sopinion in Wtsl Yu-giniaStau.Bd. ofEduc.
v. BarntU, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),Justice Black's opinion in GU!ton v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Chief
Justice Warren's opinion in I.JJuing v. Vtrginin, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and justice Douglas, opinion in Skinnn v.
OklliJwma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Ste DOMNARSKl, supra oote 14, at 77-89. · ·

128. Domnarski explained his selection method as follows:
In constructing my canon I have used the following criteria: the judicial opinion (l) comes
from the United States Supreme Court, (2) establishes or acts as a harbinger of (3) an
important rule {4) affecting a fundamental aspect {5) of the AmericaJI democracy o1· the
American way of life (6) with clarity, conviction, or eloque11ce.
DOMNARSKI, supril note 14,-at 77.
129. /d. at 88.
•
130. See id. at 90-115.
•

•

.

.

•

•

•

•
•
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lively, draws the legal issues and the judiciary's response to them·into
131
sharper focus.

The difference between Supreme Court opinions and the opinions of
.the lower federal courts, according to··Domnarski, is due to two key·
132
factors: (1) the "greater intimacy with the litig~tion process" in the
le>wer federal courts compared. to the High Court's often rarified view
of the litigation process, and (2) the large group d}'namics involved with
Supreme Court writing ~here nine justices ''can have a ·h and in what is
133
ultimately written" compared to the court of appeals judges where
panels typically consist of only three judges, and therefore, ''the judge
who writes the opinion has more opportunity to write the opinion as he
134
or she wants."
·
•
Fourth, Domnarski briefly examines the evolution of lively ·and
unique appellate judicial opinion writing ~tyles over the course of the
35
last century.l In the course of this evolutionary discussion, he cites
examples of noteworthy and admirable judicial opinion styles including
·the opinions of the following United States Circuit Judges: Learned
136
137
138
139
Hand, - Jerome Frank, Henry Friencily, Abner Mikva, Amalya
14
141
142
Kearse, °Frank Easterbrook, and Bruce Selya.
·
Finally, In the Opinion ofthe Court adds to our understanding of stylistic
de.vises utilize.d by federal appellate court judges who are "interested in
•

.

131. /d. at 90. Lower federal court opinions, according to Domnarski,-h.ave an enormous quantitative
impac~ on the "flow,; of legal language in American culture. A$ :the author notes in this regard:
The [federal district and circuit] courts together publish more than ten thousand cases in
the Federal Suppiemtrit and the Fetkral Reporter each year. In the fifty or so combined volumes
of the Federal Supplemtnt and the Federal Reporter the West Publishing Company produces
approximately eighty thousand pages of opinions from the district and circuit courts
annually. Each volume has about sixteen hundred pages, and approximately twenty five
of each series comes out in a year. Each page ofe.ithe_r series contains approximately 750
wotds. 'Put differently, West Publishing publishes approximately 60 million words ofjudicial
opinions from lower federal courts each year.
/d. at 92.
132. Jd. at 94.
13.3. ld.
•

•

•

134. /d.
135. Domnarski, in a related way, also· alludes to what he. tongue-in-cheek, refers to as the
"peripheral amusements', oflo~er federal courtopi·nions.
Jd.
As
specific
illustrations
of
these
"peripheral
.
.

amusemen.ts," the author refers to opinions reUecting "the-oflbeat. the controversial, or the juicy~, as well
as humor in various guises. ld. at 93, 94.
·
136. See it!. at 97 ..99.
13 7. Ste id., at 10 J.Q2.
138. See ul. at 103.
139. Seeid. at 105.
·
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See it/.

•

•

•

•

•

•
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143

distinguishing their opinion~."
Domnarski ~atalogs and discusses
stylistic techniques in current federal appellate opinions noting the
following! examples: ~'dramatic introductions, apt or poignant
144
introductio.ns, angry introductions, ·and· humorous introductions;"
145
humor, including "subject matter puns," revelation of "a party's
146
stupidity, sometimes with deadpan analysis," "decidedly unjudicial
147
148
subheadings,'; and mocking of counsel's performance;
"use (of]
149
150
151
various fonns of figurative language." like epigrams, hyperbole,
152
153
extended metaphors, literary allusion, and "B.ardalotry· through
154
reference to Shakespeare."

•

•

•

B. Judge Coffin's Approach
•

•

Judge Frank M. Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, has made several interesting
155
obsetyations about appellate judicial opinion style~ His most recent

contribution is encapsulated in the book, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering and
156
Judging. Judge Coffin's personal insights on appellate judicial opinion
style in On Appeal -are illuminating; they can be placed under a number
of different points, as follows..
,

•

•

1. The "construction" of an appellate opinion is "the core of
appellate judging" since the written opinion reflects a 'judge's unique
157
qualities, values, methods, tone, and approaches."
•

143. /d. at 107.
144. ld. .
145. /d. at 112.
146. ld. at 109~
147 . .Jd. at 112.
148. Suid.atll3.·
•
149. /d.
150. . &4 id. Forexample;Judge Fmnk Easterbrook noted that ')udges are 110t like pigs, hunting for
truffies buried in briefs., /d. (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955,956 (7th Cir. 1991)).
15 I. See it/. at 114.
152. See id.
153. See id.
.
154. /d. at 114-15. For an eloquent and scholarly exercise ofbardalotry and the law see DANIELj.
KORNSTEIN, KilL ALL •TilE LAWYERS?:
SHAKESPEARE•s LEGAL AP~EAL (1994).
•
155. See,.e.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS. OF AjUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL
•
APPElLATE BENCH (1980).
156. FRANK M. COFAN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING ANDjUDGING (1994). In addition to
obse1vations on appellate judicial opinion style, Judge Coffin also addresses an assortment of other
interesting subjects on appellate. practice and advocacy including the following: the English appellate
tradition; the Am-erican appellate tradition; comparisons between state and federal appellate systems in the
United States; practical advice to appellate lawyers about briefs and oral arguments .
157. ld. at 171.

"

•

•

•

.

•

..

•

•

.

•
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2. A written appellate opinion serves three important jurisprudential
functions: "it decides a case, ending at least one dispute between .the
parties; it continues the story by making some law, from a little bit of
interstitial law to a huge chunk; and it projects the story into the

•

158

future by giving intimations of further directions."
3. Each written appellate opinion should rationally be preceded by
a "triage" as$essment by the writing judge. This assessment is not a
willingness to decide some cases incorrectly, but rath~r, a willingness
to sacrifice "the length, depth and elegance of the reasoning" in
written form for the sake of keeping current with the appellate

•

caseload.

159

•

•

•
158. ld.
159. Id. at 176. Judge Coffin's tripartite "Topography of Cases," from least burdensome, and
therefore subject to sacrifice in written analysis, to most burdensome requiring a thorough, full-dressed
written opinion is as follows:
I. Lighl: Cases in which the disposition, order, or opinion .can ordinarily be expected to
take from one or two hours to no more than haifa day"[with law-clerk assistance].
a.
A.ffinn on llze Opinion Below
b. A Short Order ofSeveral lines
c.
Memorandum Opinion (tT Per Curiam
2. Motkrt~U: Cases in which an opinion should ordinarily be prepared in from two or three
days to a week.
a.
A Simple, Fact-Intm.rWe Unpuhli.Jhed Opinion.
b.
A Straighlforward Application l!f lAw to Facts.
•

c.
d.

•

3.

I..iJu Drawing.
Statutory Constnlction.

•

•

He~tht Blockbusters~

Cases in which, for various reasons, the expected time investment
is substantial. By "substantial" I mean from two to six weeks. The advent of such a case in
a chambers requires careful planning and readjustment of work schedules so that the
remaining work goes forward as the "biggien slowly moves forward.
a.
11zt Multi-issue, Mulli-tkftntltml Case. The paradigm of this kind of case is the
criminal prosecution ofa drug conspiracy, involving many defendants, wiretaps,
one or more searches and seizures, incriminating conversations with
codefendants, exclusion of some evidence and admission of some, rulings on
. expert witnesses, alleged prosecutor overreaching in argument, refusal to sever
trials of various defendants, challenges to sufficiency of evidence as to some, and
claimed errors in the instructions to the jury. The very magnitude of the trial
record and the multiplicity of issues assure me that a very large piece of work is
·
involved, requiring up to four weeks of a lawclerk's time and from a day or so to
several days of my time.
.
b. An Overarching Legal Issue. The facts may be relatively few, uncomplicated, and
undisputed. But the task of legal analysis is a heavy one. It may take a number
· of forms: a crucial, threshold decision (is a municipal ordinance content-based?
Is a suspect "in custody"?); a delicate balancing act (do institutional interests
outweigh individual rights?); a deep policy analysis (should sectarian high ·
schools be more immune to church·state establishment clause scrutiny than
sectarian universities? ... ); study of a cluster of diametrically opposed cases to
decide which group is to be followed; or a microscopic study of an enigmatic
Supreme Court decision.
c.
An Overarching Factual Qjuslion. This typ~ of case requires the opinion writer to
master a lengthy transcript and many exhibits. Examples are an antitrust case

,

•

•

•

•
•
•

•
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In "[d]oing an [o)pinion,-" an appellate judge like Coffin

~'imm~rse[s

himself) in [a] case totally, ~rawing first upon everyt~ing
160
the parties and the judge below have said:"
.
.

The case at this point is like a tidal pool, recently stirred by the tide.
Everything is cloudy and in motion. My faith is that if I just wait long
enough and observe closely enough, the water will clear~ So I begin
my re·reading and note-taking. I start with my very brief and
impressionistic argument notes,just to refresh my memory as to li.vely
issues. Then I look at my very· skeletal notes of our Uudges']
conference to see if either o~ my colleagues [on the panel] had voiced
some idea that I should keep in Plind. Then I pick up the briefs
161
[again].
.

5. Following an immersion phas~, an appellate judge, adhering to
Frank Coffin's methods, would "[p]ause for (b]earings" and then
"summon (his] troops, (his] ·clerks, and . .' . have a wide-ranging
discussion'' about a variety of key stylistic and substantive issues.
_described as follows:

•

•

•

•

d.

tuaning on market share, a case involving a decision by the ·Food and Drug
ActministrAtion not to approve n new dl'ug for use, and a challenge to the
sufficiency of an environmental impact statement issued
in connection with the
.•
proposed construction of a major air terminal.
Court Policy. A ca.;e may not tum on any casclaw, statute, regulation, or
constitution, but on the court's supervisory powc.r over courts within the
appellate court's jurisdiction. Matters of pr.1ctice and standards of behavior
affectingjudges and lawyers are frequenl subjects. Because any decision dealing
with such issue~ must be clear, fair, and practicable, great care in phrasing is.
rcquil-ed and usually illl mcmbet-s of the cou.-t aa·c invited tQ comment.

•

•

·
/d. at 177..80.
160. Id. at 183~
. . 161. /d. Judge Coffin's "immel'sion'• phase of opinion Wl'iting also. involves a -check ofthc~lppeUatc
record and b.-owsing, on occasion, into collateral legal materials like law review atticlcs and treatises. A'i
poignantly expressed by Coffin:
.
•
The briefs having been read, I realize that I shall. no.t &l:ally "know'' the case until I
have gone tht'ough the-recot-d. But I know that I can spend several entr'ancing hours. with
a l·cco•·d and retain only generJI ifllpressions unless I can I"Ctt~cc my trctcks. So I emulate
Theseus when he entered the Minotaur's maze and leave a thread behind me as I go
forward. This thread, in the form of a crude index of major facts and the page,s on which
•
they are found, is my assurance that I can retrace. my steps and, when I am in danger of
being overwhelmed by detail, see \\'ith some pe1-spcctive the relation ofevent.s. I have no
doubt that today a judge with greater word·processing sophistication than I possess could
make a computer progrdm that does for judges what the thread did for Theseus.
Sometime~, if fancy suggests and tim~ allows, I shall go beyond the ba·icfs and recor~,
and b..owse. J shall look into law l'eview articles that have 'long lain on my· desk <?r I shall
open·a treatise or two and "read around', the issues. Once in a while I find some ore worth
mining. What this kind of experience teaches me is that when one sets forth to work on
what could be a signifi'cant opinion, It is a pearl of gt·eat price not to be harassed by tight
·
deadlines.
•
/d. at 184.
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
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In this kind of case,just exactly what ir the standard of review? Even
if there was a waiver .o f this objection, should .we neverthele.ss reach
the merits? If one issue proves dispositive, should we deal with any of
the:.o ther? Should we decide on a narrow ora broader ground? Do
we ~ant to make a ringing pre.cedent, or should we minimize the
preGedent by affirming on ~lternate grounds? lnvariably I leave such
162
a conference refreshed and inspired.
6. On "[t]he. [r]oad to U]ustification" moving well beyond the
decision on the merits. in a case to the explicit rationale for th·e
decision judge. Coffin suggests a twofold preliminary process:
·outlining a draft opinion and writing the first draft of the opinion. As
explained by Judge Coffin:
.
.
Outlining is not a·task that I per~orm all at once. I do my outlining
not only in sequential stages, but in different layers of detail. I first
concern myselfwith outlining the preliminaries?everythin,g leading up
to my analysis and discussion of the merits. I do not attempt an
oudirie of the merits at this point. Also, in outlining both the
preliminaries and the merits, I act again like the cross-country
traveler: when I come to a big city like Chicago (or a complex section
of an opinion), I need a more detailed road map on a larger scale. So
I make sub•outlines.
•

• • • •

I am now ready to outline my treatment of the merits. Of course, the
first decision will be to determine the order in which the issues,_if there.are more· than onel should be discussed. I ·suspect that generally
the most important issue should lead off. But not necessa~ly. It may
be that disposing ofless important issues Will clear out the underbrush
and lead logically ~o the final and dispositive issue. As priority of

am

issues is considered, I also
thinking of grouping issues, some
deserving very summary treatment, ~nd some·desemng no treatment
at all.
I am now ready to begjn writing. I realize that I still shall have to stop
along the way to make a more detaile·d sub-outline ifan issue warrants
it. At this point, I usually sense a welling of enthusiasm as I begin to
163

express the fruits 'of more creativity.
· 7. The culmination of Coffin's opinion writing ·p.rocess consists ofthe
"[f]inal [t]ouches" of editing the draft opinion, and then,
164
" [c] irculating the [d] raft" to his colleagues on the appellate panel.
The "pro~f of the pudding'' is the fe~ling of satisfaction that comes in
"working up an opinion". As explained by Judge Coffin:
'

162. ld. at 184..85. (Original emphasis).
163. ltl at 186, 188·89.
164. It/. at 190.·
·
'

•

•

•

•

•
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Sometimes, often enough to make me aware of the privilege of being
an appellate judge, the process of working up an opinion from the raw
materials of the cold record, the contesting briefs, the existing law,
history, logic, custom, arid such considerations of policy and social
justice as the case permits, becomes an intense, all-engulfing, and
fulfilling experience. 165 ·
·
•

•

•
•

C. Miscellaneous Vzewpoints
•

•

•

•

•

In ending my discussion on appellate judicial opinion writing style, it
is appropriate to briefly mention some other, antecedent, viewpoints .
1. Judge Edward Re. In his brief pamphlet published by the Federal
Judicial Center, Judge Re opines that, "[t]here is no such thing as an
exclusive style .. We each have ou·r own particular style. There is,
·however, good writing as distinguished from poor writing. For each of
166
us the questio11 is whether the writing represents our best effort.,'
The "A, B, C" of good appellate opinion writing,·forJudge Re, boils
167
down to "Accu.racy, Brevity and Clarity."
2. Dean John H WWnore. According to Wigmore:

•

•

•

[T]here can be no one and exclusive style, appropriate for a judicial
opinion. It may begin by rehearsing the facts, or it may begin by
stating the question of law; it may notice the arguments pro and con,
or it may merely state the conclusions reached; it may pay attention
to precedents distinguished, or it may not; and so on. But there is
one thing that it must do, viz., it must state plain!J the rule upon which the
decision proceeds. This is required, in theory, because the (Appellate]
Court's function is to declare the law; · and in practice, because the
Bar is entitled to know exactly what rule they can follow in advising
168
clients and in trying cases.

•

•

.

3. Professor Robert ujlar. In a law review article published in Columbia
Law Review, Leflar obseiVed:

•

Some judges argue that literary style has little or nothing to do with
the quality of opinions, that style is "dressing" merely, and that the
functions of opinions are served wholly by their substantive content.
This simply does ·not make sense .. For one thing, every judge has a
writing ·style, whether he knows it or not. It may be semi-literate,
graceless, obscure, opaque. It may be simple, clear, plain. It may be
florid, subtle, or fancified, repetitious, elf:lborate, or sketchy, garrulous,

•

•

.

.

165. ComN,supra note 155, at 155.
166. EDWARD D. RE, APPELLATE OPINION WRmNG 1 (1975).
· 167. Id. at3.
.
168. APPElJATEjUDICIAL OPINIONS 155 (Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974) (quoting 1 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE 253-54 (3rd ed. 1940}.
.
.
•
•

•

•
•
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•

·o r meticulous. There may be emphasis on policy and theory, on
practical socio-economic effects, on pre'cedents, or on counsels' briefs.
Whatever it is, it determines how effectively the·substantive content of
opinions is conveyed; in fact, it detennines whether there really is a
169
usable substantive content, and what that content is.
•

4.Justice James D. Hopkins. Justice Hopkins, a former judge of New
York's intermediate appellate court; ~rote a pithy law journal article .
about appellate judicial opinion style, articulating several incisive points.
Among the
most
interesting
points
in
his
article
are
the
following:
.
.
•

•

Judges write opinions for an audience. The audience varies as the
•
case vanes .
The opinion, as an expression ofjudgment, is an essay in persuasion.
The value of the opinion is measured by its ability to induce the·
audience to accept the judgment.
·
The nature of the audience is defined by ~he case. When the issue is
essentially factual, the audience usually consists of the parties and
their attorneys. When the issue is essentially legal, the ·a udience
usually consists of the parties, their attorneys, and the bench and bar.
When the issue has public implications, the audience includes the•
legislature, public officials, the news media, and the community .
•

• • • •

The style of an opinio~ has two aspects the organization of the
discussion, and the composition of the language.
The organization of the discussion means first, the approach of the
author to the issue, and second, the method employed to make the
discussion clear and concise.
The approach should always be measured, temperate,·and objective.
Rhetoric is best suited for the advocate; an opinion expresses a
decision above the individual passio·ns in the case.
The method of the discussion is not bound by any one rule. An
opinion considering several issues may be divided into branches.
Footnotes are useful when they inforrn ~he reader as to relevant
citations and material not crucial to the decision or contain quotations
at length of statutory provisions and pivotal testimony. Footnotes
breed irritation when their number and proximity interrupt the flow
of the discussion.
The operative facts should be stated in depth preceding the discussion
· in the opinion concerning their effect and the operative law. This is ·
not an absolute: sometimes disparate issues arise from unrelated facts,
and divisions of the discussion as to both fact and law pertinent to
each issue assist understanding.

•

•

169. ld. at 161 (quoting Robert A. LeOar, Some Observalitms Concnning]udicial Opinions, 61 COLUM: L.
•

REv~

•

810, 816 (1961)).

•

•

•

•

•
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One cardinal rule: do not omit the facts which are stressed by the
unsuccessful party or a doctrine which may be at war with the
ultimate disposition. Otherwise the standing.of the case both as to
persuasivene~s and as a precedent is impaired.
• • • •

Metaphors illuminate, yet may also be delusive. Be sure that they
·truly fit the pattern illustrated, an<;l are not so remote in their bearing
that the reader loses his way in underbrush .
• • • •

•

Humor has a dubious place in an opinion. · It is not an universal
commodity and the decision of the rights of th·e parties is a serious
matter. Irony may be an effective tool of expression, when sparingly
used, but sarcasm directed toward the parties is seldom in good taste .
•

•

• • • •

.

At some point in the opinion .a ppears its .fulcrum. That is where the
author ends his discussion of the operative facts and law and begins
his explanation of the decision. The value of the opinion largely
hinges on this section. Make sure that it expresses the intent of the
decision fully and clearly.
• • • •

•

•

Put the decision on a major ground. Recall that the opinion loses
worth as a precedent if the ·decision rests on alternative grounds.
Sometimes this cannot be helped: the 'g rounds are equally significant
and each is necessary to the proper disposition of the case. But
generally the opinion should determine the issue on one major
ground.
• • • •

•

Brevity is the soul of wisdom. Yet, do not be so brief as to be cryptic.
The audience may not alw·ays appreciate the author's desire to
170
shorten .the opinion to the irreducible minimum. .
.

•

.

.

5. Profissor Walker .Gibson. As a poet and professor of English, Walker
Gibson had some salient advice for melding literary style with judicial
opinions. Specifically, he wrote:
•

•

The problem of composing good judicial writing cannot finally be so
very different from the problem of composing any kind of good
writing. The issues to.be faced are the same, and ... they come down
pretty simply to a recognition of the virtues of one's reader. If I can
recogn~e my reader, if I can see in him a person of discretion and taste,
one who shares with me a sense of the world's multiplicity and a sense
of the tenuous relation between language and experience, then I am
•

·

170~

ld. at 164-67 (quotingjames D. Hopkins, Now on S!Jie inJudicial Opinions, 8 TRIALjUDGES'J. 49
(1969) (numbers before paragraphs omitted)).
·
•
•

•
•

•

•
•
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all right. By recognizing him, I define him, and we. may hope to
communicate across the guarded boundaries that divide us.
The.writer oflegal documents, ofwhatever sort, may be doing himself
an injustice if he f3:ils to accept such an ambitious and high-minded
notion of his art, choosing instead to .think .of himself as a relatively
mechanical and lowly worker in words .
. . . But the situation is surely·quite otherwise. The poet or novelist,
the historian, t~e physicist, the appellate judge are all deeply involved
in one essential responsibility: the expression of life's complexities in
mere man-made words. Wherever he starts, whatever trivial item of .
human experience he initially confronts, the legal writer can make.his
171
·
stab at eloquence.

•

•

•

.

.

IV. jUDGEPOSNER'SAPPELLATEOPINIONS, 1981-82: AS'IUDYIN
jUDICIAL OPINION S'fYI..E DURING HIS ROOKIE SEASON ON THE .

BENCH
.

•

A. The "Kul" as Heavy-Hitter
At the moment in late 1981 .when Richard
A. Posner assumed the
.
duties of the United States Court of Appeals Judge for the Seventh
Circuit, he possessed extraordinary ac~demic prowess, and considerable
potential to be an outstanding federal judge. In this regard, he had
helped to develop and refine the important interdisciplinary approach
172
to law called law and econol)'lics. As .no~ed by Professor George Priest
of the Yale Law School, Posner's 1973 book entitled Ecot:tomic Ana!Jsis of
Law "put forth (the] proposition that the· common law is efficient, that
it had some characteristics which achieved economically efficient ends.
This was at the same time an extremely simple and extremely ambitious
173
attempt at explaining the common law system.''
In the years
.

•

17 L ld. at 185-86 (quoting Walker Gibson, literary Minds and Judicial S9le, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 915,
930 (1961 )).
172. Set DOMNARSKI, supra note ·14, at 116-17.
173. /d. at 118. Professor Priest elaborates on Posner's law and economics theoretical contributions
as follows:
Posner's law and economics approach is a heightened, intensified form of functionalism.
It asks about the effects of the law and what effects will one legal rule have on one another.
That approach has been pursued for a long period of time. It wasn't always called law and
economics, but it was part oflegal realism in a way. What Posner did was to really intensify
the focus of effects of legal rules and legal institutions and then to show how important
economic analysis was for evaluating those effects. To say that he changed the way people
saw the law may well be right, but it was a change that caused the legal scholars to have to
address in much more serious form what the effects ofthe law were.
Id. (quotation marks in original)
.
.

•

•

•
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~allowing his

Phi Beta Kappa honors as a Yale undergraduate in 1959,
graduating first in his class in 1962 at HaiVard Law Sch-ool (preceded by
service as president of the law review), service as a .law clerk to United
States Supreme Courtjustice William Brennan, and work as assistant
to two Solicitor Generals of the United States.(Thurgood Marshall and
EIWin Griswold), Posner held law teaching positions at Stanford in 1968
and at Chicago beginning in 1969 · becoming the youngest tenured
174
professor in the school's history.
.
As pointed out by William Domnarski, ''[a]s a working intellectual he
wrote nine books and ninety-three articles [on law] in twelve years
175
before going onto the [federal appellate] bench" in 1981. During this
time, he also "found time to teach and to found and edit for .nine years
the Journal of ugal Studies, which consistendy published law and
176
economics articles.,' Ac.cording to University of Chicago professor,
Gary Becker, who won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1992, the
quantity and quality ofPosner's law and economics scholarly production
177
during this time is without parallel.
Beginning with his first batch of written opinions for the Seyenth
Circuit. in late 1981, Posner "took to the. . . ~ diet of cases with
enthusiasm, taking particular delight in divers,ity cases, which gave 'him
178
the chance to work in common law areas such as torts and contracts."
Moreover, right from the start of his judicial career, Judge Posner
exhibited a free-flowing literary style, which drew upon his
extraordinary store of eclectic knowledge and was characterized by a
stellar combination of breadth and depth in many of ~is judicial
.

•.

•

.•

opinions.

179

·

.

B. First Innings~· Posner's Initial Hundred Days as a Federal Appellate Judge
•

1. First Opinions: His December 1981 Trilogy
Posner wrote his first three opinions as a.fe-deral appellate judge ofthe
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in late·

174. Su id~ at 119..20.
175. /d. at 116. Amazingly, in lhe fifteen year period, beginning with his joining of the fede.-al bench
in 1981 through 1995, Posner wrote anotlter thirteen books and ninety-five articles. Su id.
176. Id at 119.
177. Steid. at 117.
17 8. ld. at 121.
179. For a concise and general discussion ofPosner'sjudicial opinion style over the first thirteen or
so years as a federal judge see id. at 122-55. This analysis by Domnarski has substantially influenced my
own thinking about Posner's "rookie year" on the bench in 1981-82.

•

'

•

•

•
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December of 1981, publishing these opinions within three weeks of
having heard oral argument. His first·9pinion, in the case of Dower v.

United States,

180

dealt with a rather simple issue involving a taxp,ayer's
appeal of the district C<?urt's summary judgment in favor of the
Government in a suit for refund of his federal income taxes. In a three
page opinion for the court, without subheadings or footnotes, Judge
·Posner cited only five ·cases in addition to a single citation to both the .
181
Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations.
This opinion

•

dealt with a single issue that hinged on a perusal of the record of past
shareholder lawsuits and a d,etertnination of "the origin and character
182
of the claim that was litigated" to determine whether or not the
taxpayer's financial setdement of these suits w~s a deductible business
183
expense. Posner's tone consists ofan "inquiring, expository voice,'' his

•

prose ·usage is active, fluid and brisk.

184

The chief portion of the
opinion in an_ undivided, unsectionalized, unified essay is his
discussion of the facts wherein it can be said that he "r~duce [s] them to
their essentials, and carries the reader along with the developing story

•

•

185

as ifhe were writing fiction or goodjoum~ism," while "[m]otives are
186
exposed and occasionally commented upon." . F~r example:

•

However unartfully drafted, the 1952 and 1965 agreements evidently
were designed to make provision for·the Key Men in the event that
the b,usiness was wound up or Dower, the dominant figure in it,
departed.
.
·
••

• • •

.

Dower also points to certain recitals in the settlement agreement to
the effect that his int~ntion in settling was .to preserve his position in
[the successor corporation] and avoid the derivative suit. These
recitals could have had no purpose other than to throw the Internal
Revenue Service off the scent; they have no probative yalue in this
187
·
litigation.

•

Posner's se,cond opinion for the Seventh Circuit, in the case of United.
188
States v. Carlone, was a criminal. case involving the Government's
appeal of the trial judge's order dismissing the indictment for failure to
•

•
•

''

180. 668 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1981).
181. "Each page of federal Reporter text contains approximately 750 W<?'rds." Domnarski, supra note
14, at 144. Therefore, this opinion was approximately 2,250 words in length.
.
182. 668 F.2d at 266.
183. DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 125.
184. Seeid.atl29.
185. ld.
186. [d.
•
187. 668 F.2d at 267-68.
188. 666 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1981).

•

•

'

•
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comply with the Speedy Trial Act.
In a three and one-half page
opinion for th~ court, without subheadings or footnotes, Posner
reasoned that the Speedy Trial Act did not require that a con~nuance,
which was valid when granted (which upon hindsight the trial court
thought should not have been· granted to the ·Government)
automatically compelled dismissal of the indictment. Posner cited no
caselaw in his opinion; his only citations were to su·bsections of the
Speedy Trial Act, the Federal Rules of.Crimi~al Procedure, and The Seventh
Circuit Rules. The opinion in Carlone addressed a single issue, which
focused on the course of the pretrial proceedings in the case and
whether the Government's continuance of the trial was in bad faith or
caused any prejudice to the defendant. Posner's tone was sarcastic and
angry; his prose deployment was brisk~ Again, the major part of the
exploration
of
the
facts
in
this
case,
opinion was ·an insightful
.
procedural facts. Hinting at a disporportionately severe sanction against
the Government by the trial court's dismissal of the indictment in
juxtaposition with the trial judge's misinterpretation of the conduct of
the Government in trying to obtain the testimony of essential European
witnesses, Posner is also .witty. For example:
•

.

There is nothing in the Speedy Trial Act which says that a
continuance valid when granted becomes invalid ab initio if the reasons
f~r which the continuance was granted turn out not to be the actual
causes of the delay that the continuance allows. Contingencies not
foreseen when the continuance was asked for and granted may arise
that prevent the government from using the continuance. for the
purposes for which it was granted. If so, the court can refuse to grant
further continuances; it can revoke or shorten the continuance; but
it is not required to revoke the continuance with effect back to the
original trial date. We are unwilling to read so inflexible a mandate
into the Act.
An alternative reading of the district judge's opinion is that pe was
revoking the continuance with effect back to the original trial date as
a discretionary sanction for the government's misuse of the time
allowed it by the continuance. Courts do have broad and flexible
powers to prevent the abuse of their processes; bl:Jt where, as here, the
exercise of those powers results in forever precluding the government
from trying defendants accused of serious crimes, there is a danger
that it is the powers themselves that are being abused. To dismiss an
indictment with prejudice, as the court in effect did here, is to p1.:1nish
not only the prosecutor but the entire law-abiding public. Alternative

189. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994) .
•

•

•

•

•
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sanctions are available that do not involve such windfalls for law
breakers.
•• •• •• •

.

•

We therefore reverse;. and because we think that relations between the
trial cqurt and the prosecutor may have become frayed beyond repair
by the events leading up to the court's order .. .. we remand the case
190
to a different judge for further proceedings in the matter.

•

Completing his December tour deforce ofopinion writing,]udge Posner
wrote the opinion for his Court of Appeals panel in United States. v.
191
()McAnal!J
another criminal case, resulting in another reversal. The
case involved the conviction below ofJames McAnally for violating a
federal statute, which provides that any ''officer, director, agent .or
employee of any Federal Reserve bank, member bank, national bank or
insured bank who makes· any false entry in any book, report, or
statement of such bank with intent to injure or defraud the bank" is
192
"guilty of a felony punishable by up to five years' imprisonment.''
In
a three page opinion, without subheadings or footnotes, Judge Posn~r
quickly affirmed th.e trial court's denial of McAnally's motion for
193
acquittal because of alleged insufficiency of the evidence.
Posner
concentrated his analysis and exposition on the persuasiveness of
McAnally's motion for a new trial because of alleged error in the jury
instructions. Posner's tone is sarcastic, biting and compassionate~ He
cited five case~, two scholarly treatises, and pertinent s~ctions of the
federal criminal statute at bar. He also used a hypothetical to illustrate
a point. Posner's key concern in the case was the. trial court's confusing .
jury instructions below: ''[a] reckless disregard by a bank official of his
bank's interest is sufficient to establish the requisite intent to defraud"
194
under the federal statute.
Posner enlists colloquial and figurative
language, while, also employing law and economic insights to make his
opinion for the Court in McAnal!J, in. which he explained that intent and
not carelessness was an element of a false-entry offense, the vivid,
memorable, and nuanced:

•

•

~

The term ''reckless" covers a broad range of meanings to lawyers, and
probably an even broader one to laymen. In law it is sometimes used
interchangeably with gr<?ss negligence and in the absence of a

190. Carwne, 666 F.2d at 1115-16.
191. 666 F.2d 1116 (7th Cir. 1981).
192. ]d. at 1117 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1994) (the imprisionment pe1iod was increased
to twenty
.
years in Pub. L. 101-73 (1989), and then to thirty years in Pub. L. 101-647 §§ 2504(d), .2595(a)(3)(A), (B),
.

2597(h) (1990))}.
193. See McAnaJJy, 666 F.2d at 1117.
194. ld. at 1118.
•

•

,.

•

•
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clarifying instruction the jury might have so understood it here. If so,
the jury might have seriously misunderstood the false-entry offense.
That offense has two elements (so far as relevant here): a false entry,
and an intent to injure or defraud. The first is satisfied by showing
that the entry was inaccurate. If the second could be satisfied by
showing that the inaccuracy was the result of gross negligence, then
section 1005 would make gross negligence by bank employees in
making entries on the books of the bank a felony~ It is unlikely that
the statute was intended to go so far to protect banks and their
customers from the misconduct ofbank employees. There must be at
least a hundred thousand bank officers in thiS. country, many of them,
· like McAnally, young and inexperienced employees of small and
unsophisticated banks. These officers make in the aggregate millions
of entries in the books of their banks every day; no doubt many of
those entries· are inaccurate; and many of the inaccuracies are
probably due to negligence, some of it gross~ We do not think
Congress meant to expose all of these bank employees to felony
prosecutions; [there is] the danger that the heavy penalties prescribed
195
in section 1005 would over-deter, with resulting social costs ....

•

•

•

•
•

2. The First Three Months of 1982

•

•

•

The ·first quarter of 1982 completed Posner's first hundred days as a
federal appellate judge. During. this time frame,Judge Posner authored
196
anothe.r sixteen opinions for the Court of Appeals, for a total of
nineteen published opinions during his first hundred days. This
expeditious and prolific pace was a portent of his future productivity as
197
an appellate judge.
The sixteen ·court opinions written by Posner during the first quarter
of 1982 covered a broad spectru-m of issues: two opinions on labor
•

195. /d. at 1119 (citations omitted).
.
196. See Donovan v~ Ill. Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982); Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big
Ten) Conf. Athletic Ass'n., 668 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1982); By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d
956 (7th Cir. 1982); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1982);- Cummin~ v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d
81 (7th Cit-. 1982); Ruck~r v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Coca-Cola.
Co. Foods Div., 670 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1982); Arias v. Rogers,_676 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982); Hixon v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lewis, 671 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir.
1982}; Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Franzen, 671 F.2d
JOS6 (7th Ci.-. 1982); Sutton v. CityofMilwaukee, 672 F~2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982); Evra Corp. v.. Swiss Bank
Corp., 673 F.2d951 (7th Cir. 1982); Cuttiss-Wright Corp. v. Helfand~ 687 F.2d 171 (7th Cit\ 1982);
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman &·Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982).
197. William Domnarski, assessing Posner's (irst thirteen years on the federal bench, observed that
during .this timeframejudge Posner "wr[ote] more than thirteen hundred opinions,, DOMNARSKI, supra
note 14, at 122, or an average ofa hundred opinions a yea-r, twenty-five per quarter, or eight per month.
•

;

•

•

•

·'
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law,
two opinions
on federal jurisdiction/ two opinions on
200
c.onstitutionallaw, one opinion on social security and public welfare
198

99

201

•

•

202

law, one opinion on employment discrimination law·, one opinion
203
204
on immigration law, two diversity case opinions on state tort law,
205
two opinions on federal criminal law an.d procedure, one opinion on
206
207
federal contracts law, and two opinions on federal securities law.
In the course of these sixteen opinionsJudge Posner continued to define
.and elaborate his judicial opinion style. In a general sense, he persisted
in writing relatively short opinions with no footnotes or subdivisions,
continued a pattern ofsparse and focused citation to authoritative cases
and statutes, sustained an informal and colloquial tone, and pursued a
contingent, exploratory approach in reasoning (rather than writing in a
208
mechanical way, as if legal conclusions w~re obvious).ln several specific ways Posner -employed vivid, fresh, and relatively
rare stylistic devices in these judicial opinions that seiVed to heighten the
interest level of the reader while achieving a fact-sensitive, doctrinally~
focused, economically-justified, policy-based reasoning gestalt. Several
examples from these sixteen opinions illustrate the specific qualities of
the inchoate, seminal Posnerian opinion style.
·

a. Context Awareness ofugal Issues ofFirst Impression
Remarkably, in half of the sixteen Posner opinions for the ·Seventh
Circuit written during the first quarter of 1982,Judge Posn~r obseiVed
that· --either directly or obliquely an issue was novel or was a matter
209
of first impression.
For example, in NLRB v. Coca Cola Co. Foods Div.,
Posner wrote: . "We are pres~nted with a question apparendy of-first
impression regarding the power of the National Labor Relations Board

198. See Donovan, 667 F.2d 638; Coca-Cola, 670 F.2d 84.
199. See Wtlron, 668 F.2d 962; By-Prod Corp., 668.F.2d 956.
200. See Ellis, 669 F.2d 51 0; Sutton, 672 F.2d 644.
201. See Cummins, 670 F.2d at 81.
202. See Rucker, 669 F.2d 1179.
203. See Arias, 676 F.2,d 1139.

204. See Hi~on, 671 F.'2d 1005; Evra Corp., 673 F.2d 951.
205. See Lnvi.r, 671 F.2d 1025 (Internal Revenue); Davis, 67·1 F.2d 1056 (habeus corpus petition).
206. See Powers, 671 F.2d 1041.
207. See Cenco, 686 F.2d 449; Curtiss-Wright Corp., 687 F.2d 171.
208. See supra notes 198-207 .
.209. See NLRB v. Coca-Cola Co. Foods Div., 670 F.2d 84, 85 {7th Cir. 1982); Arias v. Rogers, 676
F.2d 1139, 1141 (7th Cir. 1982); Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 1982)
(oblique reference); Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d I041, 1041 (7th Cir. 1982); Sutton
v. City of Milwaukee~ 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 1982); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951,
952 (7th Cir. 1982); Genco 686 F.2d at 452 (oblique reference); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Helfand, 687
F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1982) (oblique reference).

•

•

•

•
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activities before they ·-

·

Moreover, by way of further illustration, in Arias v. Rogers Judge
Posner observed:
This appeal from the denial of a petition .for a_ writ of habeas corpus
requires us to consider a question of first impression in this circuit:
whether someone who is in custody because the government is trying
to deport him may test t~e.legality ofhis detention in a habeas corpus
proceeding after formal deportation ·proceedings have begun but
211
before a final order of deportation has issued.

•

.

•.

'

h. Penetrating _Policy-Based Ana!J'sis
Posner's first flush of opinions for the ~ourt, in early 1982, during his
first hundred days as ajudge, exhibit an overarching attention to policy
concerns: what might be viewed as the purpose of rules, the pragmatic
functioning ofrelevant legal doctrine, or the advisability ofchoosing one
body ofpotentially applicable principles over. another body ofapplicable
212
principles. Indeed, in Don.ovan v. Illinois Education Ass'n, Judge Posner,

•

•

writing an opinion that reversed the U.S. District Court, captured the
precise policy spirit of the dispute. He examined union bylaws, which
guaranteed board seats and "[r]epresentative (a]ssembly'' positions to
. four minority groups blacks, Asians, persons of Hispanic background
and American Indians but noted: "our concern is not the racial
incidence of the restrictions~ but with their impact on freedom of
213
candidacy and voting (as mandated by federal labor statutes]."
In
•

•'

•
''

210. Coct~-Coltl Co., 670 F.2d at 85.
211. Arilu , 676 F.2d at 1141. Other examples of dil'cct and ·oblique references to an issue of first
impression incl'udc Powers v. United Seaus /Willi Seroict, f>71 F.2d at 1041 ("The question we are called upon
to decide in this case one of first irnpression in this circuit is whether state law or federal common law
is to be used to decide a dispute between the United States Postal Seavice, as tenant, ~nd a private landlord,
concerning the landlord's right to termin;ate the lease for nonpayment of rent."); Suu.on v. Cig tifMilwllukt,
· 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Ci•.. 1982) ("Thus the preciSe questio~ we must decide is whetoer it is a denial or
due process lO tow a person's illegally parked car without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the car is towed. The question is one offit"St impression at the federal appellate leveL,); Evra CorjJ.
v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 952 (7th Cir. 1982) (''The question ? one of first impression ? in this
diversity case is the extent of a bank's liability for failure to make a transfer of funds when requested by wire
to do so.'?:,· Ctnco Inc. v. &Ulman & StU/man, 686 F.2d 44.9, 453 (7th Ci1.. 1982) ("In any event, creating a new
Illinois tort is something for the Illinois courls or legislature to do rclthcr than the federal courts."); CurtissWright CorjJ. v. Hd/and, 687 F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1982) ("There is a surprising dearth ofauthority on what
one might have expected to be a recurrent issue in class actions, the vast majol"ity ofwhich are settled rather
than. litigated."}.
212. 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1,982).
213. Id~ at 641.
•

•

(

•
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214

·Wilson v, Intercollegiate (Big Ten) ConferenteAthlet~cAss'n, Posner's opinion
reversed the lower court's rather rigid application of the . case law
exception to the Federal Judicial Code's thirty day time limit for a
defendant's r.emoving federally-cognizable claims filed by the plaintiff
215
in state court,. Posner paused in his analysis to probe the policy of the
thirty day limit and its judicially-created exception by writing:
The purpose of the 30-day limitation is twofold: to deprive the
defendant of the undeserved tactical advantage that he would have if
he could wait and see how he was faring in state court before deciding
whether to remove the case to another court system; and to prevent
the delay and waste of resources involve.d in starting a case_over in a
second court after significant proceedings, extending over months o~
even years, may have , taken place in the first court. These
considerations might be overborne in a case where ·a plaintiff, seeking
to mislead the defendant about the true nature of his suit and thereby
dissuade _him_ from removing it, included in his initial complaint filed
in state court an inconsequential but remoyable federal count unlikely
to induce removal and then, after the time for removal had passed
without action by the: defendant, amended the complaint to add the
216
true and weighty federargrounds that he had been holding back.

•

Powers v. United States Postal Servicr is another promi~ent example of
Judge Posner's interest in discerning the policy basis of applicable rules,
in this batch <?fsixteen 1982 opinions. Specifically, in Powers, Posner was
interested if! the reasons why it might, or might not be, appropriate_for
17

a federal c:ourt to develop a federal common law of landlord-tenant

principles, when a federal agency, like the United States Postal Service,
is a party to a lease .with a private landlord. In inimitable style, Posner
wrote:
•

•

the fact that federal courts have the power to create federal common
law applicable to Postal Service leases does not mean that they have
to exercise that power. If state l~w w~uld provide as good or better
rules of decision, a federal court can apply state law instead ofcreating
its own rules. This is a frequent choice, especially in real ·p roperty
law, of which landlord-tenant law is a part.
,
• • •

•

Since we have found no persuasive reason for using federal common
law rather than state law to decide the Postal Service's rights under
the lease, since considerations of uniformity (really simplicity) of legal

214. 668 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1982).
215. See.ul. at 965 (the relevant
statute
is
28
U.S.C.
§§1446(b)
(1994)).
.
216. Id.
217. 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982).
•

•

'

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

692

UNIVERS/Tr OF CLNCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68
•

obligations seem rather to favor state th~ federal law, and since in
the absence of strong reasons one way or the other we would be
inclined to defer to state law merely because federal lawmaking takes
place against a background of state law that the federal courts should
try to disturb as little as possible, perhaps we need say no more. But
·a powerful argument against applying federal common law in this
case has yet to be mentioned: a federal common law in this case has
yet to be mentioned: a federal common law of landlord and tenant
does not exist. The (ederal courts could of course create that law,
picking and choosing among existing state laws and proposed reforms
in accordance with the recommendations of eminent scholars and
practitioners. It is not to be expected that the federal courts would do
a very good job of devising a model code oflandlord-tenant law, since
they have very little experience in landlord·tenant matters; and.
though eventually some body of law would emerge it would not in all
likelihood be a uniform body, because there are.twelve federal circuits
and the Supreme Court could be expected to intervene only
sporadically. In any event, during the protracted transition to settled
law the uncertainties attending the rights and obligations of the Postal
Service as tenant would be profound, and this would have several
effects: the Postal Service's negotiations with prospective landlords
would be more elaborate; its leases would be more detailed; and
extensive research would be undertaken to predict the mature shape
of emerging federal common law.
This discussion shows that we do not have to balance competing
federal and state interests in this case after all. The overriding federal
. interest here is in certainty of right and obligation flowing from
conformity to known law; the state interest is in offering its landlords
a like certainty. These interests converge in favor of adopting, as the
rule of decision to govern disputes under Postal Service leases, state
218
law rather than federal common law.

•

•

•

•

·

218. /d. at 1045-46 {citation omitted). For other noteworthy instances of Posner's opinion style of
policy·based concerns ~ontained in opinions he wrote for the Seventh Circuit during the first quarter of
1982, sec DIWis v. FranQn, 671 F.2d I 056, I 058 (7th Cir. 1982) (policy considerations of rule that violation
of the hearsay .rule is not a pet· se violation of the Sixth Amendment); SuUon v. Ci9 ofMilwaukee,
672 F.2d
.
644,646--47 (7th Cir. 1982) (policy considerations regarding the impracticality of adopting a pre-towing
non..emergency notice and hearing procedure); Cmco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 689 F.2d 449,455..57 (7th
Cir. 1982) (policy considerations in predicting how Illinois courts might decide a n'?vel issue of tort law by
examining tott law objectives of compensating victims and deterring wrongdoing in a case involving
corporate fraud); and Curtis.r·Wrighl Corp. v. Helfand, 687 .F.2d 171, 174-75 {7th Cir. 1982) (policy analysis
of the equity of the district court judge's denial of one class action member's full proportionate share of
settlement proceeds without a trial-like proceeding).
·
•

•
•
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•

c. Extraordinary Narrative Skill
•

Posner's first quarter 1982 opinions are exemplars of narrative skill
219
and fact-sensitivity. In an easy, colloquial, informal manner, Posner's
rendition of the facts in his earlyjudicial opinions tells compelling stories
without getting bogged down in prolix procedural history or irr~levant
factoids so common in other appellate opinions. .His factual narratives
serve to naturally lead to the pivotal legal issues in the case. Of the
sixteen opinions judge Posner authored for the Seventh Circuit during
the ..first quarter of 1982, three examples of his narrative brilliance and
dexterity are instructive.
The first example involved a contorted and pathetic chain of events
involving government ineptness in responding to the welfare of Indiana
children who were buffeted in the conflicting cl~ms of dys(unctional
family members. Posner tells a poignant story in the process of framing
the legal questions presented:

..

•

•

•

This is a suit under42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief and damages
against several welfare and judicial officers (includ~ng a judge) in
Putnam County, Indiana·. The plaintiffs claim that their rights under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated
by these officers: in connection with procee_dings· that led to the
plaintiffs'' grandchildren (as we shall call them without meaning
•
•

•
•

•

219. This characteristic ofjudge Posner's opinior:as has been described by one commentator as being .
reader-friendly in the fQilowing way: "Posner presents the entire case, from its facts to its analysis, in a way
· that teaches and informs. In an age in which the Socratic method still finds significant pocke_ts of support
in legal education, Posner in his opinions accomplishes more by -relying on narrative skill and sheer
exposition." DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 143.
For a theoretical literary explanation of the recent scholarly concem witb. the power and structure of
narrative seeM. H. ABRAMS, A GLOSSARY OF LITERARY TERMS, 123-24 (1993). As_explained, in part,
by Abrams:
·
A narrative is a story, whether in prose or verse, involving events, characters, and what the
characters say and do. Some literary fonns such as the novel and short story in prose, and
the epic and romance in verse, are explicit narratives that are told by a narrator. In drama,
the narrative is not told, but evolves in tea·ms of the direct presentation on stage of the
actions and speeches of the characters.
·
.
Narratology denotes a recent cqncem with narrative in ger-eraL It deals·especially with the
identification ofstructural elements and their diverse modes ofcombination, with recurrent
narrative devices, and with the analysis of the kinds of discourse by which a narrative gets
told. This theory picks up and elaborates upon many topics in traditional treatments of
fictional narratives, from Aristotle's Poetics to Wayne Booth's TheRketori&ofFtftWn (1961); but
applies to them concepts and analytic procedures which detive from recent developments·
in Russian formalism and especially in French structuralism. Narratologists treat a narrative
not in the traditional way, as a fictional representation of life, but as a systemic fortnal
construction. A primary interest of structural narra~ologists is in the way that narrative
discourse fashions a "story,?the mere sequence of events in time Into the organized
structure of a literary plot.
·
ld. (emphasis.omitted).

•

•

.•

•

•
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thereby to prejudge their status, which is contested) being removed
· from the plaintiffs' homes ·and adopted by strangers. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The plaintiffs are Amy Ellis, her sister Zelia Frazier, and Zelia's
husband Cyril Frazier. Mrs. Fra~ier is th~ natural mother, and Amy
Ellis the aunt, of Larry Ellis. In 1952 Mrs. Ellis adopted Larry with
the consent ofMrs. Frazier. The adoption extinguished Mrs. Frazier's
parental rights and vested the~ in her sister. Mr. Frazier is:-.not ·
Larry's father or otherwise related to him. He married Zelia long
after she had given up Larry for a~option. ·
Larry grew up and got ·married. Between ·1969 and 197 4 four
children were born to the marriage. Larry and his wife were
unsatisfactory parents, however, and the children lived for .long
stretches of time with Mrs. Ellis and Mrs. Frazier. In 1975 Mrs. Ellis
complained to the defendants that Larry and his wife were mistreating
the children. Her complaint led to criminal charges being lodged
against Larry and his wife .for cruelty and neglect.
An ·order was .
.
entered removing the children from their parents' custody and placing
them in a foster home, but the parents later regained custody, and
were living with the children in Mrs. Ellis' home when, in july 1977,
the mother decamped. Larry thereupon told the defendants that he
wanted·two of the children to remain. with Mrs. Ellis and the other
two to live with Mrs. Frazier. Larry took the two children to Mrs.
Frazier's house and then disappeared.
• • • •

The plaintiffs say that the defendants initially acquiesced in Larry's
proposal to place. the children in the homes of Mrs. Ellis and Mrs.
Frazier, and that the plaintiffs thereby acquired legal cus.tody of the
children. One month later the defendant welfare officers ordered the
plaintiffs, on two days': notice and without any explanation, to
surrender the children to them. They placed the children in a totally
unsuitable in fact, notorious group foster home where the female
· children were subjected to sexual abuse. When the plaintiffs
complained, the welfare officers took the children out of the group
home and placed them with fost~r parents but refused· to tell the
plaintiffs who the foster parents were or where they lived. The
children were heartbroken at the separation from their grandparents
and would have -preferred to live with them.
The plaintiffs eventually · retained a lawyer, who in May of the
following year inquired of the defendant welfare officers about the
children. The welfare officers, fearing that the lawyer would begin
proceedings for the adoption of the children by Mrs. Ellis.and Mrs.
. Frazier, filed injune a petition with the defendant judge to terminate
the parental rights of Larry Ellis and his wife. Because their
whereabouts were unknown, notice of the proceeding was by
publication in the local newspaper. No effort was made to notify the

•
.

.

•
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plaintiffs specifically, but their lawyer knew about the proceeding. A
hearing was held on June· 25, 1978, and the judge ordered the
parental rights of Larry and his wife terminated. Neither the
plaintiffs' lawyer nor any of the pl~intiffs was at the hearipg.
The termination cleared the way for the children to be adopted, and
the plaintiffs set about trying to adopt them. But their lawyer was
given the runaround by the defendant court officers, who offered
niggli~g ·and specious objections to the fonnal adequacy of the
petition for adoption. As a result she was forced to file a second, and
on Au,gust 24 a third, petition. A few days later the defendants
informed her that the children had already been adopted by others.
The adoptions (each child was ·adopted by a different couple) had
taken place after ·~he plaintiffs' ·lawyer filed the first petition~ and
neither she nor the plaintiffs had actual or constructive kpowledge of
the adoption proceedings. The adoptions
robbed
the
plaintiffs
not
.
only of their hopes of adopting the children themselves but also, it
seemed; of al).y right ever to see them again, for the defendants told
the plaintiffs that it would be up to the adoptive parents to decide
220
whether to permit the plaintiffs to ·visit with the children.
.

'

'

•

'

•

.

•

•

Posner's narratology in this fa~ily-govemment dispute tells a tale ofw<?e
and pervasive.· but random interconnectedness in the tradition of the

•

novels of Charles Dickens. Like the mud and the fog, the Chancery,
and the Old Curiosity ·shop of Dickens' London, Posner
conveys through his narration of the facts told from the standpoint of
the plaintiffs because.ofthe procedural posture of the case involving an
appeal from the summaryjudgment dis~issal ofthe compl,~.int ·-similar
•

0

images of random interconnectedness, in late twentieth century, rural
Indiana. Posner's, narration brings to mind ·faceless local courthouse
bureaucrats, absentee parents, and anonymous adoptive parents. Yet,
considering these facts "in the light most favorable" to the plaintiffs,
Posner's opinion for the court found no due process violatio,n because,
as he reasoned, "[i]f due process were denied every time local officials
blundered, then any plaintiffin state, court who was asserting a right
within the broadly defined categories ofliberty or property and who lost
his case because the judge made an error coUld attack the judgment
221
indirecdy by suing the judge under section 1983."
According to
Posner'· while the factual narrative "deepen [s] [the court's] sympathy for
this unfortunate family and bolster[s] -the plaintiffs' contention that the
defendants have mishandled the whole business [the facts] also show

•

•

•

•

•

220. Ellisv. Hamilton, 669F.2d 510, 511·12 (7th Cir.. l982) .
221. /d.at514.

•

•

•

•

•
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that the plaintiffs really did, and still do, have remedies under Indiana

law."222
A second example of Posner's narrative prowess in his opinions
during this nascent·period in his judicial career is ·extracted from an
employment discrimination suit brought by a black man, which involves
•

interesting issues. of reverse racial

disc~mination

and . sexual
223
discrimination.
Presenting the narrative from the standpoint of
plaintiffs' evidence at trial, because of the trial court's conclusocy .non-

•

•

224

foundational dismissal order in the ben.ch trial, Judge Posner set the
stage for his subsequent legal analysis for the court, which reversed and
225
remanded the case for a new trial.
In prose. that suggests the
Dickensian random interc<?nnectedness ofmultiple chara~ters, and also .
hi~ts at Kafkaesque alienation and injustice in the face of meaningless
· procedures. Judge Posner wrote,:

..

,,

The plaintiff, Carl Rucker, was a supeiVisor for the defendant, the
Higher Educational Aids Board, a Wisconsin state·. agency that
provides counseling services to disadvantaged youths. Rucker, who
is black, contends that the Board fired him because he opposed the
efforts of his supervisors to discriminate on racial and sexual grounds
against a white woman who worked for the Board, Mary Phillips.
'T hus he invokes 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), which so far as relevant here
. forbids an employer to discriminate against an employee because "he
has opp.osed any practice made an unlawful employment practice" .by
Title VII, including, of course, racial and sexual discrim'ination. ·
At trial Rucker presented evidence in support of the following facts.
He had been hired by the Board in 1973, had been rapidly promoted,
and. in 1976 had received an Exceptional Performance Award from
the Board's chief executive officer. Also in 1976 Miss Phillips who
had been working as a typist at the Board, applied for a professional
position as a counselor it:t an office wher~ Rucker would be her
supervisor. Rucker's immediate supervisor, Spraggins, ·also a bla~k
man, told Rucker that he wanted to prevent Miss Phillips from getting
the job as cou~selor because she had not been "·cooperating," ~hich
Rucker interpreted as referring to the fact that Spraggins in his
presence had orice placed a hand on Miss Phillips' breast and she had
pushed it away. Spraggins asked Rucker to write a memorandum to
him stating that the local black community did not want a white
en:tployee to serve them as a counselor. Rucker refused. Spraggins
then had Rucker attend ~ meeting that Spraggins had arranged with

..

•

•

•

•

•

222.
223.
224.
225.
•

ld. at 515:
Su Rucker v: Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982).
Set id,. at 1183.
See id. at 1184.

•

•
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two black ministers, who told Rucker: "You're going to have to get
a black woman and put her on that job. It's as simple as that.'~ On
the way out of the meeting one of the ministers said to Spraggins that
he had better get rid of that "nigger," meaning Rucker. After this
Spraggins repeated his request to Rucker. to write the memorandum
about community feeling, and Rucker again refused.
.
Shortly afte-rward, Miss Phillips was appointed to the counselor's
positien, initially on a six-month probationary basis. During this
period she claimed to be having further problems with Spraggins and
wrote him complaining about his hostile ~ttitude toward her, which
she summarized in the phrase "vile crap." He wrote back accusing
her of lying and other misbehavior, and she responded by filing with
the Board a written. grievance protesting Spraggins' co-nduct toward
her. Rucker then wrote a memorandum to Spraggins in which he
defended Miss Phillips and in addition stated, ''I have good reason to
believe that the charges ... forwarded to you from Mary Phillips ..
. are true.;' This was on December 28, 1976. Shortly afterward, in
a meeting with the-Board's chief executive officer, Rucker was given
to understand that he should give Miss Phillips a poor evaluation so
that she would not receive permanent statu~ at the end of her
probationary period. He refused and instead, onjanuary 18, 1977,
sub~itted ~written evaluation in which he found her to· be qualified
for a permanent appointment. Three weeks later Rucker was .
suspended_ from his job on a variety of charges, and the next day he
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a
complaint that his suspension was in retaliation for his refusal to be a
party to proposed discrimination. A month later he was fired; Miss
226
Phillips had meanwhile received her permanent appointment.
•

•

•

•

•

A third illustration of Posner's facility in writing compelling,
interesting and pithy narrative in his early judicial opinions during 1982
227
, is contained in Hixon v. Sherwin- Williams Co.
a diversity suit involving
principles of state tort law ~manating from a comedy of errors involving
attempts to ftx the linoleum kitchen floor owned by a married couple.
In vivid, forceful, simple and elegant language, Judge Posner wrote:

•

•

,

Mr. and Mrs. Chess, who are not parties to this litigation, sustained
several hundred dollars in water damage to the kitchen floor of their
home in Indiana. Their homeowner's insurer, American States
Insurance· Company, a nonresident corporation,· hired a local
· ~on tractor, Marv Hixon, to install a new linoleum floor in the kitchen.
Too busy to attend to the ,contract himself, Hixon subcontracted the
job to the Sherwin-Williams Company, another nonresident
'

•

226. /d. at 1180·81.
227. 671 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1982).
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corporation. Sherwin-Williams is! a manufacturer of linoleum and
other products rather than a building contractor, but it undertook to
install its linoleum in the Chesses' kitchen rather than just sell the
linoleum to Hixon for installation. The local office of SherwinWilliams hired.Louis Benkovich to do the installation. Benkovich had .
been in the linoleum installation business for. many years and had
done previous jobs for Sherwin-Williams. His reputation. was good;
people said, "Louie puts in a nice. floor.'' He had never been known
to have an ~ccident or otherwise fail to render adequate service. He
was self-employed, and was retained by Sherwin-Williams as an
independent contractor rather than an employee. Sherwin-Williams
did ·n ot supervise his work and knew nothing about the particulars of
the Chessjob beyond the fact that Hixon wanted a new linoleum floor
installed .
The new linoleum could not be attached directly to the cement floor
beneath it because of dampness; a plywood layer was required
between the cement and the linoleum. Benkovich used a glue that
happened to be extremely flammable to fasten the plywood to the
cement. The label on_ the can contained explicit and ~mphatic
warnings concerning the flammability of the glue and the importance
of good ventilation. Benkovich had ·never used this brand of glue
before; in fact, he had never in- his many years as a linoleum

•

•

•
•

•

contractor fastened a plywood layer to a cement floor. He proceeded
to ignore the warnings on the can; he may not even h~ve read them.
· Instead of opening the windows and turning off the pilot light in the
hot water heater in the Chesses' kitchen, _he closed the windows and

left the pilot light on. The. .glue exploded; and pursuant to its
homeowner's policy American States found itselfhaving to indemnify·
228
the Qhesses for some $27,000 in additional damage to their house.
0

Posner's narrative. structure in this story of comical carelessness
suggests a plot theme of how seemingly -small acts and omissions can
lead. to catastrophic losses. A close reading of Posner's account of the.
facts of the case is remarkable in two respects. First, he cuts to the quick
of the dispute by a straightforward, informal recitation of the relevant
evidence. Unlike many-appellate opinions, Posner ~oes not provide an
excessively detailed chronology; does ~ot quote at length from
documentary evidence (insurance policies for example); and passes on
the easy temptatio-n to comment at length o.n the entire corpus of
evidence. Second, Posner's narrative is memorable and imaginativelycrafted; his story reminds the reader of the analogous universal plot
themes of "Wretched Excess'' (whereby "life sometimes throws us a

0

·'

228. ld.

at

1006.
'

.

•

•

•

•

•

•.

•

2000]

PLATING ON WORDS

•

699
•

229

cuiVe that we can't hanClle" that leads to an unraveling) .and
230
"Metamorphosis;' (all about "change" both physical and emotional)"
.

(

d. Intense Doctrinal Scrutiny
.

Right from the start of his service on the federal appellate bench,
Judge Posner wrote opinions that are unusual and noteworthy for their·
231
penetrating analysis and ~riticism of prevailing legal·doctrines.
By
way of illustration, his ·early 1982 opinio~s provide rich; clarifying, and
fact-sensitive insights on a panoply oflegal doctrines ~ncluding pendent
232
jurisdiction and pendent party jurisdiction in federal diversity suits;
due process notice and hearing procedures in government property
233
deprivations; Hadlf:y v~ Baxenda~ limitations on consequential damages
234
235
in contract actions;
avoidable consequences limits in tort actions;
236
the foreseeal?le consequences rule in negligence suits;
the concept of
37
238
ancillary jurisdiction;~ the ·equitable nat~re of class actions;
and
239
affirmative action by employers.
'

•

229. RONAlD B. T_OBIAS, 20 MASTER PLoTS 209 (1993).
230. /d. at 146.
231. As explained by one commentator in· ~onsidering the corpus ofPosncrian opinions during the
Eighties and early Nineties:
He asks why ·certain, doctrines exist, what function they .serve, whether·they still setve that
function, and what might be gained by discarding the doctrine for something else. He
explains and reveals the reasoning undergirding whatever doctrine he is looking at and only
at the end cites cases to support his position. Wilh each case he reasons tht'Ough the
doctrine and then applys facts, always questioni~g the usefulness of the doctrine. This isnot
· to say that he is quick to discard precedent when he disagrees with it. Firm principles
dictate the extent to which a lower court can igno•·e Supreme
Court .precede1,1t, and Posner
.
adheres strictly to them .
DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at ·134.
232. See 'Hi~on; 671 F.2d at 1007-09.
·
2.33. See Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d .644, 645-47 (7th Cir. 1982).
234. St~t Evra Corp. v~ Swis5 Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955-57 (7th Cir. 1982).
235. See id. at 95 7-58.
236. See id. at 958. A slice of Posner's analysis on this doctrinal issue stands out from the run-of. . the~
mill standard of appellate
opinion
writing:
.
.
These were circumstances too remote from· Swiss Bank's P.ractical range of knowledge to
have .affected its decisions· as to who should man the telex machines in' the foreign
department or whether it should have more intelligent machines or should install more
machines in the cable depa•·tment, any more than the falling of a platform scale· because a
conductor jostled a passenger:who was carrying fireworks was a· prospect that could have
influenced the amount of care taken by the Long Island Railroad. See Palrgrcifv. Long Island
R.R., 24.8 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); if. N9 v. f'eliow Cab Co., 2 111.2d 74, 80-84, 117
N.E.2d 74~ 78-80 (1954).
/d.
237. Sa Cenco Inc. v. Seidman&. Seidman, 686 F.2d 449; 452 (7th Cir. 1982).
2.38. Sa Curtiss-Wright Corp. v~ Helfand, 687' F~2~ 171, 174 (7th Cir. 1982).
239. Su Donovan v. Ill. Educ. Ass,n, 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982).
.
t

•

'

'

•

•
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'

•

•
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•.

e. Illuminating Economic Insights
•

Given Richard A. Posner's remarkable quantitative background and
prior scholarly predilection to employ eco~omic analysis in solving legal .
240
problems, it was not surprising forJudge Posner to use ".the language
241
of economics" in his early judicial opinion$.
Three striking instances of his extraordinary economic reasoning
contained in his first quarter 1982 judicial opinions are instructive. In
the first instance · in a case examining whether an explosion occurring
from glue vapors in the course of a contractor's laying of a linoleum
kitchen flootwas an "inherently hazardous activity," thereby; being an
exception to the independent contractor rule of no vicarious
liability Posner deployed the. following economic prose:
This· case is not within the exception to the rule for inherently
. hazardous activities. The more hazardous an activity is, the higher is
the cost-justified level of care; and if it is hazardous enough, the .
principal should take· his own precautions even though he does not
supervise the details of the independent contractor's work. But there
is nothing hazardous about laying a linoleum floor. It becomes so
only if the installer misuses one of the inputs, the glue. This kind of
hazard is present in almost all construction work and does not make·
construction a hazardous ~ctivity. If the presence of a hazardous
input made the principal liable for the torts of his independent
contractors,_then if the employee of a building contractor saw~d off
his finger while repairing a house the owner of the house would be
liable, at least if it ,turned out that the accident had been due to
ne.gligence by the contractor. The exception would swallow the

rule.

242
•

•

•

•

240. Set general!J DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 129-3_3.
241. ld. at 131.
242. Hixon v. SheiWin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
•

•

...

•

•

:
•

•

•

•
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Postal] Service will lose the benefit of the low rent fixed in 1964. But
the advantage would be transitory. Knowing that they would have
fewer rights under federal leases than state law (if applicable) would
have given them, Indiana landlords would in the future drive harder . ·
bargains with the Postal Service. Concretely, the more difficult a lease
is to terminate, the higher will be the rent demanded by the landlord;
there will be no net saving to the tenant in the long run. And even if
the Postal Service could somehow gain a perrnanent advantage by
having its leases in Indiana governed by federal common law rather
than by state law, this would merely shift so~e of the cost of postal
service from the users of the mails and from the federal tax payer to
Indiana landlords. No net increase in the nation's welfare can be
assumed from so random a change in the distribution of.t he costs of
243
·
postal service.

•

•

In my final illustration ofjudge Posner's dynamic and piercing use of
economic analysis in the course of his early 1982 opinions, we see how
.
he is able to lucidly even for non-economists apply cost-benefit
analysis to decide "whether due process requires notice and hearing
244
before government may deprive a persori ofproperty" in the ~ontext
of police towing of illegally parked cars. Posner wrote:

•

•

•

•

[fhe cost benefit test mandated by the Supreme Court] require[s]
com·p aring the benefit of the procedural safeguard sought, which is a
function of the value of the property interest at stake and the ·
probability of erroneous deprivations if the safeguard is not provided,
with the cost of the safeguard. The benefit of the safeguard can be
thought of as the product of multiplying the .value of the property
interest by the probability that that value will be destroyed by a
gov~rnment error if the safeguard is not provided. Quantification will ·
rarely be possible but expressing mathematically the relationship
between the value of the interest and the probability of its erroneous
destruction may assist in thinking· about the tests which, being
general, are as applicable to the towing of autombiles as to the
termination or reduction of social security benefits ....
On the benefit side of the ledger in this case, the first thing to be noted
is that the property interest is a slight one. It is not the car itself but
the use of the car for a short period, usually a few hours, that is at
stake.
Second, the additional safeguard ofpretowing notic~ and opportunity
to be heard is not required in this case to prevent frequent errors .

•

•
•

•

•
•

243. Powers v. U.S. Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 1982).
244. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The starting point for- our
analysis is Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U .S. 319, 335 ... (1976), where the Supreme Court announced a
simple cost-benefit test of general applicability ... !,).
•

•

•

•
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. The determination that a car is illegally parked is pretty cut and dried .
Police officers make mistakes, of course, but in giving out parking
tickets not very many far fewer than in the case of moving
violations. . Rarely would a car's owner be able to convince an
impartial arbiter that his car really was not illegally parked and so
· should not be towed; few would be the occasions, therefore, when
notice and an opportunity to be heard in advance of towing would ·
·p revent an unjust .deprivation of a property interest ·SinGe the
procedural safeguard sought here would avert few .errors, and those.
of small magnitude in terms of cost to the car's owner, the benefits of
the safeguard would be very small.
We turn to the costs of the safeguard. They are not in this case
limited, as one might expect, to the expense of notice and hearing. ·
. The~e is no way that the city or state can notify the owners of illegally.
parked cars that their cars will be towed and provide them then and
there ·with an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of the towing.
To require noti.ce and hearing in advance is, as the appellees concede,
·
to prevent all towing of illegally parked cars.
The cost of notice and hearjng is therefore the cost of abandoning
towing as a method of dealing with illegal parking. It is clearly
prohibitive, as the districtjudge recognized, when the illegally parked
car is blocking traffic or otherwise causing an emergency, for in that
case there is no feasible alternative to towing. When the illegally
parked car is not creating an 'emergency in this sense, the benefits of
towing are less. This i~ ·by definition: the term '" emergency" is a
shorthand expression for situations where towing is the only solution
t<? the problem created by an illegally parked car. But we are not
prepared to say that the benefits· of towing are negligible in the·
nonemergency case. Parking regulations have a valid purpose;. and
not only does towing implement the regulations djrectly, by removing
cars parked in violation of them, but the threat of towing deters
violations, as every driver knows~ Of course there are alternative
methods of deterrence, such as heavy fines for illegal parking. But
that is equally true with regard to ·parking violations that create
emergencies: they too could be punished more heavily than they are,
and there would then be less need for towing. State and municipal
traffic officials, who know much more about these matters than
federal judges do, have decided that towing is more effective in
dealing with parking violations of all kinds than just jacking up the
fines further would he; and we cannot say that this judgment is not a
reasonable one.
·
We conclude that the benefits of towing illegally parked cars even
when they are not creating an emergency benefits that would be
sacrificed by requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard in
advance of towing-outweigh the very modest costs entailed by
forgoing procedural safeguards that would be merely ,additive to the
.

.

.

•
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post~towing

procedural safeguards to which the parties have ·
stipulated. We hold, therefore, that it is not a violation of the due
process clause to tow an illegally parked car without first givin·g the
owner notice and an opportunity to be heard wi~h .respect to the
245
lawfulness of the tow.

•

•

f.

Miscellaneous S~listic Virtues

Posner's· early opinions are impressive . fo~ possessing several
additional vigorous qualities having to do with his budding, inform·al,
personalized judicial opinion style~ Specimens ofhis emerging opinion
style embedded i~ his sixteen opinions, penned for the Court ofAppeals

during th.e first three months of 1982, are easy to find, although less
246
pronounced than in his later judicial opinions.
Consider some of·
these examples. First, an analogy:
•

•

•

'

[In a Ninth Circui~ case] a heli~opterwas seized to coerce payment of
a debt to the government. The helicopter was not illegally ",'parked,"
· a menace to public safety, or otherWise "in the way" of some valid
government project; it really was a hostag~. The Milwaukee police
do not seize a person's legally parked car in order to make him pay off
247
. his prior unpaid
parking
tickets
..•
,
.
.
'

Second, an ·epigram:. "Cenco's evidence te.nded to show that in the
early stages.of the fraud Seidman had been careless in checking Cenco' s
inventory figure.s and its carelessne·ss had prevented the fraud from being
248
nipped in the bud. " Finally, an historical allusion,: '' [b] ecause of the
confusing Watergate aura that the counterclaim would have cast over
the antitrust suit if tried with it, the district judge would, he said in his
249
opinion dismissing the complaint, have ordered separate trials. "
A poignant instance of ·Posner's. ·pench~nt for hypotheticals in his
opinions is found in a case about a batde between councy officials~ and
relatives'· claims over the adoption· of children. Posner opined:
We have no doubt that if welfare caseworkers, acting so precipitately
as to prevent any recourse to the protective legal machinery of the
state, barged into a· couple's home, seized their children, sequestered·
them in a ·secret place, and put them up for adoption without

•

245. 672 F.2d 6.44 at 645-46 (citations omitted). .
246. Cf. DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 127-29. .
247. 672 • F~'2d 644 at 648. Set also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Helfand, 687 F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir.
1982) ("For this is not a case where a district judge tries to rip open a settlement that, has become final.'').

248. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1982).
249. By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d
956,
960
(7th
Cir.
1982}
.
.

t

•

.

•

•
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'

.

.

notifying the parents, they would be guilty 9f violating 42 U.S.C. §
1983, no matter how regular the adoption proceeding on its face. We
do not think any exotic constitutio~al ·doctrine not even the
ubiquitous oxymoron "substantive due process" would be necessary
in order to reach that result. It is plain to us that the "liberty"
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
includes the right to the custody of one's minor children and that it
would be a deprivation of that liberty without due process of law for
persons acting under color of state law-permanently to separate the
children from their parents without notice and hearing~ We have to
250
.
decide how close this case is to that one.

,

•

Moreover, in the adoption case,just mentioned, we can discernjudge
Posner's noteworthy use of simile: ''on this appeal we must ... accept
as true that Mrs. Ellis was in loco parentis -to these childre~ when the ·
defendants took them away from her; and we are reluctant to conclude
that a great-aunt, an adoptive grandmother, and a de focto mother and
father all rolled up into one does not have a liberty interest sufficiently
251
like that efa p,a rent to support an action under section 1983." Judge
Posner's early judicial opinions also reflect a love for colorful slang as
exemplified in an employment discriminatio.n case involving possible
conspiracy between a state public agency superVisor and members ofthe
local religious community giving input on the agency's mission: "[a] s a
detail, we note the preference afthe local black community for a,black
counselor was not ... conceded by [the plaintifl] . . . [since h]is
evidence· was that the ministers were not speaking for the community
252
but were in cahoots with [the supeiVisor]."
For an early Posnerian
aphorism: "the business of the courts is to do justice rather than to
253
spread good fe~ling.''
For an instance of Posner's focus on human
motivation and the law:

•

•

'

•

•

•

•

We understand, ofcourse why the [aliens1sought habeus corpus after
they were arrested and put in jail they wanted their freedom. The
motive for this appeal is less easily understood since the petitioners are
now free on bond.... From the briefs and oral' argument on this ·
appeal, however, it appears that the petitioners are after bigger game
than being relieved from what may well be the trivial burdens
associated with their bond status. What they principally want is for
the district court to enter an order barring the INS from using in the
•
•

250. 'Ellis v~- Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982). For another striking example' of Posncr,s
use of hypotheticals in his early opinions see Arias v. Rogers, 616 F.2d ll39, 1143 (7th Cit\ l982) (various
hypothetical extremes of INS detention of suspected illegal aliens).
·
251. See id. at 513.
252. Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982).
25-3~ Id. at 1182.

•

•

•

•
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deportation proceedings any admissions or other evidence (perhaps
254
even their identity) tr~ceable to their arrests-....
·

g. Some ('Dark Side" S!Jlistics
'

Even in Posner's very first batch ofjudicial opinionS; there are subde
hints of prose qualities that some critics might label as being
255
undesirable.
By way of an explicit hint, the concurring opinion of
256
Judge Harlington Wood, in Rucker v. Higher educational Aids Board, is
instructive. Judge Wood, obviously upset at the way Judg~ P<?sner's
opinion for the court personally slammed the trial court judge, stated:
"I believe that [the trial court judge's] findings need some clarification,
257
but they need only be repaired,_notjunked.''
On an implicit level, some of the stylistic qualities that make Posner's
early appellat~ opinions praiseworthy can, when viewed from other
perspectives, be considered undesirable. Thus, some of Posner's free258
wheeling economics analysis might appear to be speculative and
· untethered to the facts of~e case;-instances ofPosner's reference to th.e
259
issues of ''first impression''
could appear to be egotistical and
gratuitous; cases of Posner's intense scrutiny of the underpinnings of
260
setded legal doctrine might be intetpreted as being presumptuous and
out of line.
•

•

•

•

C. Runs Batted In: The Rest ofPosner's 1982 Opinionsfor the
Court Thoughts on the ('Beautifol'~.and the "Ug!J''
•

During the remaining nine months of 1982,Judge Posner's judicial

opinion style continued to evolve along the trajectory established during
261
his first hundred days as a federal judge. Of the fifty-nine opinions
that he authored fo"r the Seventh Circuit during the remaining nine
months of what I have c~led his rookie season, there are fiye opinions
•

•

•

•

•

•

~

254. Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, •141-42 {7th Cir. 1982)., For another incisive instance, in the
early Posner opinions, of probing human motivation sec UniledSto«.sv. LewiJ, 671 F.2d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir.
1982) (examining motive of taxpayer in not filing tax return).
255. CJ. Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 20 and accompanying text (criticism by members
of the Seventh Circuit Bar).
256. See 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982).
257. Jd. at 1184 (Wood,J., concurring).
258. Su supra notes 240. .45 and accompanying text.
•
259. See ~pra notes ·209.. 11 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 178-260 and accompanying text.

•

•

•

.
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•

that desetve extended favorable. commentary.

262

These are-

· 262. See injrtl notes 268-326 and accompanying text. For ''honorable mentions, ofbeautifuljudicial
opinion style practiced by Posner during lhe_last three quartet-s of 1982 see; for example, United Statts ex rei.
SteVens v. Cirt;Uit Court,-675-F.2d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 1982) (mastetful synthesis of criminal law on double.
jeopardy, followed by a focused "comparison ofinconvcniences" between a state criminal defendant seeking
habeus corpus relief after a guilty plea as to some counts and the state in trying him on the remaining
counts); United States v. Boulalumir, 677 F.2d 58.6, 587 (7th Cir. 1982) (vivid; concise, and humorous narrative
of FBI sound recording ofcriminal defendants which yielded a tape ofdefendants using "language free from
any shade of ambiguity that if he did not pay them ... for allowing gambling ... they would shut it down,
while if he did pay they would not only 'terroriz~ nobody more in here' but would beat up anyone else who
was trying to extort money from (him].''); Hamilton v. Nu!lsen, 618 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1982) (eloqu~nt and
succi~ct exposition of facts, federn.l su~ject matter jurisdiction in tort action against executors for alleged
'
negligence, prediction of Illinois tort principles in federal diversity suit against estate executors); Bart v.
Telfordt 677 F~ 2d 622, 623, 625 (7th Cir. 198'2) {insightful discussion of "questions relating to the First
Amendment rights of publicemployees who run for public office" in the context of a civil rights case against
the Mayor ofSpringfield, Illinois; judicious policy. . focused assessment, involving "the court's weighing [of]
. general considerations rather than by its listening to witnesses" in deciding that a required leave of absence
(or the candidate-employee wasjustified; wry comment on allegation that the Mayor held the plaintiff"up
to ridicule for bringing a birthday cake to the office on the occasion of [another·employee's birthday]", with
Posner noting that "a certain air of the ridiculous hangs over the harassment allegations, in particular ...
regarding the birthday cake."); Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 41·42 (7th Cir. 1982) {trenchant pragmatic
analysis of the efficacy of a civil rights action brought against police officers and a bank alleging wrongful
arrest~ with Posne r,s opinion for the court noting: "We resist the tern ptation to reach [the] conclusion [that
there is no Fourth Amendment violation] by the casuistic route of deeming a warr~nt to be valid on its face
even if it contains discrepancieS/' rather "[w]e pla~e our decision on (the] more practical ground [that)
[t]he execution of a warrant by an officer who if he were more careful might have noticed that the warrant
had been issued by mistake is not the stuff out of which a proper federal case is made."); Illinoir v. General
Ekctric Co., 683 F.2d 206, 216 (7th Cir. 1982) (elegant and nuanced ·St:atutory analysis of_ a federal
environmental statute, the Clean Air Act, which while giving states the power to promulgate dean air
measures more stringent than federal standards di~ not allow a state to ban the importation of radioactive
wastes from another state since "while one effect of the (state statute) ~ay be to reduce [aitj emissions by
eliminating interstate shipments to the facility, that is no.t enough to make [the state statute] a rational
pollution..control ~easure, especially when, for aught that appears, the facility emits no radioactivity into
the air" and ended by stating, "[w]e cannot believe that Congress in promulgating the Clean Air Act
Amendments meant the states to have carte blanche to enact any statutes ... that migh~ as a side-effect
•
reduce theJevel.of radioactive emissions in the state, regardless of how much the statute ... disrupted the
federal atomic energy program ... [Including] disposing ofnuclear wastes.,,); C~ ofPeoria v. General Electric
Cableuision Corp., 690 F.2d 116, 119 (7t~ Cir. 1982) (Incisive analysis, based on creative use ofhypotheticals,
of error of lower court in allowing the City to bring an action against a cable television company alleging
breach of a franchise contract while seeking a declaration that the Federal Communications Commission
regulation was invalid, noting "Peoria•s action ... to declare the Fcc•s rul«: invalid was brought in the
wrong court at the wrong·time against the wrong party."); Sulu v. Duckwoith, 689 F.2d 128, 130 (7th Cir.
1982) (magnificent use of sarcasm and deep analysis of human nature in rejecting criminal defendant's
habeus corpus petition alleging ttlat his constitutional righ~ to remain silent was infringed by allowing a
police officer to testify that the petitioner's sanity was partially proven by the fact that he asked to speak to
a lawyer when arrested,. without having Miranda rights read to him, Posner's opinion for the court noting:
"In deciding whether to apply this enforcement device in the present case, we have to consider first how
much the exercise~ of the tight to remain silent would be deterred if a suspect knew that a r~quest for a
lawyer could be used as evic:Jeqce of his sanity. Not much, in our opinion."}; MentJTa v. Illinois High Sclwol
Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 19~2) (extraordinary and particularized use ofeconomic analysis in
examining the constitutionality, under First Amendment free ex~rdse principles) ofan athletic association's
rule fo1·bidding basketball players to wear hats or other headgear while playing, ·noting that·" [ij ree exercise
of religion does not mean costless exercise of religion, but the state may not make the exercise of religion
•

•.

•

•

•

•

'

•

•
•

•
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plain and simple my stylistic favorites during this time segment.. These
Posnerian opinions for the court embody remarkable opinion style: they
are riveting; they fairly, efficiently, and accurately discuss the relevant
facts and law; and they sparkle in different stylistic ways with
erudition, wisdom, wit and clear reasoning.. They are from my
standpoint as a judicial opinion aesthete objects of beauty. In
discussing why I think these opinions are beautiful I will not dissect each
case or seek to describe every ~ttractive stylistic feature. Rather, my
review will be synaptical, providing a divers.ified, balanced,
evolutionary, big-picture view of the '-lnique, seminal Posnerian opinion
·
.
style.
On the other 4and, of ~e nearly five dozen opinions for the court
written by judge Posner during the last three quarters of 1982, there is
only one opinion that I believe deserve-s extended unfavorable
commentary because of significant stylistic. flaws. This opinion is a
263
prominent example of what' I call Posner's ugly opinionsl!

•

•

•
•
•
•

•

•

unreasonably costly," thus Orthodoxjewish basketball
players are not necessarily
entitled to wear a pinned
.
.
yarmulke while playing, in light oflegitim~te safety concerns c)f preventing wearing of headgear that might
fall off in the heat of play, when other, safer, foa·1ns ofheadcovering may reasonably be available that would
conforrn to Orthodoxjewish religious beliefs); Products liab~ lnsuranuAgtn9, Inc. v. Crum & Fursttr /nmranu
Cos., 682 F~2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982) (masterful, clear, scholarly and concise explanation of basic anti-trust
legal principles involvingsuitallegingviolations_ofthe_Sherman Act); Muscarev. (}Jlinn,680.F.2d 42,44 (7th
Cir. 198_2) (seasoned, practical, trenchant, eloquent and _legal factual ana1ysisofproponionality limitations
in setting limits to the endless litigation of attorneys, fees awards in civil rights litigation with a classic
Posnerian use ofa metaphor that cut to the quick of the controve..Sy: "For rather obvious practical reaSQns
we are loath to disturb a ruling by a district judge on a request for second.round attorneys, fees. The
consequence ifwe should reverse and remand for an award ofadditional fees is all too predictable: however
little the plaintiff is awarded on remand he will move the district court to award him attorneys• fees for the
time spent in prosecuting this appeal, and if the district coun denies his motion he will be back up here.
Every civil rights litigation will be like a nest of Chinese boxes. The -outside box is the litigation of the civil
rights issue itself. Within it is the litigation. over the fees incurred in the litigation over the
merits ordinarily a lesser litigation, as our metaphor implies, though in this case the stakes in each of the
two rounds of fee litigation have been greater, at least in monetary tertns, than the stakes of the original civil
rights litigation.''); Dragan v. Mdler, 679 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1982) (masterful,scholarly and concise analysis
or the probate exception to federal diversityjurisdiction in an action by residea,ts of Rumania against Illinois
defendants for imposition of a constructive esta.te, with Posner pbscrving that "[t]he probate exception is
one of the most mysterious and esoteric_branches of the_law of federal ju.risdiction.,, /d. at 713.); HZ W.
Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 557, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1982) (concise, jugular analysis of human motivation
in conjunction with intea·preting labor warning policies c;>f NLR.B, with Posner reasoning that after an
employee had been dischar~d and his forrner supervisors) with the company lawyer, attempted to
interview the ex-employee for an upcoming hearing, the em.ployee "had no incentive to ingratiate himself
with the inteJViewers. So there was no carrot. Neither was there stick. Nothing ... could have intimidated
Jaske .... Ifjaske had been intimidated, he would have consented to be interviewed; he would not have
fobbed off his questioners with a lie").
.
263. See in.fra notes 327-38 and accompanying text. For "dishonorable mentions,, _o f ugly opinion
style exhibited by Posner during the last quarter of 1982~ his rookie season on the bench, see, for example,
CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton, 682 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1982) (in a securities law civil suit against one corporate
director for recovery of short-swing profits allegedly realized by the director, Posner's use of economic
•

•

•

•

•

•
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Before undertaking this discussion of ~'beautiful" and "ugly"
Posnerian opinions fo.r the Seventh Circuit, I need to briefly mention the
structure of the rest of this article. In the · final portion of this
article before offering some overarching conclusions and a call for a
more robust aesthetic theory and praxis ofjudicial opinions based on a
264
richer appreciation of judicial style
I discuss th.is style of Judge
:Posner's isolated dissenting, concurring and chamber opinions during·
265
his rookie season as a federal judge.
I shall admit to something in
advance ofthi$ discussion; like Wendy Steiner, Professor of English at
the University ofPennsylvania and the Director ofthe Penn Humanities
66
Forum, writing in a recent article in The American Scholail about literary.
criticism, in general, I .offer my "subjective preference" on. matters of
judicial opinion style and "have -given up on being ... . a scientist" (if I
ever was one) of the aesthetics ofjudicial opinions. I, therefore, heartily
concur with Professor Steiner's admission:
.

It has taken me a long time to admit that the thrust of criticism is the
"I like," and whatever expertise I have accumulated conspires in this
admission. The authority ofone's institution.of higher learning, one's

.

.

•

analysis is hypertechnical, overly-intellectual, confusing and gratuitous,_.for example Posner's .dicta that
"[t]hough some economists believe that emotional relationships within the family can be expressed in
economic terms and, presumably, monetized, we doubt thatthe framers ofsection 16(b) wo~ld have wanted
to complicate enforcement of the statute to this degree merely to make an already Dt:aconian strict liability
statute still more Draconian.,,- {citation omitted)); Wuunl' Transptn1lil.iD~ Co. v. Wwon & Co., 682 F.2d 1227
(7th Cir. ! 982) (in bankrupt common carrier suit against a former shipper seeking recovely of alleged
undercha.-ges ofapproxima,tely S124,000, Posner's rev~rsal ofthe district court summ~ryjudgment in favot•
of a shipper, based on his i.nsistence that despite an identical tariff with the same common carrier and
another shipper which the ICC had declared as unreasonable in an ICC decision thereby allowing
judicial notice of the decision a separate administrative action be brought before the ICC by the shipper
was hyper-.technical,.and surprisingly unrealistic); WW.VConlinmlol Bro.ati;Casting Co. v~ United Vuleo, Inc., 693
F.2d 62'2 (7th Cir. 1982) (in complex copyright and intellectual property case involving action by television
broadcasting company to enjoin telecommunications common carrier from retransmitting its copyrighted
television program into cable television system customers after stripping the vertical blanking intetval of
Teletext information, Posner's opinion
for the court was sloppy and confusing, using impt~ecise language.
that had to later be defended in a statement-- probably also authored by Posner rejecting a petition for
rehearing with suggestion for rehearing·en bane); Fedtral.Dtposillnsurance. Corp~ v. Bromwor Assocs., 686 F.2d
550 (7th Cir. 1982) (prolix and overly-intellectual discussion of subject.matter jurisdiction before analysis
of the meaits of the dispute); Bowers:v. DeVw, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (short-shrift factual analysis in
Posnea~'s opinion affirming the dismissal. ora federal civil rights-based, wrongful death suit on summary
judgment agains~ private physicians and a state mental hospital; Posner's analysis did not give a balanced
rendition. of the facts of the case as persuasively argued by .the dissenting opini<;>n of Circuit Judge
Hartington Wood; Posner's analysis also failed to distinguish that prior Supreme Court precedent in a case
~as "narrowly written to apply to a parole release," riot a state mental hospital release, as pointed out by
Judge WoocJ•s dissent); Grip-Pak, Inc. v.Illinois Tool Wotks, Inc., 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982) (a prolix, overly·
intellectual, dicta-l~den case wh~re Posner t~nnecessarily "shows ofl'' his knowledge of anti.. u·ust law).
264. See itJfra notes 390•407 and. accompanying text.
265. Sel in.fta notes 339. .89 and accompanying text.
266. Wendy Steiner, Prll&.li&e Wlllwul Principk, 68 AM ..SCHOLAR,' Summer 1999, at 77.
.
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.
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academic credentials, one's ever-increasing experience may establish
"objectively" one's claim to being an expert, but at the heart ofany critical

•

act is subjective preference. To lilce, to find important, at this time and in such267
.and-such a situatioTL~ tlzis if .tlze essence ofthe critical act.

•

•

•

•

•

•

1. Posner'·s Beautiful Opinions
.

'

Of the fifty-nine opinions written by Posner for the'court during the
. last nine months of his rookie s~ason, five opinions are what I deem to
be, from a holistic perspec~ve., s~listically beautiful.
·
.

'

a. Tne Tale ofthe Injured Tugboat Cook
•

268

•

•

In O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., J1:1dge Posner·melds a compelling
narrative with pertinent economic insights in resolving the key issue
relating to the computation of the plaintiff's lost wages. At the outset of
the opinion he succincdy frames the questions presented: " [t]his is a;tort
case under the federal .a dmiralty jurisdiction. We are called upon to
decide questions of contributory negligence an.d damage assessment, in
particular the question one offirst impression in this circuit whether,
and if so how, to account for inflation in computing lost future
269
wages .." .
Posner devotes over one full page of the Federal .Reporter to the sorry
story of Margaret O'Shea "a 57 ~year-old woman who weighs 200.
270
pounds (she is five foot seven)" -who "was coming off duty as a cook
271
on a towboat plying the Mississippi River.n
As described in the
opinion for the court, Mrs. O'Shea was forced to use a catwalk, in lieu ·
of climbing a seawall without a ladder, ~'the top of which was several
272
feet above the boat's deck,'' · in disembarking from a harbor boat
bringing her . ashore from. the tug. After climbing a ladder to the
·catwalk, she was told by a deckhand to ')ump [down three feet from the
catwalk to the top of the seawall] and that the men who had already
273
disembarked would help her land safely." Mrs. o~Shea "did as told,

,

•.
•
•

•

•

•

267.
26.8.
269.
270.
271.

ld. at 81 (emphasis added).
677 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1982).
ld. at 1196.
ld.
ld.
272. ld.
273. ld.

•

•
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.but fell in"landing, carrying the assisting seamen down with her, and
274

·
·
broke her leg. "
Judge Posner's initial analysis of the facts in O'Shea, as a prelude to his
legal discussion, advanced wh~t Professorjames Boyd White referred to
275
in the Chicago Law Revie.w Colloquium as a "claim ofmeaning." In
·this regard, Posner framed the pivotal legal issue of the case as what the
law expected Mrs. O'Shea to do, in seeking possible further·
employment, afte~ her serious leg injury. Posner opined that "[t]he ·
question is ·not whether Mrs. O'Shea is totally disabled in the .sense~
relevant to social security.disability cases but not tort cases, that there is
276
no job in th~ American economy for which she i.s medically fit~"
Rather, "[I]t is whether she can by reasonable diligenc~ ·find gainful
employment, given the physical· condition in which the accident left
277
her."
Then, Posner's opinion tells the story of Mrs. O'Shea in such
a way that it, in Professor White's parlance, ''connects ·the case with
278
· earlier cases [and] the particular facts with more general concerns."
Posner's rendering of this claim to meaning is ~ttractive ~nd forceful.
He states:
•

•

Here is a middl~·aged woman, very overweight, badly scarred on one
arm and one leg, unsteady on her feet, in constant and serious pain
from the accident, with no education beyond high school and no work
skills other than cooking, a job that happens to require .s tanding for
long periods which she·is incapable of doing. It seems unlikely that
someone in this condition could find gainful wo~k at the minimum
wage. True, the probability is not zero; and a better procedure,
therefore, might have been to subtract from Mrs. O'Shea's lost future
wages as a boat's cook the wages in some other job, discounted (i.e.,
multiplied) by the probability very low-that she would in fact be
able to get another job. But the district judge cannot be criticized for
having failed to use a procedure not suggested by either party. The
question put to him was the dichotomous one, would she or would she
not get another job if -she ~ade reasonable efforts 'to d<? so? This
required him to decide whether there was a more than 50 percent
probability that she would. We cannot say that the negative answer
279
he gave to that question was clearly erroneous.
•

Mter resolving th~ linchpin issue in favor of Mrs. O'Shea, Judge
Posner engaged in nearly four pages of closely-reasoned law and

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

•

/d.
White, supra note 17, at 1367; see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
677 F.2d at 1197.
/d.
White. supr11 note. 17, at 1367~38; see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
677 F.2d at 1197.
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•
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economics analysis to resolve the tricky questio~ of how to account for
280
inflation in computing l~st future wages.
The way ·that Posner
accomplished this task was to weave a seamless web oflogic and analysis
281
utilizing the following stylistic techniques: analogy, computational
282
283
284
285
example, case comparison, aphorism~ and gende admonition.
•

.

b. The Case ofthe Crafty Under

•

.

•

•

Judge Posner's opinion for the c~urt ·in In re Holding Co., is a
splendid example ofstatutory construction in the face ofscant legislative
history and caselaw. .H is reason~ng process~~~.:...gracefully and succint?dy
contained i11 only two and a half printed p.ages . . ···started by stating· the
re'levant facts involving a bankruptcy case. The district court judge had
dismissed as moot an appeal by .the creditors' committee from the
286

bankruptcy judge's approval of a loan to the debto·r which involved a
grant of special post-petition priority to C.hase Manhattan Bank.
.Posner's rendition of the facts established below portrayed· the efforts of
Chase, after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, to grab· as much of the
bankruptcy .estate as it co.uld, in. spite of the competing pre-petition
.

.

•

•

.

claims of other creditors:
.

.

•

~

.

B-efore Wisconsin Steel (a~ we shall refer jointly to ·the affiliated
corporations that are th~ bankrupt~ in this case) went bankrupt, the
Chase Manhat~an Bank had loaned it money secured by a lien on
in\:entory and by a bank ~ccount that the company maintained with.
Chase. Wisconsin Steel defaulted, and Chase set off against these
defaults the funds in the account. Wisconsin Steel was accustomed
to
'
paying its employees with checks drawn on this account. Chase's setoff caused those checks to bounce, which induced Wisconsin Steel to ,
petition for protection under Chapter ll of the Bankruptcy Code.
The union representing Wisconsin Steel's workers filed 3: complai~t
in the bankruptcy court seeking payment to i~s members of their

•

•

•

•

280. See id. at 1198-120 1.
.
·
·281. Stt it/. at 1198 ("If a man who had never worked in his life graduated from law school, began
;working at a law firm at an annual salary ofS35,000, and was killed the second day on the job, his lack of
· a past wage history would be irrelevant to computing his lost future wages.").
·282. See id. at 1199-1201 (applying·past wages earned to e~amplc oqnvesting money in federal bonds
accounting for impact of inflation).
283. See id. at 1200 (comparing different circuit court approaches).
284. See id. at 120 l ("Unlike many other·damage items in a pet'SOnal injury case, notably pain and
suffering, the calculation of damages for lost earnings can and should be an analytical rather than an
intuitive undertaking.").
285. See id. ("[F]or the future we ask the district judges in this circuit to indicate the steps by which
they arrive at damage awards for lost future
earnings.,').
.
286. 676 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1982).
•

•

•

•

•

.

•
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unpaid wages. · Chase was named as a defendant along with
Wisconsin Steel. The union claimed that it had a lien on the same
. inventory on which Chase claimed a lien. Although the bankruptcy
court authorized Chase to take possession of~he inventory, the·union,
by picketing Wisconsin Steel, prevented Chase from · doing so.
Eventually a settlement was reached by which Chase agreed to lend
Wisconsin Steel some $1.7 million in exchange for the union's
dropping its suit and · allowing the inventory to be removed. The
agreement stated that Wisconsin Steel would pay out of the proceeds
of the loan $77,000 to the union to reimburse it for attorneys' fees and
other legal expenses incurred in its suit, and the rest (except for some
small amounts for various taxes) to the company's employees in
settlement of their claims. The agreement further provided that the
entire loan was to receive the priority that .I l U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) gives
287
wage claims.

•

•

Next, Posner framed th~ question on appeal as follows:
[I]f in lending Wisconsin Steel $77,000 to pay the union's ·legal
expenses Chase was acting in good faith, its priority could not be
affected ... and the issue of validity therefore moot . . . . [b] ut if
Chase was not acting in good _faith, the Committee was entitled to
288
have the merits of its objection to the grant of priority adjudicated.

is

.

Then, the opinion identified th~ relevant provision of the Bankruptcy
Code that governed the appeal section 364(e), which provides that a
bankruptcy court's post-petition grant of priority does not affect the
validity of the priority if it was granted "to a~ entity that ext~nded such·
289
[post-petition] credit in good faith." Posner thoughtfully and lucidly
offered the following policy rationale underlying the statutory provision:
•

•

[fhis type of] provision[ ] seeks to overcome people's natural
reluctance to deal with a bankrupt firm ... .as ... [a] lender by
assuring them that so long as they are relying in good faith on a
bankruptcy judge's approval of the transaction they need not worry
about their priority merely because some creditor is objecting to the
transaction and is trying to ... reverse the bankruptcy judge. The
proper recourse for the objecting creditor is to get the transaction
290
stayed pending appeal.

•

Typical of his skill in going for the jugular issue in a cas~, Judge
Posner wryly noted that the relevant legal standard contained in the·

•

287.
288.
289.
290.

•

ltl.,at 946.
ld. at 947 (citation omitted).

ld.
/d.

•

•
•

•

•
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291

Bankruptcy Code "presupposes good faith." In the face of"find(ing]
neither cases nor legislative history, pertaining either to good faith.
292
lenders to bankrupts or to good faith purchasers fro~ bankrupts," .
Posner brilliandy reasone.d fro~ the Structure and ostensible purpose of
the "good faith" Bankruptcy Code Standard:
·
·· Chase argues that so long as the terms of the transaction are not
misrepresented to the bankruptcy judge, as they were not here, the
creditor may rely on the bankruptcy judge's order unless it is stayed,
no matter how obviously erroneous the order is~ But if this is. what ·
Congress· intended, the words "in good faith" could have been
deleted, as it would be perfectly clear even without them that an order
obtained from a bankruptcy judge by fraud was ineffective to put the
lender who procured the order ahead of other creditors. We assume.
th.e statute was intended to protect not the lender who seeks to take
advantage of a lapse in oversight by the bankruptcy judge but the
lender who believes his priority.is valid but cannot be certain that it
is, because of objections that might be upheld on appeal. If the lender
~ows his priority is invalid but proceeds-anyway in the hope that a
stay. will not be sought or if sought will not be_granted, we cannot see
293
how he can be thought to be acting in good faith. .

•

.

•

•

. Viewing the union's claim, underlying Chase's post-petition loan,
''realistically," Judge Posner cut to the quick, .noting that the "claim by·
the union's attorneys for time and expenses incurred in prosecuting the
union members' claims for unpaid wages ... was not entitled to priority
over the claims of the general creditors [and, indeed] could not be paid
294
out of the bankrupt's estate· at ~1."'
This was_ so, Posner reasoned,
because the pertinent blackletter bankruptcy rule '.'is that no allowance
295
will be made to a creditor's attorney for proving his client's claim.''
Wrapping up the do~trinal discussion of good faith lending to a
bankruptcy debtor, Judge Posner ended the opinion for the- Seventh
Circuit with a hypothetical flourish, which he then turned into a
penetrating syllogism that correcdy resolved the case and reversed the.
district court below:
.

.

'

•

•

•

Where it is evident from the loan agreement itself that the transaction
has an intended effect that is_improper under the Bankruptcy Code,
the lender is not in good faith; and it is irrelevant what the improper
purpose is. If the loan agreement had- stated that Wisconsin Steel

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

!d.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 947-48.
/d. at 948:

I

•

•

•
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would use the proceeds to buy one-way airplane tickets to Brazil for
its officers, we do not think Chase would be arguing to us that it had
extended credit to the compa~y in good faith and therefore had an
untouchable priority. Ofcourse in such a case the general creditors
should be able to obtain a stay but we do not think their failure to do
so would place. Chase's priority bey~nd the power· of judicial
.correction; otherwise the good faith requirement would be read out
of the statute. The pre·sent case is less extreme but no different in
principle. Just as Chase would pot have been a purchas'e r in goo·d
faith if it had bought from Wisconsin Steel property to which it knew
. the company did not have good title, ·so it could not 'be' a lender in
good faith in. extending ~redit in exchange for a priority that it kne.w
· the company could not properly. give it since the transaction
amounted to taking money out of the pockets of the general creditors
to pay lawye'rs whose claims were not allowable under bankruptcy law
at all.

\

.

• • • •

·,

As. all this must have been as obvious to Chase as it is to ·
us · . probably more so we do not think . that the context
(settlement of litig~tion) in which .the loan was made and the
special priority received casts enough doubt on the forbidden
nature of the transaction to.rebut an inference. of bad faith that
is, knowledge of improper purpose. Nor, finally, are we
persuaded by Chase's argument that the priority.it received on
the $77,000 was a sine qua non of the entire loan transaction a
transaction beneficial to the bankrupt and ·hence to the general
creditors of the bankrupt as we·ll as to Chase· .. -·because the union
would not have called off its pickets. unless it was given its legal
fees and unless the union did call off its pickets and thereby
allowed Chase to remove the inventory on which it had a lien
Chase would not have made the loan to cover the ~npaid wage
claims. Chase ·could have paid the union's legal fees out of its
own pocket if that was what was required to get the inventory out.,
Instead it claims a right to force the company's general creditors
to pay the union's legal expenses out of their pockets. That is an
improper use of the bankrupt's ·estate, to which the general
creditors are the residual claimants... The fact that Chas.e was a
defendant in the suit by the union actually strengthens the
inference of bad faith. Chase was not a disinterested lender but
a settling. litigant that saw an opportunity
to reduce the cost ofthe
.
settlement by putting the union's lawyers ahead of the general
creditors of Wisconsin Steel. An extension of credit having such

•

•

'

•

•

.

.

.

.

.

•

•

•
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an ulterior purpose is not in good faith within the meaning of
sectio·n 364(e). 296 .
·
·
.
.

c. The Perils qft~e Greedy Railroad
297

Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. (C&NW) v. United States

is
a high prototype of Posnerian economic analysis through creative and
persuasive use ofhypotheticals. The case, in essence, boiled down to the
appeal by a railroad of the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC)
order establishing the price for sale of a railroad line between northern
Illinois and southern Wisconsin, which the railroad wanted to abandon.
Posner opened his opinion for the court by observing that "(t]his case of
first impression under the .1980 Staggers Rail Act ~mendments to 49
U.S.C. § 10905 requires us to decide both statutory and constitutional
questions relating to the meaning of the term 'fair market value' applied
298
·
to an abandoned railroad line."
The dispute aro~e because, as Posner incisively observe~, C&NW
"valued the (proposed abandoned] property as a rail line, as . . . the
(Geneva Lake Area Joint Transit Commission (GLA) a consortium
dedicated to the preseiVation of commuter rail service] intended to use ·
it [but] GLA maintained and the_[ICC] agreed that the relevant value
was the value of the property for nonrail use the use to which it would
299
·
have been put had it been abandoned."
Mter examining the text ofthe statute (detertnining that Congress had
300
not defineq the dispositive term "fair market value")
and the
legislative history of the Staggers Rail Act amendments (concluding that
the pre-enactment jurisprudence on the subject as well as unenacted
bills and subcommittee hearings provided "obscure and conflicting clues
[that] do not help us to decide whether Congress would have wanted the
[ICC] to consider the value of the Lake Geneva line to GLA in setting
301
the terms of sale"), Judge Posner looked at what he called "history in
302
a broader sense. " In this regard, he canvassed the "legisprudence" of
railroad abandonment proceedings since the mid-1970s that often
303
Posner
worked to the detriment of shippers and commuters.
insightfully grasped that Congress had made the policy judgment to
•

•

•

•

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

•

•

Itl. at 94 7-48.
678 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1982).
/d. at 666.
Id.
•
ltl. at 667.
Id.

•

/d.
.

.

See id. at667-68.

•

•

•

•
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partially subsidize "public transit authorities and other entities willing
either to support or to acquire and operate branch lines after they were
304
~ban cloned [by railroad co.mpanies] ."
Moreover, according to his
reasoning for the court, "Congress did not want the railroads to have
any hold-out power in negotiating with entities planning to continue
passenger rail seiVice on a subsidized basis" and- ''[t]hat is ~hy it
amended section I 0905 in 1980 to allow indeed require the [ICC]
305
to fix the price of the sale if the parties could not agree~''
Posner,
therefore, concluded: "The purpose of the amendment would be
frustrated if the [ICC] were required to consider the value of the line to
the offeror, for tpat would give the-railroad an approximation to what
306
it was able to get . under the previous statute."
·
Turning to a series of colorful hypotheticals to test the
constitutionality of his interpretation under the takings clause of the
Fifth Amendment,Judge.Posner provided vivid and helpful perspective
on theointerpretational question. In his first hypothetical, Posner noted:
0

• •

l'r

•

•

•

The government may notcf~rce a railroad to operate a line at a -loss
for an indefinite period of tim~ and it would seem to follow that if, as
here, the right to abandon is conditioned on the railroad's willingne·ss
to sell the abandoned line at a price fixed by the [ICC], that price
must not fall short ofjus_t compensation. If the line had a scrap value
of $1 million, it would not do for the [ICC] to tell the railroad, "we
are going to force you to sell the line for $100,000, and if you don't
like that price we will refuse to let you abandon the line until you have
307
lost another $900,000, at which point you'll cry 'uncle. '" .

•

•

0

In his second hypothetical, designed to test the takings clause, Posner
wrote:
·
.

Setting aside measurement problems, we think it irrelevant whether
private property is taken for a new use or to continue an old one, and
even question whether this is a meaningful distinction. If C&NW
owned a hospital that w:as losing money and had no prospects for
~ profitable operation, and the State ofWisconsin condemned it for a
public hospital, C&NW would not be entitled to the value of its
property as a hospital. It would have value to the state only because
the state could use its taxing powers to force state residents to defray
the losses. In theose circumstances the change from private to public
•

304.
305.
306.
307.

ld. at 667.
/d. at 668.
/d.

/d. (citations omitted).

•

•

•

•
•

•
•

•

•

•
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ownership would be as distinctive a change in the economic character
8
of the hos:pital as if it had been taken for use as_an artillery range.3° ·

.

.

Finally, Posner replied to his hospital hypotheticall?y articulating, and
analyzing, a counter-hypothetical:
But to all this it may be replied that GI.A, whatever its source ~f
funds, was a potential purchaser of the Lake Geneva line and this
shows that the line had a market value which the statute prevented
C&NW from realizing. We agree that a buyer's willingness to pay a
high price is not an invalid indication of market value just because he
is subsidized. The government could not refuse to pay the market
value of western farrnland that it condemned, merely because the
value had been enhanced by govemmef1.tally subsiclized water projects
·
in the area.

.. . .
~

.

This res_ult is required if for no. other reaso.~ simply to keep the
valuation process manag~able. But it is not clear that GI.A really was
a potential purchaser, at least at any price higher than the salvage
value of the Lake Geneva line. It is a public entity that has or could
easily be given the power of eminent domain, and if it exercised that
power the price it would have to pay would be l~mited to what
C&NW could get from other prospective purchas_ers who did not have
eminent-domain -power, none of whom would continue the line in rail
use.sog
•

Distilling the wisdom .from his law and economics analysis, freighted.
with hypothetic:als_,Judge:Posner in Chicago & North Western Transportation
Co. concluded h:is opinion with a legal insight that joined political theory
· with economic thought:

•

•

(The Staggers Rail .Act] amendments have given the railroads a faster
abandonment procedure than the Fifth Amendment entitles them to
and it is reasonable that they should be asked.to give up something in
return t}?.e opportunity to engross values created by a political
process that weights the preferences of railroad passengers [as
reflected in federal subsidy legislation] more heavily than the market
310
·
does.

•

•

..
•
•

•
•

'

3:08. Id. at 66'9.
309. ld. at 670 (citations omitted).
310. ld. at 771.

•

•

•
•
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d. The Case qfthe Fired HUD Employee "Slumlord"
11

Wild v. United States Department qfHousing and Urban Developmenf
arose
.
on a set of unusual facts'; an employee who was disciplined and
ultimately fired by HUD for moonlighting
as
the
manager
of
his
wife's
.
slum properties. and letting the properties deteriorate so badly that it
312
became a focus of gang activity.
The legal basis asserted by HUD in
firing Mr. Wild was the HUD Code qf Conduct, which provided in
pertinent part, as quoted inJudge Posner's opinion for the court, that a

HUD employee

··

can never have a right of tenure that transcends [sic] the public good.
He can properly be a Government employe'e only as long as it
remains in. the public interest for him to be one. Public trust and ..
313
confidence in the integrity of the Government are paramount.
.

,,

Judge Posner's controversial and frank opinion for the Seventh Circuit
· upheld the legal basis ofHUD's discharge of its employee.

•

In the view ofjudge Patricia Wald, discussed earlier as part of tlle
synthesis of the Chicago Law Review Colloquium, the gist ofJudge
Posner's opinion for the court in Wild might be cynically interpreted. as
an exercise in ''personal gratification;' or an effort to attract attention in
14
"hopes of' promotion to higher judicial office.',~
Wald's realistic
insights about the internal wo,rkings of ap.p ellate courts are -also useful in
understanding Posner's acerbic opinion; one could not help concluding
that Posner was using, in part, caustic prose in order to debunk the views
315
or perceptions of a disfavored colleague or doctrinal foe, or otherwise
attempting to imitate the combative and sarcastic stylistic posture. of
316
·
jurists like U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Scalia.
In the Chicago Law Review Colloquium view ofProfessor Nussbaum,
however, the nub ofjudge Posner's opinion in Wild might be seen as an
opinion reflecting ''the literary judge/judicious spectator'' who is able
317
to "think like a novel reader."
Professor Leflar might label Pos.ner's
opinion in Wild as primarily concerned about the ironic and "practical .

•

•

.

~~

•

•

31 L 692 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1982).
312. Set id. at 113J .
313. /d. (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 0. 735-201 (a)).
314. Wald, RketorU:, supra note 15, at 1372.
315. Su supra note 36 and accompanying text. Compare the dissent.ng opinion ofjudge Decker in
the case at bar criticizing Posner for his characterization of the HUD employee as a "slumlord,'' without
substantial evidential support. See Wtld; 692 F.2d at 1134!1'35 (Decker, SJ., dissenting).
316. ·See supra notes 3,9-40 and accompanying text.
'31 7. Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1486, 1492.

•

•
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318

•

•

socio-economic effects"
of allowin.g a federal HUD employeecharged with helping to adequately house the poor · to continue in his
job after public revelations that he was a: "slumlord" of property that he
managed; on his own time, for the benefit of his wife. Professor Gibson
might even be inclined to applaud Posner's opinion in Wild as (orcefully
engaging in "the expression of life's complexities ·in mere man-made
319
words" verging on the eloque.nt.
·
What I have been referring to as the nub or essence of Posner's
opinion in Wild- (text that I find breathtakingly delightful with the
deployment of creative and vivid language, examples, metaphor and
precedent) is as follows:

•

•

•

.

.

But where an employee's off-duty behavior is blatll:ntly inconsistent
with the mission of the employer and is known or likely to become
known, most any employer, public or privat~, however broadminded,
would want to fire the employee and would be reasonable in wanting
to do so; and we find.no evidence that Congress intended to deny this
right to federal agencies. If an employee of a manufacturer bf safes
moonlighted as a safe cracker, his_days as an employee of that

'

manufacturer would be numbered, even if he scrupulously avoided
cracking safes manufactured by his employer. If an officer of a
musicians' union owned a nightclub that employed non-union
·musicians, because their wages were lower, .his days· as an employee
of the union would be numbered. A customs officer caught
smuggling, an immigration officer caught employing illegal aliens, an
IRS employee who files false income tax returns, a .H UD apprais~r
moonlig4ting as a "slumlord"--·,-these are merely the public
counterparts of a form of conflict of interest that is not less serious for
~ot being financial,
that
would
not
be
tolerated
in
the
private
sector,
.
and that we do not believe Con.gress meant to sanctify in the public
sector.
·
It may be replied that all Wild is asking is that the agency be forced
to prove a reduction of its efficiency due to an off-duty misconduct,
rather than bein.g allowed to infer it from the relation between the
misconduct and the agency's mission~ But proof of that relation is the
substan~ial evidence that the statute requires; to require more proof
would be unnecessary and unrealistic. Without judicial precedent,
without persuasive evidence of congressional intent, a~d in the face of
our own contrary precedent ... we will not force HUD to continue
employing a "slumlord" in a responsible position.until it can prove, by
the cumbersome methods of litigation, what ought to be

•

. .

•

318. Robert A. Leflart Soml Observations Concenling]udicial Opinion.r,-61 COLUM. L. REv. 810, 816
(1961 ). See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
.
319. WalkerGibson,LiteraryMindrand]udicialStJk, 36 N~Y~U. L. REV.915, 930(1961}. SeesujJra note
. 171 and accompanying text.

•
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•

obvious . that the credibility and effectiveness of the department are
undermined. by such ·discordance between public ·duty and private
320
conduct.

e. The Strange Case ofthe Longshoreman Who Fell to His Death in the
·Darkened Hold
•

'

•

Judge _Posner's opinion for the court in U.S. fidelity Guarantee Co. -v.
321
Plovidba, rounds out my favorite cases of Posnerian judicial opinion
style during the latter pa~t of his rookie season on the federal appellate
judiciary. The procedural co11text on appeal was one. of factual review:
whether the evidence supporte~ the jury's finding that t~e. ship<?wner
was not negligent and was therefore not liable for the death of a
longshoreman.who fell through an o·pen l1atch in a darkened hold where
. loading and unloading -actiVities were not being conducted at the time.
Posner's stylistic strengths in Plqv-idha include his concise and masterful
factual and legal analysis, coupled with his penetrating assess~ent and .
judgment of human motivation. First, Posner starts his opinion with a
simple schematic cross-section diagram· of the Yugoslavian ship . ---the
M/V Makarska where Patrick .H uck fell to his death inside a darkened ·
322
hold. This simple embellishment aids immeasurably to the clarity of
· his opinion. Second, in the course of on~ page of the Federal Reporter,
Judge Posner referring in his discussion to the cross-sectional diagram
of the ship described the r~levant .evidence that the jury heard below
about the circumstances surround~ng Huck's death. A subtle stylistic
·
sample of his fluid factual account is as follows:
Holds 2 through 5 are identical, so far as we can glean from the
record .... Each has three decks. From top to bottom they are the
weather deck, the upper 'tween deck, and the lower 'tween deGk.
Below the lower 'tween deck is the main cargo area of the hold. Each
deck contains a hatch roughly 30 feet across. When all three hatches
in a hold are open, cargo can be loaded into (or. unloaded from) the
main cargo area. Hatchways of the typical Jllaritime type (smaller
than regular doorways, and with high thresholds) connect the holds
323
laterally at each deck.
.

· A third stylistic virtue of Posner's Plovidha opinion is· the succinct,
scholarly, and balanced discussion of federal statuto-ry and ca~elaw
governing the ability oflongshoremen, injured while working on a ship,
•

•

320. 692 F.2d at 1133.
321. 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982).
322. See id. at 1023.
323. /d. at 1023-24.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•
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to recover damages from the ship owner under principles parallel to
324
traditional tort law.
.
Finally, analogizing the federal admiralty law dealing with injuries to
longshoremen to the famous Learned Hand formula in United States v.
325
Carroll Towing Co.,_ Posner undertook an insightful,_ astute ancl detailed
review of what the jucy below could have reaso~ed in reaching its
verdict in favor of th~ shipowner, A_selective portion of his elegant
analysis for the court strikes me as unusually allurin,g and is worthy of
· full quotation,. to wit:
•

The plaintiff also contends that even if the instructions were
satisfactory, the undisputed facts showed negligence by the shipowner
as a matter of law. We again use the Hand formula to frame this
issue. ·L , the loss if the accident occurred, was lt:trge. There was ~ 25
foot drop from the upper 'tween det;:k of hold number 1 to the bottom
of the hold, and a fall from that height was very likely to cause serious
injury or, as in this case, death. As to B, the burden of precautions,
there ·w ere vari<?us ways the shipowner could have prevented the
accident. He could have lit the hold, locked the hatchway leading t~
it from the weather deck ofhold number 2, roped off the open hatch,
or placed a sign at the hatchway (though the effectiveness of this last
· precaution may be doubted)~ Probably the cheapest way ofavoiding
the accident, however, would have been for the s~ip's crew not to
open the hatches until all the longshoremen had left .the ship. This
would have meant either the crew's working after norrnal working
hours, or, if the opening of the hatches. was postponed till the
following ·morning, delay in beginning stevedoring operations at the
next port of call. We doubt that either alternative would be very
costly so we judge B in this case to have been, at most, moderate, and
possibly small.
If P, the probability of an accident if the precautions that would
avert it were n~t taken, was high, then it would appear, in light of
our discussion of L and B, that the shipowner was negligent in
failing to take one of the precautions that we have mentioned.
But probably P was low.
There was no reason for a
longshoreman to reenter a hold after he had completed his work
there and moved on to another part of the ship. The plaintiff
speculates that Huck may have left a piece of clothing in hold
. number 1 and gone back to retrieve it. It does not seem very
likely that anyone would enter a pitch-black hold to retrieve a
gl<;>ve or a sock or. a jacket, when he could easily ask for light. It
is far more likely that Huck entered for an illicit purpose. This
•

324. Seeid.at 1024-27.
325. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Ci... 1947).
••

•

•

•

•

•
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would not defeat a recovery if the .shipowner were negligent;
neither assumption of risk nor contributory negligence is a defense
to liability in a negligence action under [the relevant federal
statute]. But Huck's motive in entering hold number 1 bears on
the probability of the accident and hence on the cost-justified
level of precautions_by the shipowner. Unless it is common for
longshoremen to try to pilfer from darkened holds and it was ·
the plaintifi's burden to show that it is the shipowner would
have no reason to think it so likely that a longshoreman would be
in a darkened hold ~s to require precautions against his falling
through an open hatch.
Moreover, the relevant probability, so far as the Hand formula is
concerned, is not the probability that a longshoreman would
· enter a darkened hold but the probability that he would fall into
an open hatch in such a hold. The probability was small. The
darkness was as. effective a w~rning of danger as a sign would
have been. Any longshoreman would know that ~here was a
hatch on the floor and he could not rationally assume that it was
closed. Only a reckless person wbuld walk about in the hold in
these circumstances, especially ifhe had no flashlight; Huck had
none. There are reckless people as there are dishonest people;
but the plaintiff did not try to prove that there are so ~any
reckless dishonest longshoremen as to require the precautions that
the defendant in this case would have had to take to avert injury
to them.
We do not know whether Huck was aware of the custom of
op.e ningthe hatches after the longshoremen left the hold, and for
the reasons just suggested. it is not critical whether he was or riot.
But probably he was. His body was found well forward of where
he would have fallen had he walked straight into the hold. ,No
doubt he was trying to skirt what he kne_w to be an open hatch.
The shipowner :was riot required to anticipate that a
longshoreman knowing of the open shaft would not be able to
avoid it; this was possible happened but the probability was
too remote t9 warrant precautions beyond the implicit warning
of darkness· itself.
Another factor bearing on the probability of an accident is that
Huck was under the general supervision of the stevedore
company, that employed him. Even if the defendant should have
regarded Huck as no better than a sheep wandering about the
ship with no rational concern for his ow.n safety, it was entitled to
regard the stevedore as his principal shepherd. The stevedore
had a work rule forbidding lon_gshoremen to be anywhere on the
ship except ·where stevedoring · operations were actually in
progress. The shipowner was entitled to rely on the stevedore to
enforce this rule, if not 100 percent at least enough to make it
.

.

•

•

•

•

·.

.

•

•

'

•

•

PLAYING ON WORDS

2000]

723

.

.

highly improbable, in light of the other circumstances that we
have discussed, that one of the longshoremen would stray away
326
from the rest and fall into a darkened hold.
·

•

•

•

2. Posner's Ugly Opinions
Of the nearly five dozen court opinions authored by Judge Posner
during the latter part of 1982, one opinion strikes me, from a holistic
327
perspective, as substantially stylistically ugly.
•

a. ''Professor" Pomer Goes Bonkers

In probably the most unusual stylistic court opinion written during his
entire 1981-82 rookie season on the Seventh Circuit, Posner seemingly
forgot that his daytime job .h ad shifted from being a law professor to

•

•

•

•

·being a federal appellate
judge.
By
way
of.
a
n
overarching
preliminary
.
comment, the medical antitrust case against a priv~te medical
328
association, Marrese v. American Academy ofOrthopaedic Surgeons, came to
be decided by an unusual panel of three Seventh Ci~cuitJudges in an
odd way. The panel of three includedjudge Posner the,author of the
court opinion Circuit judge Pelland retired Supreme Court justice
329
Potter Stewart.
Posner was a fill-in for circuit judge Sprecher, who
· "was originally the- third member of the panel; but [whose] untimely
330
death prevented his participation in_ the decision of this case.''
The
ev~r intrepid ':Judge Posner took his place and~ .. read the briefs and
pertinent portions of the record -a nd ... listened to the tape recording
331
of the oral argument, in the case .
The remarkable opinion of the panel, writte,n by Judge Posner,
consumes over ten pages in the Federal Reporter-an unusually long
332
Posnerian opinion, over twice his average opinion length.
While it
exhibits Posner's trademark intellectual dexterity and brilliance on a
•

•

•
•

326. 683 F.2d at 1027·28 (citations.oinitted).
·
327. See supra note 263 (where I briefly describe certain rather minor unattractive features ofPosner's
court opinions during this timeframe).

328. ·692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982).
329. See id. at 1086.
330. See id. at 1086, n* (the footnote was inserted prior to the court•s opinion to signify the change
of panel members and was not denoted by a number).
331. /d.
332~

See DOMNARSKI~ supra note 14, at 143-44. In a random sample of Posner ~pinions over
approximately the first ~ecade of his tenure as a federal appellate judge Domnarski concluded that"[e]ach
Posner opinion averaged 4.14 pages [and] is app.roximately three thousand one hundred words long." !d.
at 144.
•

•

•

•

•
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wide assortment of topics, it .is aesthetically disagreeable for three
principal reasons. First,Judge Posner, like a precocious, but obnoxious,
child showing off for his parents' friends at a cocktail party in his home,
is oblivious to what, aesthetically, might be called a sense ofoccasion and,
legally, is referred to as the procedural context of the case. As
persuasively expressed in this regard by Justice Stewart in his dissent:
0

0

In this case our mission is no more than to review a criminal contempt
citation [made by the court on the defendant medical associationJfor
refusing to comply with a discovery order [by the district court judge,
under a protective order, to produce ten years' worth· of
correspondence and other documents relating to plaintiffs; application
for membership in the association and other membership denials].
Nonetheless, the majority opinion wrestles with difficult questions
concerning, first, the doctrine of res judicata, and, second, the
application of the Sherman Act to a denial of a membership in a
333
professional organization.
0

Second, Posner's opinion violates, without good reason, the cardinal
jurisdictional convention and collegial rule ofjudicial etiquette, that appellate courts should not pontificate on abstract .questions of law based·
on speculation of what the relevant facts of a case might, or might not,
he- In stylistic terms we might say that written appellate opinions should
334
avoid engaging in too much "gossiping" .
Again, Justice Stewart's ·
dissent in th.e case aptly expresses this criticism of Posner's opinion:

•

..

•

It forges new ground, despite the absence of a factual record in this
case and despite the existence of contrary precedent in other Circuits.
Because I believe that neither of these questions is ·properly presented
for review by this Court, that the substance of the discussion
concerning the doctrine of res judicata is extremely dubious, and that
335
the contempt citation was proper, I respectfully dissent. ·
0

0

'

336

and related to the first criticism
while Posner's opinion
in Marrese, reversing the contempt citation against the medical
association for refusal to conduct ordered discovery is ·scholarly, and
exhibits certain literary flourishes, such as his references to Aristotle and
Finally

'

•

•

333. Marrese,, 692 F2d at 1096 (Stewart,J., dissenting).
334. The definition of "gossip" is "rumor or report of an intimate nature;'' ''a chatty talk.,
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 504 {Merriam·Webster, Inc. ed., I Oth ed. 1998).
'
335. 692 F.2d at 1096 (Ste\vart,J., dissenting).
,
336. See suprtl note 332 and accompanying text.
•

•

•
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338

de Tocqueville and to Don Quixote, on balance, his gingerbread
embellishments are stylistically out of place and, therefore, like "pigs_ in

•

a parlor."
•

•

•

D. Free Agent: Posner)s Dissenting, Concurring and Chamber Opinions .. .
Judge Posner also wrote a handful of other opinions during his 1981339
~2 rookie season: · one ''in chambers" opinion,
two concurring
340
341
opinions, and six dissenting opinions. · Brief stylistic comments are
in order for each of these three types of separate opinions.
•

1. In Chambers
Taking the opportunity to create precedent and correct what he
viewed as past judicial "laxity" and lawyerly frivolity in filing motions
for extensions of time for the filing of appellate briefs, P-osner wrote a
one page opinion in Conne~ticut General Lift Insurance Co. v~ Chicago Tttle &
342
Trust Co. on the topic. Denying the motions in ~e case,Judge Posner
was chiefly concerned about the integrity of the Seventh Circuit Rules
343
· and the waste of judicial resources.
Yet, he chose to drive th~se
judicial policy considerations home by quoting from Shakespeare's
classic play on law and justic~, Measure for Measure:
"'[O]ur
decrees,/Dead to infliction; to themselves ~re dead,/And liberty plucks
344
justice· by the nose. '"

•

•

•

337. See 692 F. 2.d at 1089 (" [o] ne does not have to raise the ghosts of Aa·istotle and de T oq ueville to
be reminded that voluntat-y associations are important to many people, Americans in particular, and that

•
•

voluntary professional associations are impol:tant.to American
professionals").
.
338.. ld. (quoting an epigram from a disttict court opinion, "[ijederal courts do noLstage academic
tournaments merely for Dpn Quixotes to practice knightho.od") (internal quotation marks omitted).
339. Ste Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Chicago Title & Trus,t Co., 690 F.2d 115 (7th Cit-. 1982).
340. See United States v. Franzen, 676 F.2d 261,267 (7th Cir. 1982); Treckerv. Scag, 679 F.2d 703,
7 I 0 (7th Cir. 1982).
341. See United States. v. Bd. ofSch. Comm'l's, 677 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Anton, 683 F.2d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir. 1982); Sur v. Glidden-Durkee, Div. ofS.C.M-. Corp., 681 F.2d
490, 499 (7th Cir. 1982); Brotherhood ofR..R. Signahnen v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 688 F.2d 535,
545 (7th Cir. 1982); Allison v., Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 1982).
342. See 690 F.2d at 115.. 16.
343. See id. at 116 .
344. ld. (quoting WIU..IAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, act I, sc. iii).
,•

•

•

•
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2. Concurring Opinions ~

•

.•
•

.~.In a habeus corpus petitio,-t appeal,

United States v. F~anzen,

346

Judge
P~sner filed an uriusual concurring opinion,joining in th.e reversal of the
d,istrict court's dismissal ~f a state prisoner's petition for habeas
347
~qrpus.
According to Posner, he went t<? the trouble to. write his
•

c~ncurrence

·' 'in the hope that Congress will consider ref~rms in the
348
1\abe:as corpus. statute. "
As a matter of style, federa~ judges rarely
write such gratuitous law and policy opinions. Ot:t one level, Posner
could be criticized for, agai.n, trying too hard to look smart and trying
to impress his peers. Query, whether he also had in mind the notion of
trying to impress President Reagan to consider appointing P·o sner to the
349
next available vacancy ·.on the High· Court.
On another level,
however, Posner's style in broaching a legal-policy subject th-a t he, in
good faith, might have thought .Congress (er a Committee
or ·
.
Subcommittee of Congress) might be interested in addtessing .was
judicious, scholarly and frank. Indeed, he posited legitimate reasons
why Congress might be interested in reforming federal habeas corpus
procedure including ''principles both of federalism and of rational
criminal procedure," "th·e responsibility and morale ofstate judges,'' the
"reasonable finality to criminal proceedings ·and . · ... the legitimacy of
the criminal-justice system," imposition "on the time of our busy district
judges," arousal of"false hopes in state prisoners" and the "accuracy of
350
constitutional determinations. " . Moreover,Judge Posner's concurring
opinion provided an insightful and concise historical analysis of habeas
351
corpus proceedings in the Nation.
.
In the other concurring opinion written byJudge Posner during 198182,35~ he agair:t filed his.concurrence to plead normative policy matters
to Congress this time of federal ·securities law and tG, no doubt~
attempt to impress conservative allies ~o push his appointment for a seat
353
on the Supreme Court.
Posner, inappropriately and imprudently in
· my judgment, impljcidy takes the Supreme Court to task for its past
'

.

345. In comparison with the general discussion ofjudicial opinion style focusing on opinions written
for a majority of an appellate court; thet·e is a body of scpaa-:-ale; and generally o'der; literature on
concuaTing and dissenting judicial opinion style. See, for example, the materials collected in APPELLATE
jUDICIAL OPINIONS, suJnt• note 168, at 203·14.
.
~

· 346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
'

•

676 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).
See it/. at 267.
/d.

·see general[, suprtz note 26 and accompanying text.
676 F.2d at 268.
See id.
352. See Treckcr v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1982).
'

'

CJ supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text...
'

353.
•

•

.

•
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354

jurisprudence in t)lis area and even has the gall to injttdiciously
355
comm~nt on a pending grant of certiorari in the High Court.
Moreover, on the subject of what he sarcastically refers to earlier in his ·
.o pinion as ''the unintended federalization of corporation law by Rule
356
lO(b)-5," he takes the low road of pure judicial subjectivity ana
pandering by quibbling with what he thought,"Congress intended 'fo
357
happen w.hen it enacted section 1O(b) in 1934,"
because of his
subjective view that the case Qefore· the Seventh Circuit panel was··'a
mere "garden-variety squabble among shareholders irt a closely held
corporation, whic.h could not even be maintained as a diversity action
358
because of the lack of complete·diversity among the parties. "
•

•

•

. I

•

•

. 3. Dissenting Opinions ·

What about] udge ~osner's dissenting opinion style? In examining
some points of Posner's dissenting opinions during 1981-82, it is
illuminating to start with the truism of former Justice Harry A.
Blackmun that "[i]t is much easie·r to write a biting dissent than a
360
constructive majority opinion. "
While a complete analysis of the
judicial opinion style, both comparative and normative, of Judge
Posner's dissenting opinions is a subject worthy of a separate law review
article, the following stylistic comments, addressed to the most striking
features of his six dissenting opinions during 1981-82, indubitably
belong in this article.
· .
.
First, in his first-ever dissenting opinion as a judge, in the Indianapolis
361
school desegregation case of United States v. J!oard qf School Comm'rs,
Posner exhibited what might ·b e called an outwardly respectful tone to
his colleagues in the majority, with a subtle slam of outrage at his
brethren's lack of economic and practical common sense. Thus, while
Judge Posner begins his dissent using language ofob~isance " [w] ith all
due regard for the forcefully articulated contrary view of my
362
brethren"
the essence of his contrarian opini9n uses· words that
cot1vey ridicule of the majority "[t]hese are fascinating questions for
economists, [dealing with where a defendant will "get the money'' to
359

•

I

354. See 619 F.2d at 710-11.
355. See id. at 711 (referring to Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, ·I 02. S. Ct. 1766 (1982)).
356. /d.
35 7. !d. at 712.
358. ltl. at 711.
'
359. See supra note 345.
·
360. APPElLATEjUDICIAL OPINIONS, suprlz note 168; at 203 (quoting unacknowledged source).
361. 677 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1982).
362. !d. at 1190.
•

•

•

•

•
•
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pay for its legal liability] but too difficult and tangential to engage the
363
attention of courts." Yet, at least at the end of his dissenting opinion,
Judge Posner offers up a succinct, helpful and non-pejorative alternative
remedial approach that has the virtue of acting as a beacon for future
federal judges who might be called upon to fashion equitable relief in
school desegrega.t ion cas~s. Posner wrote:
[R]ather than get into the tangled and recriminatory business of who
shall pay for this court-ordered busing, we should say: "1.,his litigation
ended, at long last, when the district court's busing order was u.pheld
by this court and certiorari was denied. Let the State of Indiana
Worry about who shall bear the costs of complying with the order. It
is not a matter for the federal courts unless the state should devise a
method of financing that discriminates against the black people who
are .the intended beneficiaries of the order. Other than in a purely
364
technical sense there is no federal question before us today.'' .
•

Judge Posner's second dissenting opinion, in the case of United States
365
v. Anton, was in an immigration case involving the interpretation ~fa
federal statute that made it a crime for a once-deported alien to re-enter
the United ·States "unless . . . the Attorney General has expressly
366
consented to such alien's reapplying for ·admission."
Posner's
dissentingjudicial opinion style in this case was uniformly respectful and
measured. Moreover, during the entire course of his dissent, Posner
elegantly and persuasively deployed traditional techniques of ~tatutory
367
construction, such.as textual analysis ofthe language ofthe'legislation,
368
examination of the possible purposes of Congress in passing the.law,

•

•

•

•

•

363. Id. at 1192. Other language of ridicule could be found in Posner's dissent: " [a] II this is a vast
oversimplification," and "I am thus willing to indulge the heroic assumption .... " ld.
364. ld. at 1194.
•
365. 683 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1982).
366. ld. at 1012 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)(A) (1994)).
367. Seeidat 1019.
368. See id. at 1019-20. Posner's use of the analogy of statutory t·ape to probe the possible purposes
of Congress in passing the Alien Re-entry Felony Statute is striking. As reasoned by Posner:
A statute that does not allow a defense of reasonable mistake as to the girPs age will deter
some men from having intercourse with young-looking girls who in fact are over the age of
consent. Socially permitted activity is thereby deterred; but.since ~here is no strongly felt
social interest in encouraging the activity, overdeterrence
is seen as a small price to pay for
.
having a statute that is easier to enforce than it would be if a defense inevitably rather
porous of reasonable mistake were allowed. Similarly, Co'ngress would not I think have
thought it a high price to pay for a strict prohibition against the illegal return of previously
deported aliens that some deported aliens who would have gotten the Attorney General's
.
express consent to reenter this country if they had applied for it would be discouraged from
applying because of the consequences of making mistake.
/d. at 1020.

a

•

•

•

•
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•
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the "historical evolution" and legislative history of the deportation
369
· statute,
policy considerations underlying various plausible..
370
interpretations,
and the force of the precedent of other courts'·.
371
interpretation· of the specific statutory issue at bar.
•
Despite his implicit disclaimer to his third dissenting opinion in Sur v;.
372
Glidden-Durkee, Division of S. C.M Corp., that he did not want to "cry
wolf' or "utter prophecies of doom that become self-fulfilling by
drawing attention to and then exaggerating the scope of the majority
373
opinion, " that is precisely what]udge Posner did in his overdy vitriolic ·
dissent. Given Posner's demonstrated sense of proportionality in being
mindful .of assessing the costs and benefits of pursuing a partic~lar
course of conduct in a specific context coupled with his usual refined
sensitivity to the equities of human foibles, it is remarkable that he
bothered to go to the trouble of ~riting such a vigorous dissent, which
objected to the majority's reversal of a summary judgement against the
father of a c~ild who was born with·severe and cosdy birth defects. The
father's previous employer's insurance policy would have substantially
covered the medical expenses of the father's child. The legal issue at bar
was one of Indiana law in a diversity case. Here, employers and
medical benefit insurers were in a better position than the departing
employe;r to avoid the costs ofmisunderstanding health insurance policy
provisions and conversion options.
.
·
In Judge Posner's fourth dissenting opinion, Brotherhoo4 of Railroad
314
Signalmen v. J;.ouisville & Nashville Rail-Road, his concern for the proper
allocation of legal responsibilities between federal courts and federal
375
·
administrative boards under the Railroad Labor Act was well-taken;
howeve~, the .w ay that he presented his thoughts ·that the court of
appeals should "direct the district court to remand this case to the board
for further interpretation provided, ofCO\}rse, that the district court has
376
· the power to remand'.'
is confusing, rambling, unstructured and
377
ultimately unhelpful.
·
.
318
Judge Posner's fifth dissenting opinion in McKeever v. Israel
a
prisoner's civil rights appeal under42 U.S.C. § 1983 comes offas shrill
I

•

•

•

•

•

•

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
.
376.
377 .

!d. at I 020-21 .
See id. at 1021.
See id. at 1021-22.

•

•

681 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1982):
!d. at 501.
688 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1982).
See id. at 545 (discussing tl:le Federal Railroad Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §153 First (m)) .
Id. at 547.
·
See id.
378. 689 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1982).

•

•

•

,
•

•

•

•
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379

and unmeasured.
His harmless -error objection to the majority's
reversal of a judgm~nt on the merits in favor of the Wisconsin prison
officials, and remand of the ~ase back to the district court for
3 80
appointment of counsel, is rational and appropriate. . McKeever's
· claim of constituti9nal infringement by his jailers, in regulating the
amount of personal mail that he could take with him when he left the
confines of the prison for various co·u rt hearings, seems to have been
dubious. . Further, the. panel majority's rema~d order requiring
appointed counsel to brief and argue issues that had been resolved
against the prisoner at trial appeared. to have imposed unreasonable ·
381
costs on the state officials· as well as the practicing bar.
But, judge
Posner's rhetoric and use ofinflammatory broadsides was bad form, and
82
:a n exercise in overkill and judicial whinin~ in a type of dissent that
could be viewed by. outside observers as a type of political pandering to
·consetvative movers and shakers in a position to suggest the elevation of
383
Judge Posner to the Supreme Court.
·
Before we leave the ~atter of the style of the dissenting opinions of
Judge Posner during 1981·82, his dissent from denial of rehearing en
384
bane in Allison v. Liher9' Savings should be briefly mentioned.
Posner
was not a member of the panel that decided Allison. Yet, he chose to
make the unusual gesture of writing a substanti.al opinion disagreeing
385
with the vote of the entire Seventh Circ~it to deny rehearing en banc.
First, Point one: Judge Posner acknowledged that the panel opinion,
which interpreted the federal Real Estate Setdement Procedures Act
(RESPA) as precluding a private cause of action by .a borrower against
a lender claiming excessive escrow dep.osit requirements wa.s "lucid and
386
well reasoned".and "reacqe[d) an attractive result," he observed that
he "disagree'[d) with the decision, and believe[d] that the case should be
387
reheard en banc," because "the panel's opinion both sets forth an

..

•

•

'

.

.

.

.379. Ste id. at 1323-25.
·sao. Su id. at 1324.
381. See id. at 1324-25.
382. See; e.g., id. at 1323 ("However dubious ••. it might seem ..• to allow lawfully imprisoned
convicts·to spend their time bringing damage suits against their jailers, so that instead of reflecting on the
wrongs they have done to society our convicts ... prosecute an endless series of mostly imaginary
grievances against society, this ... is too well established for me to question.',); id. at 1324 ("This seems
rather a routine prisoner's rights case: a scatter shot of implausible charges."); and id. at 1325 ("Perhaps
this apocalypse is ah·eady. upon us. Our ·criminal pt'Oseclltions are becoming-to use an ugly but apt

word

multiphasic.,).
383. CJ supra note 26 and accompanying text.

•

384.
385.
386.
387.

•

695 F.2d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 1982).

See id.
/d.
/d.

•

•

•

•

•
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approach potentially of general application to deciding when federal
statutes may be enforced by private damage actions and creates a
388
conflict with another circuit.''
Second, while Judge Po~ner's motive
may have been to get the Supreme Court interested in ultimately
rethinking its private cause of action by statutory implication
jurisprudence, his style· of doing so was attractive. This is so because
Posner makes insightful and plausible arguments of statutory
construction in the course.ofhis opinion, while.examining) in a scholarly
fashion, matters of statutory remedies t0 carry out the full· p'urposes of
.

Congress.

.

389

· V. CONCLUSION
Appellate judicial opinion style can be conceptualized as a subject
that addresses different kinds or manners or ways of writing the
rationales for court judgments and orders. Two major epistemological
subdivisions exist:
( 1) de.scriptive judicial opinion style
studies concerned with canvassing. and assessin.g types of judicial
opinions (for example, long or short; scholarly or barebones; policydriven or precedent-based; literary or non-literary; beautiful orugly); (2)
normative judicial opinion style studies (concerned with articulating the
ideal w.a y or ways.that appellate judges should writ~ their opinions given
such jurisprudential concerns as separation of powers, the role of the
judiciary, the putpose ofjudge-made law, the value ofjudge-interpreted
law, and the general accessibility ofjudicial opinions in a free society.
· Relatively little systematic thought has been ·given to date on the
subje.ct of appellate judicial opinion style. The 1995 Chicago Law
390
Review Colloquium
is . the most prominent recent scholarly
391
The Chicago Law Review Colloquium
effiorescence on th~ subject.
brought together the most prominent scholars in the field of literary
studies of judicial opinions Professors Nussbaum, Schauer and
White and two of the Nation's most thoughtful and respected federal
appellate opinion stylists Circuit Judges Posner .a nd Wald.. In -a n
assortment ofincisive and engaging articles the Colloquium participants
contribute.d to furthering both descriptiye judicial opinion style studies
as well as normative judicial opinion style studies. Only a few authors,
.

.

•

'

•

388. !d.
389. See id. at 1092.
390. See supra notes 26-113 and accompanying text.
391. For a sampling of the literature on appellate judicial opinion stylc.antcdating the 1995 Chicago
Law Review Colloquium, see supra notes .155-171 and accompanying text.
'

•

•
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however, have bothered to systematically study the judicial opinion
392
.styles of specific ·a ppellate jurists.
.
Judge, professor, prolific author, popular speaker ·and, now,
settlement ''Czar" of the Microsoft antitrust case, Richard' A. Posn~r is
a worthy subject of study as .a theorist and practitioner of appellate
judicial opinion style for four reasons. First, he is probably the most
3 3
famous and influential non-Supreme Court jurist in the United States. ~
Second, given his vast, diversified and interesting scholarly input and his ·
background, he is unquestionably one of the brightest persons currently
sitting on any appellate court in the world. Third, unlike the vast
majority of appellate judges in the United States, Posner actually writes
394
his own opinions . . He uses his law_ clerks solely for research.
Finally,
Posner is an omnivorous reader who is inclined to reflect his reading in
39
his opinions. ? . .
.

•

•

•

•

392. For a discussion of the insights contained in one of the best books on the subject of appellate
judicial opinion style, which examines a variety of styles of different jurists, see supra notes 114 to 154 and
•
notes 172 to 186 and accompanying text. See lllso RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN
REPUTATI<?N (1990) (a pioneering study in both judicial reputation and the literary dimensions ofjudicial
writing, collecting and discussing some of the prominent literature on both subjects).
393. See general!J DOMNARSKI,-supra note 14, at 145.
·
394. As pointed out by William Domnarski:
Uudge Posner] is one of only three or four federal judges who writes every word of every
opinion. And while we know thatjudges and justices in the past, such as Holmes and Hand,
wrote their own opinions, no other judge has written his opinions in Posner's fashion,
although one wonders what Holmes, with his promptness and speed, would have done if
word processing technology had been available to him.
At oral argument Posner asks pointed questions designed to isolate the key issues and
occasionally makes notes to be used later. The panel votes on the cases and then opinions
are assigned by the presiding judge. Sitting on a panel of three, hearing six appeals during
a day of oral argument, Posner is assigned to write tWo opinions for the panel, as are the
other two judges sitting that day. His practice,. as astonishing as it sounds, is to write
complete drafts for both opinions that evening. That he also writes more opinions per year
than any federal judge in the country by a sizeable margin makes his writing ability even
more astonishing. He writes not in longhand but on a ... computer. He has three of
these?onc for his oflice, one for his home in Hyde Park, and one for his vacation house.
Going through the first draft, he indicates where more research has to be done, although he
is .able to provide most of the research and citations from cases he has already written and
.
which are readily available. Sometimes a first draft will go to the printer virtually
unchanged. When more work is calle~ for, he directs his law clerks to research points oflaw
to provid~ authority for various propositions. They assemble the research on a library cart
for his conveni~nce. The clerks also are encouraged to make comments and suggestions on
the draft. He uses two law clerks, although most circuit court judges use three. With the
additional research he or his law clerks have done, Posner then revises the opinion on his
computer until he has what he wants. He writes every word of his opinions and has read
all of the authorities cited in them.
ld. at 122-23.
395. Set general!J id. at 147.
He has eclectic reading taste and is as likely to move through all ofjoyce as he is to read spy
novels byJohn Le Carre or books ofRussian history. He rereads much of Shakespeare each
•

•

•

•

. .

•

•

•

•

•
•

•
•
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With the exception of William Domnarski's excellent book, In the
Opinion of the Court, which devotes a long chapter to Judge Posner's
396
opinion style, there is little extant scholarly discussion of Posner's
judicial opinion style. This article is an attempt to start the scholarly
process of providing more thought and attention to following up
Domnarski's seminal work. I have examined what I have referred to as
Posner's "rookie season" as a federal appellate j~dge a little over one
ful~ year ftom the time that he assumed his office in late 1981 through .
the end of 1982.
Research of Judge Posner's rookie season lead me to several
conclusions. First, Posner burst onto the scene.as a newly minted federal
·appellate judge with an extraordinary amount ofintellectual energy that
he has continued to ~xhibit for nearly two decades. Second, Posner
writes his opinions in what he has himself labeled an "impure style":
''explaining to a hypqthetical audience of laypersons why the case is
39
being decided the way that it is." ~ Posner eschews what he calls the
prevailing style of appellate judicial opinion writing-the "pure" style
that is "solemn, highly polished and artificial far removed from the
tone of conversation impersonal ... and predictable in the sense of
conforming closely to professional expectations about the structure and
398
style of a judicial opinion. " Third, from the very start of his service as
a federal appellate judge, Posner wrote several "beautifuP' opinions
during 1981-82 for his panel of the Seventh Circuit, which opinions
exhibited such positive stylistic qualities as context awareness of legal
issues of first impression, penetrating policy-based analysis,
extraordinary narrative skill, intense doctrinal scrutiny, illuminating
economic insights, and miscellaneous stylistic virtues (by way of
illustration use·of analogy, use of epigrams, use of creative and helpful
399
hypotheticals, use of simile, deployment of vivid and colorful slang).
Fourth, during his rookie season on the bench,Judge Posner's opinion
style also reflected occasional and isolated "ugly" opinions, or portions
thereof, which exhibited such negative stylistic qualities as overly-harsh
criticism oflower court judges, argu~bly free-wheeling, speculative and
untethered law and economics· analyses, apparent egotism, pos~ible
presumptuous questioning ofsettled legal doctrine, sloppy and imp.recise
·use oflanguage, over-intellectualization, intellectual grandstanding, and

•

•

•
•

•

.
•

•

•

year and reads 'Th£ American Sclwlar, Commentary, The 1imes literary Supplement, the New York
Reuinv ofBooks, 1k Economi.rt, Rarilan, 1k Public Interest, and the New Republic regularly.
/d.
•

396.
397.
398.
399.

•

See id. at 116-55 (Chapter 6 of his book called ''Closing the Circle").
Posner, supra note 16, at 1430; ste supra note 58 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1429-30. See Jupra note 57 and accompanying text.
Sees:tpm notes 180-254,261-62,268-326 and accompanying text.
•

•

•

•
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short-shrift treatment of the facts of the case. ° Fifth, given the few
instances of Judge Posner's in-chambers, concurring an.d dissenting
opinions during his rookie season, his judicial opinion styl«; ·is generally
more uneven than his· oveiWhelmingly .a ttractive styl¢ 1 ·of writing
majority opinions for the court during this same timeframe. In this
regard, Posner's two concurring opinions during 1981-82 although not
without stylistic virtues largely exhibit unattractive styli~tic attributes
includin.g gratuitous discussions of law and policy; inappropriate
criticism of the Supreme Court, imprudent commentary on a pending
401
certiorari petitio.n, political pandering, and intellectual exibitionalism. .
Sixth, the handful ofdissenting opinions written byJudge Posner during
1981-82 show a mix ofrelatively attractive stylistic qualities · such as an
exposition ofa non-pejorative alternative remedial appro-a ch to deciding
the case, and astute contrarian probing of the purposes, history and·
language of the federal statute at issue with relatively unattrac.tive
stylistics, such as overdy vitriolic rhetoric, failure to exercise a sense of
proportionality and equitable sensitivity, confusing, rambling, and
unstructured digressions on the role of federal courts vis-a-vis federal .
administrative boards, argumentative overkill and whining, and political
402
pandering).
•
In closing, I wish to emphasize that appellate judicial opinion style
matters. It matters because, from a practical standpoint, good
substantive legal reasoning is inextri.cably intertwined with attractive
style. It matters from a purely aesthetic perspective, because published
appellate judicial opinions are a separate genre ofliterature and desetve
to be crafted in ways that create beauty. In
this
regard,
while
legal
.·
philosophers have given some attention to aesthetic theory and the law
through isolated discussions the literary "poetics" of judicial
403
opinions like those discussed at the outset of this article
and
glancing treatment of aesthetics theory and the law through delineation
404
of matters of ''coherence" and the law; much· more remains to be
done. Lawyers, judges, scholars a.n d citizens need richer, more
40

•

.

•
•

•

•

.

.

400.. Se~ supr(l notes 255-260, 263, 327-338 and accompanying text.
40 I. See suprfl notes 345-58 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 359-89 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 82,·113 and accompanying text.
404. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Coherence in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
533 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
•
An idea or theory is coherent ifit hangs or fits together, ifits parts are mutually supportive,
ifit is intelligible, ifit flows from or expresses a single, unified viewpoint. An idea or theory
is incoherent if it is unintelligible, inconsistent, ad hoc, fragmented, disjointed, or contains
thoughts that are unrelated to and do not support one another.
Id.
•

•
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.

particularistic, more nuanced, more comparative, more historically
situated assessments of the nature ·a nd practice of appellate judicial
opinion· style.~ .I offer this article as a modest start along that path ~th
.. regard to one·very prominent and respected appellate judge.
Judge Richard A. Posner's appellate judicial opinion style during his
rookie season on the feder~ appellate bench, by and large, is uniquely
beautiful, with isolated pockets of ugliness. At their core, Posner's
judicial_opinions· exhibit what might be called an essayistic sryle--a style
generally des.c ribed by Edw_ard Hoagland as "caroming thoughts not
merely in order to convey ·a certain packet of information, but with a
special edge or bounce of personal character in a kind of public .
405
letter. "
·
One might call Posner's ·" special edge" in his first batch ofjudicial
opinions as possessing an intangible, "sexy style," a way of legal
reasoning that "'cal) be serendipitous or domestic, satire or testimony,
tongue-in-cheek or a wail of grief' that is, at its essence,
•

[m] ulched perhaps in its own contradictions, it promises no su~e ·
objectivity, just the condiment of opinion on a base of observation,
and sometimes such leaps of illogic or superlogic that they may work
a bit like magic realism in a novel: namely, to stimulate the mind's
406
own processes in a murky and incongruous world.
.
.

Posner's legal reasoning exhibits, in the words of Professor Robert S.
Summers ''the capacity to understand complex and subtle issues and the
407
capacity to bring reason to bear in articulate balanced ways."
.

•

•

•·
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405. ·Edward Hoagland; Wrilus AjooL· Essl!Jists as !rifantry, 68 AM. SCHOlAR, Summer 1999, at 103.
406. ld.
407. RobertS. s·ummers, lAw tis More 17zan a Livelihood, 26 CORNELL L. FORUM 13 (1999).,
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